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Mental Capacity to Transact 
Bin (Ben) Chen 
Elder financial abuse is an alarming problem in this era of aging population. Baby 
boomers are entering retirement with a higher life expectancy and more wealth than 
any generation before them. The combination of mental decline and substantial wealth 
renders many seniors vulnerable to overreach. Empirical studies suggest that financial 
abuse against seniors is hard to detect and likely prevalent. 
In private suits alleging elder financial abuse, courts often apply the mental 
capacity doctrine to avoid seemingly exploitative contracts, gifts and many other 
lifetime transactions. The formal rationales for avoidance are that the elderly party to 
the impugned transaction lacked mental capacity, and that the transaction was 
inequitable. Moreover, guardians and attorneys who manage property for the elderly 
may have perverse incentives to exploit their position. Presuming the worst from the 
property manager, courts and legislatures typically impose onerous fiduciary duties to 
minimize conflicts of interest and deter misconduct. Orthodox fiduciary law explicitly 
aims to overdeter. 
This Dissertation first argues that the mental capacity doctrine in prevailing 
American law is ill-suited for the era of aging population. In theory, the doctrine grants 
 
 
a mentally-incapable individual a power to choose whether to avoid her transactions. 
In reality, that power is usually exercised by a claimant who expects to inherit from 
the incapable individual. Prevailing doctrinal theories overlook the possibility that the 
claimant may seek to avoid a transaction to increase her expected inheritance rather 
than to advance the interests of the incapable individual. The mental capacity doctrine 
thus poses a heighted risk of avoiding transactions that actually benefited potentially 
incapable seniors and reflected their testamentary intent. This harms the welfare of 
many seniors by unduly limiting their ability to benefit their close relatives and friends, 
reward informal caregiving, and recruit their preferred caregivers. 
The mental capacity doctrine can nonetheless be reformulated to offer appropriate 
protection against elder financial abuse without undue intrusion into close families and 
personal relationships. In particular, when applied to transactions involving close 
relatives and friends, the doctrine should be narrow, determinate, and respectful of 
individual will and preferences. 
This Dissertation further argues that orthodox fiduciary law is too strict on most 
guardians and agents who manage property for the elderly. The problem is that mental 
or physical decline is common among seniors, but a lack of mental capacity typically 
stultifies the power to authorize a fiduciary to depart from adherence to strict fiduciary 
duty. By contrast, mentally-capable individuals are free to discharge those aspects of 
fiduciary law that they find intrusive and undesirable. In other words, while fiduciary 
 
 
law is mostly a default law when applied to capable individuals, it is a mandatory law 
when applied to elderly incapable individuals. Harming the welfare of many seniors, 
mandatory application of fiduciary law tends to stultify the pursuit of valuable other-
regarding preferences in close families and personal relationships. Such strict and 
inflexible application further disregards the presence of intrinsic bonds and informal 
norms. 
To remedy these shortcomings, this Dissertation proposes a substituted-judgment 
defense to permit those departures from strict fiduciary law that the incapable 
individual would have authorized if she was mentally-capable. This defense should be 
made available to close relatives and friends but not to profit-driven professionals. To 
deter and sanction elder financial abuse by professional guardians and agents, this 
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INTRODUCTION 
Population aging is old news. As baby boomers enter retirement with a 
higher life expectancy and more wealth than any generation before them, 
courts and legislatures are increasingly pressed to resolve disputes over the 
properties of the elderly. Empirical research suggests that elder financial 
exploitation is hard to detect and likely prevalent. While human rights-
oriented scholars and law reformers have devoted much effort to tackle the 
problem of elder financial abuse, to my best knowledge, economics-oriented 
scholars have not paid much attention. This Dissertation offers a law-and-
economics perspective on the problem of elder financial abuse. 
More precisely, I explore the concept of mental capacity and its 
implications for financial dealings in the era of aging population. Mental 
capacity is the threshold concept of mental ability to incur legal responsibility 
for one’s own acts.1 A lack of mental capacity to transact, for instance, can 
lead to avoidance of contracts, gifts, and many other lifetime transactions.2 
                                                 
1 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 181–84 (4th ed., 2007); SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE 
MODERN MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1–2 
(2016). 








Focusing on prevailing American law and offering lessons for Anglo-
Australian law, the first chapter of my Dissertation examines the transactional 
capacity doctrine.3 Moreover, a lack of mental capacity to manage one’s 
property is a legal basis for appointing a surrogate property manager. 
Covering prevailing American law and Anglo-Australian law, the remaining 
chapters of my Dissertation study and critique the fiduciary regulation of 
guardians and agents who manage property for the elderly.4 
Although elder financial abuse is a global phenomenon, this thesis 
focuses on American law and Anglo-Australian law due to their common 
historical origin and their divergent developments since the mid-twentieth 
century. While the relevant fiduciary and transactional doctrines remain 
formalist and inflexible in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, the Realist 
revolution in the United States has rendered these doctrines more transparent 
and flexible, but also less determinate. An economic analysis of American 
doctrine and theory can offer valuable lessons for Anglo-Australian scholars, 
courts and law reformers, and vice versa. 
                                                 
enforceable promises, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981), irrevocable gifts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.1(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1999), irrevocable trusts made in the settlor’s lifetime, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2003), and many other types 
of lifetime transactions, see generally 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10:1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
3 This Dissertation, ch. 1. 








This Essay summarizes and connects the three substantive chapters of my 
Dissertation. Parts I and II below highlight the key findings in respect of 
transactional law and fiduciary law, respectively. The Conclusion 
underscores the common problems with these areas of law and my proposed 
reforms. 
I. AVOIDANCE OF TRANSACTIONS FOR WANT OF MENTAL CAPACITY  
Mental capacity to transact is the threshold concept of mental ability to 
incur legal responsibility for one’s own transactional choices. A mentally-
incapable individual (or her representative) has a limited power to avoid her 
transactions. According to the widely-accepted, conflicting-policies theory,5 
granting the individual (or her representative) a power of avoidance has the 
following benefits and costs. On the one hand, the power can invalidate 
transactions arising from exploitation of diminished cognitive abilities or 
other forms of mental weaknesses. In particular, an exercise of the power can 
hold an elder financial abuser liable to return the ill-gotten gain of 
exploitation. Moreover, by disgorging ill-gotten gains after the fact, the 
power of avoidance can disincentivize potential abusers from making 
                                                 
5 In the United States, this theory was introduced by Professor Milton D. Green in the 
1940s. See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Section II.C.2. British scholars also tend to 
support this theory. See, e.g., BRENDA HALE ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH LAW 366 (6th ed. 
Sweet & Maxwell 2017); Eliza Varney, Redefining Contractual Capacity? The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Incapacity Defence in English 








exploitative transactions before the fact. On the other hand, a broad power of 
avoidance can harm the interests of the capable transacting party and the 
security of transactions. In addition, allowing avoidance after the fact can 
discourage others from transacting with potentially incapable individuals 
before the fact. “Legal incapacity is legal disability, and a person who lacks 
the capacity to undertake a legally binding obligation is foreclosed from 
participating in transactions that may be advantageous or even vitally 
necessary.”6 
There are two doctrinal models in American and Anglo-Australian 
jurisdictions. Both models first ask whether the relevant transacting party 
lacked mental capacity at the time of making the impugned transaction, and 
then impose equitable restrictions on any power of avoidance arising from a 
finding of incapacity. While the initial step of ascertaining mental capacity is 
not without controversy, the predominance of equitable considerations has 
long rendered “disparities in mental ability . . . less salient as a matter of 
law.”7 In modern times, academic and judicial disagreements mainly pertain 
to the equitable restrictions on the power of avoidance. 
                                                 
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 








A.  The Traditional Model 
Anglo-Australian jurisdictions and a minority of American jurisdictions 
adhere to the traditional, narrow conception of transactional incapacity.8 
Mental capacity to transact in this model is a cognitive notion, asking whether 
the relevant transacting party was unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the impugned transaction. A finding of incapacity would 
only ground a heavily-qualified power to avoid the transaction. The power 
would be lost if the transaction was made in good faith, the capable 
transacting party did not have knowledge of the incapacity, did not overreach, 
and could not be restored to the status quo ante. 
B.  The Modern Trend 
The modern trend among American jurisdictions is to expand the concept 
of transactional incapacity and the scope of judicial discretion.9 In addition 
to the cognitive test, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts a 
volitional test to deny capacity if the individual was unable to act in a 
reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.10 Influenced by the writing 
                                                 
8 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Section II.A; Simon Whittaker, Personal 
Incapacity, in 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS 9-077 (H.G. Beale et al eds., 32d ed., 2015) 
(discussing Hart v. O’Connor [1985] UKPC 17, [1985] AC 1000 (appeal taken from N.Z.)). 
9 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Section II.C.2. 
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Although 
this Restatement denies capacity on the volitional basis only if the capable party has “reason 
to know” the incapacity, id., courts often apply the knowledge qualifier to the cognitive basis 








of Professor Milton Green,11 this Restatement also invites courts to avoid 
transactions that are substantively abnormal, which means deviation from the 
norm.12 Inadequacy of consideration is one indicator of substantive 
abnormality.13 To Green, abnormality is both “evidence of a disordered 
mind” and of potential overreach.14 Moreover, the recently-published 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment directs courts to 
determine capacity disputes “by weighing at each point the value of the 
protection secured against the cost of securing it.”15 This view eschews 
general and predictable rules in favor of a substantial judicial discretion to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
C.  An Economic Case for Curtailing the Power of Avoidance 
1. Prevalence of Inheritance Disputes 
The author’s survey of modern transactional capacity cases reveals that 
they were usually inheritance disputes between litigants who expected to 
                                                 
11 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Section II.C.2. 
12 Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 
53 YALE L.J. 271, 309 (1944). 
13 Id. at 309. 
14 Id. at 305. Contra. George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to Status 
via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 537, 541 (1973) (arguing that judicial consideration 
of abnormality deprives the incapable individual of the right to make eccentric contracts, the 
practical result of which is “punishment for deviancy, not protection against helplessness”). 
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c (AM. 








inherit from the potentially incapable individual.16 Many cases concerned 
near-death transactions, and the potentially incapable individual usually had 




Figure 1: Typical Transactional Capacity Dispute 
 
The prevailing doctrinal theories fail to account for the hallmarks of 
inheritance disputes. First, the conflicting-policies theory assumes that the act 
of challenging a transaction for want of capacity indicates that the transaction 
is disadvantageous to the potentially incapable individual. It is for this reason 
that the policies of protecting the individual and protecting the security of 
                                                 
















transactions are necessarily in conflict.17 In reality, the claimant who seeks 
avoidance is typically not the potentially incapable individual herself, but a 
relative with inheritance expectations;18 the choice to challenge the 
transaction is the claimant’s rather than the individual’s. The conflicting-
policies theory fails to make room for the likelihood that the potentially 
incapable individual might have benefited from the transaction. 
Another hallmark of inheritance disputes is the “worst evidence” 
problem: the testimony of a deceased individual is unavailable.19 Courts can 
at best gauge from circumstantial evidence to ascertain the past mental ability 
of the deceased. If the impugned transaction took place in private, then courts 
also can only rely on circumstantial evidence to ascertain how the capable 
transacting party had dealt with the deceased. Such significant evidential 
deficiency, together with the legal uncertainty arising from the vague 
standards of mental capacity,20 give the potential beneficiaries of the 
deceased’s estate an opportunity to avoid transactions that actually benefited 
                                                 
17 See generally Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental 
Incompetency, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1214 (1940). 
18 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Section III.A.1. 
19 See generally ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES xxxiii, 141, 263–64 (10th ed., 2017); John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts 
and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STANFORD L. REV. 335, 
336, 345–46 (2013) (criticizing the tort of interference with inheritance or gift). 








the deceased. This again challenges the underlying assumption of the 
conflicting-policies theory. 
Moreover, many near-death transactions are will substitutes—meaning 
transfers of wealth at or near death without using the formal probate system.21 
For example, by creating a joint tenancy in her property with a right of 
survivorship, a potentially incapable individual allows her co-tenant (usually 
her spouse) to inherit the property when she passes away.22 Like wills, will 
substitutes are by their nature one-sided—in favor the party who is expected 
to inherit—regardless of their makers’ mental ability. As a result, substantive 
imbalance is an inherent characteristic of will substitutes. Contrary to the 
widely-accepted abnormality theory, substantive imbalance is not a good 
signal of mental deficiency, nor does it raise a red flag of overreach. 
The tendency to avoid transactions made in the estate-planning context is 
particularly problematic in the light of the current shortage of elder 
caregivers. In American and Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, the burden of 
caring for the elderly is primarily borne by families rather than the state.23 
                                                 
21 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the 
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). 
22 Id. at 1112. 
23 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 
CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2015 at 12, 66–67 (2015), 
https://www.caregiving.org/caregiving2015/; 4430.0 – Disability, Ageing and Carers, 
Australia: Summary of Findings, 2015, AUST. BUREAU STAT.,  
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4430.0main+features402015 (last 








Unless formally appointed to some fiduciary office,24 family caregivers 
typically do not get paid a salary. While caregivers may enjoy the emotional 
reward of caring for loved ones, they may also expect a reward in the form 
of inheritance from the care-recipient’s estate.25 Yet the transactional 
capacity doctrine places undue limits on the ability of many seniors to reward 
caregiving with inheritance. This harms the welfare of many seniors by 
limiting their ability to recruit their preferred caregivers. Moreover, many 
seniors are precluded from pursuing valuable other-regarding preferences to 
benefit their close relatives and friends. 
2. Transactions with Businesses 
The transactional capacity doctrine is unduly suspicious of transactions 
involving close relatives and friends, but it remains suitable for regulating 
transactions between potentially incapable individuals and businesses. 
Unlike in the estate-planning context, the abnormality theory correctly 
regards substantive imbalance in transactions with businesses as a signal of 
                                                 
Later Life, OFFICE NATL STAT., 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/ageing/
articles/livinglongerhowourpopulationischangingandwhyitmatters/fittingitallinworkingcari
ngandhealthinlaterlife (last accessed Jan. 25, 2018). 
24 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-316(a), 5-417 (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 
120(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(4) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2012). 
25 See generally Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 








mental inability and of potential overreach.26 While the conflicting-policies 
theory still ignores the prevalence of avoidance claims driven by inheritance 
expectations, these claims are unlikely to defeat the testamentary intent of the 
potentially incapable individual. Thus the flaws of the prevailing doctrinal 
theories tend not to affect consumer contracts and other transactions with 
businesses. 
Moreover, the transactional capacity doctrine offers much-needed 
safeguards against elderly financial exploitation by businesses. In transacting 
with businesses, potentially incapable individuals tend to be in a position of 
significant disadvantage. Aside from having a low bargaining power, 
individuals—mentally-capable or not—tend to be boundedly-rational in the 
sense of having cognitive biases, limited willpower, and many other forms of 
systematic mental limitations.27 Research in behavioral economics and 
psychology have shown that businesses can exploit these mental limitations 
to extract extraordinary profits.28 In particular, the combination of severe 
                                                 
26 See generally supra Sections II.A, C.2. 
27 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 
99 (1955); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence 
on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981). See generally Christine Jolls, Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 5 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1476–81; Jonathan Baron & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Conceptual Foundations: a 
Bird’s Eye View, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 25–38 
(Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2018). 
28 See generally RAN SPIEGLER, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND INDUSTRIAL 








cognitive limitations and substantial wealth can render many seniors 
vulnerable to financial exploitation.29 Moreover, unlike in close families and 
personal relationships, intrinsic bonds and informal norms do not constrain 
profit-driven businesses. Thus the need to protect vulnerable seniors from 
exploitative business practices can justify the continuing application of a 
rigorous transactional capacity doctrine to transactions with businesses. 
3. Modeling Claimant-Incapable Individual Conflicts 
Aiming to clarify the role of incentives in typical capacity disputes, I 
construct a behavioral-contract-theoretic model to capture what the 
prevailing doctrinal theories fail to recognize:30 that three players are really 
involved—the potentially incapable individual, the capable transacting party, 
and the claimant who decides whether to seek avoidance. The claimant’s 
preferences regarding the impugned transaction can be different from the 
potentially incapable individual’s. For instance, when deciding whether to 
exercise any power of avoidance, the claimant may disregard the relational 
bonds and norms between the potentially incapable individual and the 
                                                 
LITERATURE 1075 (2014); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 2, 42, 248 (2012). 
29 Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, The Age of 
Reason: Financial Decisions over the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulation, 2009 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 51, 51–52, 80. 








capable transacting party. 
More precisely, in this model, a sophisticated actor may transact with a 
potentially incapable individual, and may be the subject of a subsequent 
avoidance claim by the claimant. The sophisticated actor has superior 
bargaining power and makes choices to maximize her own payoff. This setup 
“stacks the cards” against me. The model aims to facilitate an analysis of the 
problem of elderly financial abuse. This problem is most pronounced when 
the potential abuser—the actor in the model—is assumed to be sophisticated, 
self-interested and superior in bargaining. Under this assumption, the 
normative case for a broad power of avoidance is the strongest. This 
assumption “stack the cards” against me because I will propose to curtail that 
power.  
This model produces equilibrium properties that illustrate several real-
life problems. First, without allowing avoidance on the basis of mental 
incapacity, exploitation may be a problem: the incapable individual may be 
bound by a transaction that she would not have made if she had capacity. 
Second, while allowing avoidance may mitigate potential exploitation, it also 
encourages the claimant to avoid transactions that actually benefited the 
incapable individual. In some cases, the claimant’s temptation to avoid ex 
post can even discourage transactions with the incapable individual ex ante. 








capacity is not known at the time of making the transaction. 
The main insight from the model is that the “true” conflict generated by 
the power to avoid transactions for want of capacity is often between the 
incapable individual and the claimant. Allowing avoidance would give the 
claimant an incentive to avoid transactions that actually benefited the 
incapable individual. Safeguarding the claimant’s interests may therefore 
harm the welfare of the incapable individual. On the other hand, even with a 
broad power of avoidance in place, the sophisticated actor typically can 
safeguard her own interests by choosing not to transact with the incapable 
individual. Overall, the “true” conflict that animates transactional capacity 
disputes is often intertemporal: the claimant’s incentive to seek avoidance ex 
post may not align with the incapable individual’s incentive to transact ex 
ante. Such conflicts are therefore a source of perverse incentives. 
D.  Reform Suggestions 
An appropriately-formulated transactional capacity doctrine should 
recognize intertemporal conflicts between claimants and potentially 
incapable individuals. Such conflicts tend to be severe in relation to 
transactions involving close relatives and friends (which usually take place 
in the estate-planning context), but not in relation to transactions with 








avoidance of transactions involving close relatives and friends.31 
The main suggestion is to make available a substituted-judgment defense 
to close relatives and friends. This defense removes any power of avoidance 
in cases where the potentially incapable individual would have entered into 
the impugned transaction if she had capacity. This suggestion aims to 
preclude and discourage avoidance of transactions that likely benefitted the 
incapable individual. By so doing, the interests of the incapable individual 
are prioritized over the claimant’s. 
The substituted-judgment defense directs courts to consider the incapable 
individual’s past conduct, transacting patterns, and relational norms when she 
had capacity.32 To be sure, transactional capacity cases often concern one-
shot transactions that the individual may not have had an opportunity to make 
in the past. However, most cases concern seniors who have had a life-time of 
opportunities to make use of estate-planning instruments, such as wills, will 
substitutes and wish letters. Seniors also tend to have left behind a “memory 
trail” of informed opinions and value preferences in the minds of their family 
and friends.33 Moreover, near-death transactions can be the final 
                                                 
31 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Part IV. 
32 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 1, Part IV.A.2. 
33 Terry Carney, Financial Planning Mechanisms for People with Cognitive Impairment 
in Australia, in SPECIAL NEEDS FINANCIAL PLANNING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5–6 








manifestation of property-sharing and gift-giving norms within close families 
and personal relationships.34 The substituted-judgment defense directs court 
to consider the individual’s past relational norms and estate plans, in addition 
to her past conduct and transacting patterns. 
II. FIDUCIARY REGULATION OF PROPERTY MANAGERS 
While the transactional capacity doctrine may directly avoid transactions 
that potentially exploit the elderly, fiduciary law often supplies the doctrinal 
basis for judicial scrutiny. This is because suspicious conduct or transactions 
often involve guardians and agents who provide property-management 
services to elderly incapable individuals. A guardian is officially appointed 
by a court to make decisions on behalf of an incapable individual. A power 
of attorney is a private instrument through which an individual—the 
principal—authorizes another person—the agent—to act on behalf of the 
principal. Modern agency law permits a durable agency to commence, or 
remain valid, upon the principal losing mental capacity.35 
Like in typical fiduciary relationships, the problem of moral hazard can 
                                                 
34 See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, 
and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 564–78 (1999); Alexander M. Meiklejohn, 
Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 307, 342, 364–67, 
379, 387 (1988-89) (analysis of transactional capacity cases from the 1960s to the 1980s 
showing that courts tended to uphold transactions made in the course of long-term and close 
relationships). 









affect guardianships and durable agency relationships. Guardians and agents 
typically have a broad discretion over how to take actions affecting the 
elderly incapable individuals they serve. First, that the incapable individual 
is unable to take the relevant actions without assistance is the very reason for 
engaging the guardian or agent. The same reason implies that the individual 
tends to lack the ability to monitor the guardian or agent to a satisfactory 
degree.36 Second, any actual wrongdoing by the guardian or agent is often 
undetectable; record keeping can be imperfect or poor, and the guardian or 
agent is easily able to produce evidence favorable to her position. Thus, 
unless sufficiently constrained, the guardian or agent has the opportunity to 
exercise her discretion to benefit herself (or a third party) at the expense of 
the incapable individual. The guardian or agent may be well be tempted to 
act on that opportunity, which temptation creates a moral hazard problem. A 
manifestation that problem is elder financial abuse in the course of providing 
property-management services. 
A.  Trust Fiduciary Law 
Prevailing American law and Anglo-Australian law apply trust fiduciary 
law to guardians and agents. Trust fiduciary law is prophylactic; it overdeters 
                                                 
36 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 2401, 2419–21(1995); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW  197, 199 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. 








the fiduciary to mitigate the moral hazard problem.37 In addition to the duty 
of care and accounting and reporting duties, guardians and agents owe a duty 
of undivided loyalty: subject to some narrow exceptions,38 the guardian or 
agent is prohibited from acting other than in the sole interest of the incapable 
individual. For instance, receiving a gift from the incapable individual 
typically amounts to a breach of the sole-interest duty of loyalty. A breach 
makes available a broad range of remedies. These include rescission of the 
impugned transaction, loss-based remedies to compensate any loss to the 
incapable individual or her estate, and gain-based remedies to disgorge the 
errant guardian’s or agent’s ill-gotten gain.39 
B.  An Economic Case for Limited Fiduciary Regulation 
1. Mandatory Fiduciary Law 
Fiduciary law is contractarian when applied to a fiduciary who serves a 
mentally-capable beneficiary; most fiduciary duties are understood as default 
duties to fill in the gaps in the incomplete “contract” between the fiduciary 
                                                 
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“The rationale 
[underlying the duty of loyalty] begins with a recognition that it may be difficult for a trustee 
to resist temptation when personal interests conflict with fiduciary duty.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmts. b, d, h (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Sections I.B–C, I.E (surveying the academic literature 
on the “default-penalty” theory of fiduciary duty). 
38 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Sections I.C, III.A.3; this Dissertation, ch. 3, 
Section III.C. 









and the beneficiary. This reflects the prevailing doctrinal position that 
fiduciary law generally yields to party modification. By modifying the terms 
of the instrument underlying the fiduciary relationship, the creator may 
modify the duties of the fiduciary.40 Similarly, the beneficiary generally can 
consent to a potential breach of fiduciary duty before it takes place, or ratify 
it after the fact. 
The essentially-default nature of fiduciary law supplies the standard 
objection to reform proposals to legitimize conflicted conduct or transactions 
that amount to efficient breaches.41 If the fiduciary commits an efficient 
breach without obtaining prior authorization, and is later found in breach, 
then her personal gain would be disgorged. On the other hand, if the fiduciary 
seeks authorization from the beneficiary first, then they can negotiate and 
form an agreement to share the welfare gain arising from the efficient breach; 
the fiduciary typically would still obtain some of that gain. Thus the fiduciary 
would be better off acting with the beneficiary’s authorization than without. 
In other words, by simultaneously imposing the sole-interest duty on the 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 64, 65 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n agent’s 
fiduciary duties to the principal vary depending on the parties’ agreement and the scope of 
the parties’ relationship.”). The instrument underlying the fiduciary relationship is the power 
of attorney in the case of an agency, and the order of appointment of the court in the case of 
a guardianship. 









fiduciary and conferring the power to authorize a breach on the beneficiary, 
fiduciary law can incentivize the fiduciary to take efficient actions and share 
the resulting welfare gain with the beneficiary. 
Yet, when applied to mentally-incapable individuals, fiduciary law no 
longer operates as default law. An incapable individual typically has no 
power to authorize efficient breaches by her guardian or agent. Prevailing 
American law regards mental capacity as a formal requirement for a valid 
authorization.42 While Anglo-Australian law does not formally require 
mental capacity to validate beneficiary authorization,43 it can be very costly 
to “litigation-proof” authorization obtained from an incapable individual. The 
typical basis of mental incapacity is dementia or a similar degenerative 
condition, and courts may see the authorization itself as a form of 
exploitation. To be safe, the guardian or agent may need to incur the 
substantial cost of engaging a mental health professional to verify and 
document the quality of consent. 
2. Failure to Accommodate Familial Bonds and Norms 
Applying with mandatory force, strict fiduciary law tends to harm the 
welfare of elderly incapable individuals and the welfare of their guardians 
and agents. A preliminary observation is that fiduciary doctrine does not 
                                                 
42 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Section II.A.1. 








formally recognize that there is a broad spectrum of guardians and agents. 
While some are professionals who charge fees for their services, most are lay 
persons who are in a close familial or personal relationship with the incapable 
individual.44 The incapable individual’s spouse/partner or adult child is 
typically the preferred guardian or agent.  
In this light, mandatory application of the sole-interest duty of loyalty 
tends to generate little benefits in cases concerning close families and 
personal relationships. In these cases, intrinsic bonds and informal norms can 
partially alleviate the misalignment of incentives arising from financial 
conflicts.45 In the language of economic theory, the fiduciary exploits the 
moral hazard problem to the extent that her incentives are misaligned with 
her beneficiary’s. As intrinsic bonds and informal norms become more 
effective in aligning incentives, the fiduciary becomes less likely to exploit 
her discretion. Extralegal mechanisms thus diminish the need for intrusive 
regulation by strict fiduciary duty. 
At the same time, mandatory application of the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty can generate large costs in close families and personal relationships. 
                                                 
44 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Section I.A; this Dissertation, ch. 3, Section 
II.A. 
45 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Section II.B.2 (discussing Elizabeth S. Scott & 
Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995)); this Dissertation, ch. 








Relative-and-friend guardians and agents usually have financial conflicts 
arising from joint property ownership, shared residence, or inheritance 
expectations. Compliance with the sole-interest duty would require the close 
relative or friend to remove her financial conflicts. The costs of doing so can 
deter her from taking on the fiduciary office. Thus strict enforcement of the 
sole-interest duty can narrow the pool of safe and reliable candidates for 
fiduciary appointment. 
Moreover, mandatory application of the sole-interest duty of loyalty can 
harm welfare by stultifying the pursuit of valuable other-regarding goals and 
preferences. Experimental research in psychology and behavioral economics 
shows that individual preferences are often other-regarding, rather than 
purely self-regarding. In close families and personal relationships, strong 
other-regarding preferences can manifest in gift-giving norms and property-
sharing arrangements. Moreover, many near-death transactions to benefit 
close relatives and friends can be the final manifestation of reciprocal gift-
giving norms. Yet strict enforcement of the sole-interests duty typically leads 
to a selfish, one-sided distribution of welfare gains—in favor of the incapable 
individual and no one else. This remains the case even in the absence of harm 
to the individual. In other words, strict enforcement of the sole-interest duty 









C.  Reform Suggestions 
When imposed on close relatives and friends, the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty harms welfare because elderly incapable individuals typically have 
no power to authorize harmless or mutually-beneficial conflicts. I therefore 
propose to make available to close relatives and friends a defense that 
approximates a valid exercise of the power of authorization. More precisely, 
the guardian or agent should not be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty in 
cases where the incapable individual would have authorized the conflicted 
conduct or transaction if she had capacity.46 
1. A Substituted-judgment Defense for American Jurisdictions 
For American jurisdictions, my proposal essentially introduces the well-
known doctrine of substituted judgment as a defense for breach-of-fiduciary 
duty claims. In modern guardianship law and trust law, the doctrine of 
substituted judgment provides the standard for determining whether to grant 
prospective judicial approval of suspicious conduct. In particular, courts can 
approve transactions tainted with a conflict of interest, especially if there is 
evidence showing that such approval would advance the incapable 
individual’s known wishes.47 
                                                 
46 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Part III; this Dissertation, ch. 3, Part V. 
47 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Section III.A.2 (discussing evidence of what the 








If extended to govern retrospective judicial scrutiny of fiduciary conduct, 
the proposed substituted-judgment defense can prevent the sole-interest duty 
from displacing strong extralegal bonds and other-regarding preferences. A 
capable individual who wishes to respect these bonds and pursue preferences 
may exercise her power to authorize a conflict of interest. The proposed 
defense performs a similar function for an incapable individual. It does so by 
allowing her guardian or agent to defend a conflict of interest to the extent 
that the incapable individual would have authorized it if she had capacity. 
The proposed exemption thus permits the guardian or agent to support the 
incapable individual to pursue non-selfish goals. This reduces the welfare 
costs arising from the mandatory application of strict fiduciary law. 
2. A Best-interest Defense for Anglo-Australian Jurisdictions 
For Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, I argue that close relatives and friends 
should be afforded a two-prong best-interest defense. This defense permits a 
conflict of interest in cases where (1) the incapable person would have 
authorized the conflict if she had capacity (the subjective prong); and (2) the 
conflicted conduct or transaction does not amount to evasion of the applicable 
family provision statute (the objective prong).48 The following explains why 
Anglo-Australian jurisdictions should adopt the best-interest standard while 
                                                 
48 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 3, Section V.C (discussing family provision 








American jurisdictions should reject it. 
A preliminary observation is that in England and New South Wales, the 
best-interest standard is largely the same as the substituted-judgment standard 
in American law. While Anglo-Australian statutes tend to leave “best 
interests” undefined, English and New South Wales courts give centrality to 
one factor: what the incapable individual would have wanted if she had 
capacity.49 The subjective prong of my proposed best-interest defense 
captures the centrality of that factor. Moreover, New South Wales courts 
follow the same historical Chancery judgment that American courts used to 
develop the doctrine of substituted judgment.50 Support from Anglo-
Australian doctrine also comes with “best-interests” label. 
The author’s proposal to adopt an objective prong in the Anglo-Australian 
best-interests defense, but not in the American substituted-judgment defense, 
reflects substantial differences between American and Anglo-Australian 
inheritance law and policy. The typical breach-of-fiduciary duty claim is part 
and parcel of an inheritance dispute. While Anglo-Australian law heavily 
regulates testamentary freedom, prevailing American law imposes few 
                                                 
49 this Dissertation, ch. 3, Section V.A. 
50 Ex parte Whitbread (1816) 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Eng.). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f, note to cmt. f, re. subsection (5) (AM. LAW 








restrictions (such as a spouse’s optional share in the deceased’s estate).51 For 
example, Anglo-Australian family provision statutes qualify an individual’s 
freedom of testation with a duty to provide for her dependent children 
(including adult children), but prevailing American law imposes no such 
duty.52 Moreover, the qualifications of testamentary freedom tend to be rules 
in prevailing American law but standards in Anglo-Australian law. For 
example, Anglo-Australian family provision statutes grant a substantial 
judicial discretion to decide whether a claimant for family provision relief is 
a ‘dependent’, and if so, how much provision from the deceased’s estate 
should be made.53 In contrast, showing a strong preference for rules, 
American legislatures have consistently rejected proposals to introduce 
family provision statutes.54 
Aside from being incompatible with American inheritance law and 
policy, the best-interests standard would generate unwanted indeterminacy if 
adopted in American fiduciary law. The objective best-interest factors—
factors other than what the incapable person would have wanted—are usually 
                                                 
51 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 1999); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 19, 1–2, ch. 8. 
52 See generally SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 19, at 564–65. 
53 See generally CROUCHER & VINE, supra note 53, paras. 2.35–36; ROSS MARTYN ET 
AL., supra note 50, paras. 11–049, 11–068. 








incommensurable, and there is no guidance on how to weigh or rank them.55 
Family life is also largely private; courts often have no access to much of the 
evidence needed to apply many best-interest factors.56 The resulting 
indeterminacy can generate substantial adjudication costs to courts, as well 
as compliance and litigation costs to private individuals.57 Adopting an 
objective best-interest standard in American jurisdictions would therefore 
introduce unwanted indeterminacy in the estate-planning context.58 
On the other hand, the typical Anglo-Australian inheritance dispute 
already exhibits a high degree of indeterminacy. Guardians and agents who 
are in a close familial or personal relationship with the incapable individual 
have a strong case for family provision relief. When an inheritance dispute is 
viewed as a whole, introducing a best-interest analysis adds little to the high 
degree of indeterminacy already arising from family provision statute.59 
Hence the vices of indeterminacy should not stop Anglo-Australian fiduciary 
law from adopting the proposed best-interests defense. 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 
69, 75 (2014). 
56 Id. at 74. 
57 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: an Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). 
58 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2, Sections I.F, III.B.1. 









A.  Inappropriate Response to Potential Conflicts of Interest 
When applied to resolve mental capacity disputes involving the elderly, 
prevailing fiduciary law and transactional law fail properly to respond to 
potential conflicts of interest. First, prevailing law underreacts to potential 
conflicts between an elderly incapable individual and a claimant who expects 
to inherit from the individual. It is the claimant who really decides whether 
to avoid a transaction for want of capacity or bring a breach-of-fiduciary duty 
claim; she may make that decision to increase her own expected inheritance, 
rather than to advance the interests of the incapable individual. Failing to 
account for such potential conflicts, prevailing transactional law mistakenly 
assumes that every attempt to avoid a transaction indicates the potentially 
incapable individual would have found the transaction disadvantageous. 
Similarly, prevailing fiduciary law ignores potential conflicts between an 
elderly incapable individual and a claimant who seeks to recover expected 
inheritance from a well-intended guardian or agent. 
Second, prevailing law overreacts to potential conflicts of interest 
between an elderly incapable individual and her close relative or friend. 
Prevailing fiduciary law explicitly requires guardians and agents to avoid 
conflicts between their personal interests and their duties. Such inflexible 








personal relationships. Moreover, extralegal bonds and norms can partially 
alleviate the moral hazard problem that triggers legal intervention. Similarly, 
prevailing transactional law disregards intrinsic bonds and informal norms in 
close familial and personal relationships. Garden-variety estate-planning 
transactions are regarded with great suspicion. 
While a failure to recognize the claimant-incapable individual conflict 
matters little in the consumer or business context, such failure tends to harm 
welfare in the family and estate-planning context. Directly or through their 
guardians and agents, seniors may wish to benefit their close relatives and 
friends and reward their caregivers. Yet prevailing law tends to stultify the 
pursuit of these valuable goals and preferences.  
B.  Reform Suggestions 
Prevailing fiduciary law and transactional law are unduly suspicious of 
potential conflicts between an elderly incapable individual and her close 
relative or friend. Prevailing law fails to recognize potential conflicts between 
the individual and a claimant who is driven by inheritance expectations. To 
remedy these shortcomings, I propose to make available to close relatives and 
friends a defense that enshrines what the elderly incapable individual would 
have wanted if she had capacity. This proposal aims to help the elderly pursue 
their non-selfish goals, respect their familial bonds, and reward their 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical based on Daughton v. Parson:1 for 
decades, Cecil lived with his parents, Ollie and Thomas, and assisted them 
                                                 








with operating their farm. In their old age, Ollie and Thomas orally promised 
to pass the farm on to Cecil, but no one acted upon that promise until Thomas 
passed away. Having fallen in her health and moved to a nursing home, Ollie 
executed deeds to transfer the farm to Cecil for no consideration. Ollie’s other 
children, who expect to inherit a share of her estate when she dies, now seek 
to avoid the transfer deeds and recover the farm from Cecil. They argue that 
Cecil took advantage of Ollie’s mental incapacity.2 This Chapter addresses 
the question of who should succeed in this and similar cases.3 
Disputes over the properties of the elderly arise against the background 
of population aging and the likely prevalence of elder financial abuse.4 
Mental and physical decline is common among seniors. The combination of 
severe cognitive limitations and substantial wealth renders many seniors 
vulnerable to financial exploitation. The late Brooke Astor, who had 
dementia after a lifetime of philanthropy, had tens of millions of dollars 
stolen from her by her son and family lawyer while she was left to live in 
                                                 
2 Mental incapacity is a functional concept in law, see generally infra Section I.A, and 
is distinct from the medical concept of mental disorder. A mental disorder refers to “a 
syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, 
emotion regulation, or behavior[.]” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS at 20 (5th ed., 2013). Having a mental disorder is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for an individual to lack mental capacity to transact in the eyes of 
the law. See generally infra Sections II.A, II.C. 
3 The Iowa court ruled against Cecil. Daughton v. Parson, 423 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1988). 








squalor in her final years of life.5 The famed artist Peter Max, who suffers 
from advanced dementia, has to witness his family, friends and business 
associates “trading lurid courtroom allegations of kidnapping, hired goons, 
attempted murder . . . and schemes to wring . . . money out of” his profitable 
art franchise.6 The alleged business manager and caretaker of Stan Lee is now 
facing multiple counts of financial and physical abuse against the late comic 
book legend.7 
In private suits alleging elder financial abuse, courts often apply the 
mental capacity doctrine to determine whether to avoid seemingly 
exploitative contracts, gifts and other lifetime transactions.8 The doctrine is 
meant to protect individuals who lack sufficient mental ability to incur legal 
responsibility for their own transactional choices.9 Yet allowing avoidance of 
transactions tainted with incapacity can discourage others from transacting 
                                                 
5 See Russ Buettner, Appeals Exhausted, Astor Case Ends as Son Is Sent to Jail, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jun. 21, 2013; John Eligon, Settlement in Battle over Astor Estate Is Reached, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2012. 
6 Amy Chozick, Dementia Stopped Peter Max from Painting. For Some, That Spelled a 
Lucrative Opportunity., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2019. 
7 See, e.g., Stan Lee: Ex-manager of Comic Book Legend Charged with Elder Abuse, 
BBC NEWS (May 14, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-48265450. 
8 See generally infra note 57 and accompanying text; this Dissertation, Appendix A 
(surveying modern transactional capacity cases). 








with potentially incapable individuals ex ante.10 To resolve this dilemma, the 
widely-accepted conflicting-policies theory directs courts to balance the 
conflicting policies of protecting incapable individuals and protecting the 
security of transactions on a case-by-case basis.11 A related abnormality 
theory holds that courts should be suspicious of transactions exhibiting 
substantive or procedural imbalance, or any other factor indicating deviation 
from the norm.12 Producing great indeterminacy, these theories direct courts 
to “weigh[] at each point the value of the protection secured against the cost 
of securing it.”13 
Against the weight of two modern Restatements,14 I argue that the mental 
                                                 
10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011) (“Legal incapacity is legal disability, and a person who lacks the 
capacity to undertake a legally binding obligation is foreclosed from participating in 
transactions that may be advantageous or even vitally necessary.”). See generally infra 
Section III.A.3. 
11 See generally infra Sections II.A, II.C.2. 
12 See generally infra Sections II.A, II.C.2. Professor Milton D. Green introduced the 
conflicting-policies theory and abnormality theory. See generally Milton D. Green, Public 
Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L. REV. 1189 (1940) 
[hereinafter Green, Public Policies]; Milton D. Green, Judicial Tests of Mental 
Incompetency, 6 MO. L. REV. 141 (1941) [hereinafter Green, Judicial Tests]; Milton D. 
Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 TEX. L. 
REV. 554 (1943) [hereinafter Green, Operative Effect]; Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue 
Influence and Mental Incompetency: A Study in Related Concepts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 176 
(1943); Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major 
Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271 (1944) [hereinafter Green, Major Premise]. 
13 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 
14 See infra Section III.A (arguing against the formulation of the mental capacity 








capacity doctrine in prevailing American law is ill-suited for the era of aging 
population. The previous hypothetical based on Daughton v. Parson can 
illustrate the main problem.15 While the Iowa court applied contractual 
doctrines, the case had the hallmarks of a dispute over inheritance. Ollie 
executed the suspicious deeds in her final years of life, in order to pass the 
family farm on to Cecil—the child who had labored on it for decades. Ollie’s 
other children challenged those deeds to increase their expected inheritance. 
Ollie’s mental decline rendered it difficult for her to give evidence regarding 
her true intentions.16 In theory, the mental capacity doctrine granted Ollie the 
power to choose whether to avoid her deeds.17 In reality, that power was 
exercised by those children who did not want Cecil alone to inherit the family 
farm. The critical flaw of the prevailing theories is their failure to recognize 
that the claimant who seeks avoidance may do so against the interest of the 
incapable individual.18 
Taking a law-and-economics approach, I propose to reformulate the 
                                                 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW INST. 2011)). 
15 423 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). 
16 In typical transactional capacity cases, the potentially incapable individual is unable 
to testify because she has passed way. See generally infra Sections III.A.1–2. 
17 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 7 cmt. b, 12 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 








mental capacity doctrine to promote the welfare of seniors who may lack 
mental capacity. Many transactions between seniors and their close relatives 
and friends are estate-planning instruments made to pursue valuable other-
regarding preferences and reward informal caregiving. The mental capacity 
doctrine ought to offer safeguards against elder financial exploitation without 
undue intrusion into close families and personal relationships. The main 
normative claim is that when applied to transactions involving close relatives 
and friends, the doctrine ought to be narrow, determinate, and respectful of 
individual will and preferences.19 
The types of transactions that fall within the scope of this Chapter are 
those to which courts habitually apply the doctrine governing mental capacity 
to contract.20 These types of transactions include contracts in the strict sense 
of legally-enforceable promises,21 deeds and conveyances,22 irrevocable 
gifts,23 and irrevocable trusts made in their makers’ lifetime.24 For simplicity, 
                                                 
19 See generally infra Part IV. 
20 See generally infra this Dissertation, Appendix A (surveying modern cases in which 
courts applied the doctrine governing mental capacity to contract). 
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
22 See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 10:1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999). 
23 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). 








the author labels all these as “transactions” without regard to their doctrinal 
distinctions, and highlights the exact doctrinal category (for example, 
contract, gift) when relevant. This Chapter does not cover transactions 
between incapable individuals and their guardians, agents or other 
fiduciaries. While the doctrine governing mental capacity to transact is broad 
and indeterminate, the doctrine that regulates the fiduciaries of elderly 
incapable individuals is strict and inflexible. The author has written 
separately on mental capacity in fiduciary law.25 
This Chapter contributes to the theoretical and doctrinal literature on 
contract law, property law, remedies, and the law of inheritance. While there 
is a small literature on transactional capacity disputes predating the era of 
aging population,26 recent scholarship focuses on capacity to make a will.27 
Similarly, the closely-related scholarship on undue influence focuses on 
                                                 
25 See generally this Dissertation, ch. 2 (discussing mental capacity in American 
fiduciary law). 
26 See, e.g., SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS 
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE chs. 5–7 (2016); Alexander M. 
Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L. REV. 307, 
342 (1988-89); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 763 (1982); supra note 12. 
27 See, e.g., Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity of Minors, 79 MISS. L. 
REV. 69 (2014); Stephen R. Alton, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll's Will: A Tale of 
Testamentary Capacity, 52 TULSA L. REV. 263 (2017); Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and Mind, 
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 259, 264 (2017); Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in 
Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. REV. 891 (2017). See also BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, ch. 








wills.28 With some exceptions,29 mental capacity to transact also escapes the 
attention of disability-rights scholars and reformers. Moreover, 
economically-minded scholars have not considered the interesting dynamics 
of transactional capacity disputes. This Chapter shows that these disputes 
deserve scholarly attention, and offers guidance on how best to resolve them. 
Part I below introduces the concept of mental capacity to transact and 
explains its importance in the era of aging population. Part II elaborates upon 
the mental capacity doctrine in prevailing American law. Part III argues that 
the prevailing formulation of the doctrine is ill-suited for resolving typical 
capacity disputes. Part IV offers reform suggestions to promote welfare. 
Appendix A of this Dissertation provides a survey of modern cases to 
substantiate the positive claims to be advanced. Appendix B constructs an 
economic model to highlight the crucial role of incentives in transactional 
capacity disputes. 
I. MENTAL CAPACITY TO TRANSACT: THEORY AND CONTEXT 
This Part will introduce the conceptual foundations of mental capacity to 
                                                 
28 See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
235 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997); 
Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary 
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959 (2006). 
29 See, e.g., George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to Status via 
Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 537 (1973) (arguing for abolition of the mental capacity 
doctrine); David P. Weber, Restricting the Freedom of Contract: a Fundamental Prohibition, 








transact and explain its practical importance in the era of aging population. 
The goal here is to make a prima facie case for operationalizing an 
appropriately-formulated doctrine of mental capacity to combat elder 
financial abuse. Parts II and III below will examine whether the mental 
capacity doctrine in prevailing American law is appropriately formulated. 
A. Theoretical Foundations 
Mental capacity to transact is the threshold concept of mental ability to 
incur legal responsibility for one’s chosen transactions, such as contracts and 
transfers of property.30 A threshold concept of mental ability is present in all 
major theories of contract law and in theories of property law that enshrine 
donative intent.31 In particular, economic theories of contract law have a 
threshold concept of mental ability to determine whether an individual is 
sufficiently rational to choose contracts that benefit herself.32 If she is not 
                                                 
30 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 181–84 (4th ed., 2007).; BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 1–2. Cf. 
Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 763 (defining “transactional incapacity” as lacking “the attitude, 
experience, or judgmental ability to make a deliberative and well-informed judgment 
concerning the desirability of entering into a given complex contraction”). Compared with 
the notion of mental incapacity to transact in prevailing American law, see infra Section II.A, 
Professor Eisenberg’s notion of “transactional incapacity” covers a much broader class of 
individuals and attracts less drastic legal consequences. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 
26, at 765–66. 
31 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmts. a, c (Am. Law Inst. 1999).  
32 See generally ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 








sufficiently rational, then her chosen contract may not advance her individual 
welfare or the joint welfare of the contracting parties.33 Autonomy theories 
of contract law also have a threshold concept of mental ability to determine 
whether, in the contractual sphere, an individual can be the author of her own 
goals and relationships.34 Moreover, whether a contract or transfer of 
property is likely to advance welfare or autonomy partially depends on the 
transacting parties’ mental abilities. Hence pluralist theories also have some 
threshold concept of mental ability to assign value to welfare or autonomy, 
and compare it with the protection of the vulnerable, anti-discrimination, and 
other relevant values.35 
B. Deterrence and Sanction of Elder Financial Abuse 
How best to formulate and operationalize a doctrine of mental capacity to 
transact is an important and controversial question in the era of aging 
                                                 
33 See generally Avery W. Katz, Economic Foundations of Contract Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 175–80 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas 
& Prince Saprai eds., 2014) (discussing different modes of argument using contractual 
surplus); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 13–17 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007) (comparing economic and noneconomic theories of contract law). 
34 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372–73 (1988) (“If a person is to 
be maker or author of his own life then he must have the mental abilities to form intentions 
of a sufficiently complex kind, and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality, 
the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental faculties 
necessary to plan actions, etc.”); MICHAEL HELLER & HANOCH DAGAN, THE CHOICE 
THEORY OF CONTRACTS 86 (2017); SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 24, at 465–66. 








population. Since the last century, the percentage of Americans age sixty-five 
or over [hereinafter, seniors] has tripled. The population of seniors is 
estimated at 43.1 million in 2016 (15.2 percent of the population), and is 
projected to reach ninety-six million by 2060.36 Physical and mental decline 
is common among seniors. In particular, recent studies estimate that 
Alzheimer’s dementia affects about 5.5 million (one in ten) seniors.37 “[One 
in three] seniors dies with Alzheimer’s or another dementia. It kills more than 
breast cancer and prostate cancer combined.”38 
Mental and physical decline can make it difficult or impractical for many 
seniors to safeguard their own financial interests. Empirical studies suggest 
that elder abuse and neglect are likely prevalent. One nationwide survey 
reveals that every year, about 5.2 percent of Americans age sixty years or 
over potentially experience financial mistreatment by a family member.39 
                                                 
36 U.S. ADMIN. COMMUNITY LIVING, 2017 PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS 1–2 (2018) 
https://acl.gov/sites/default/files/Aging%20and%20Disability%20in%20America/2017Old
erAmericansProfile.pdf. 
37 Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-
dementia/facts-figures (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). 
38 Id. 
39 Ron Aciero et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Emotional, Physical, Sexual, and 
Financial Abuse and Potential Neglect in the United States: The National Elder 
Mistreatment Study, 100 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 292, 292, 296 (2010). These authors broadly 
defined “financial mistreatment by family member” to mean family member “spent money”, 
“did not make good decisions”, “did not give copies”, “forged signature”, “forced respondent 
to sign a document” or “stole money”. Id. at 294. See also id. at 292 (summarizing similar 








Financial abuse is often found to be the most common form of elder abuse.40 
Moreover, family members are not the only abusers. A survey restricted to 
Arizona and Florida suggests that every year, nearly sixty percent of residents 
age sixty or over were the target of consumer fraud.41 Studies often attribute 
the prevalence of elder financial abuse to large net worth, diminished 
cognitive abilities, as well as dementia and other brain diseases.42 
If appropriately formulated and applied, a doctrine of mental capacity to 
transact can contribute to efforts to deter and sanction elder financial abuse. 
The doctrine grants a power to avoid transactions arising from the 
exploitation of diminished cognitive abilities or other forms of mental 
weaknesses.43 An exercise of the power of avoidance can hold the financial 
abuser liable to return her ill-gotten gain. Thus the doctrine can partially 
remedy financial exploitation after the fact. By so doing, the doctrine may 
                                                 
40 Id. at 296. See also LIFESPAN OF GREATER ROCHESTER, WEILL CORNELL MEDICAL 
CENTER OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY & NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT FOR THE AGING, UNDER 
THE RADER: NEW YORK STATE ELDER ABUSE PREVALENCE STUDY 17, 35 (May 2011), 
http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/reports/Under%20the%20Radar%2005%2012%2011%20final%20
report.pdf (survey of seniors residing in New York reporting that financial abuse is the most 
common form of elder abuse, and that spouses/partners and adult children are the most likely 
abusers). 
41 KRISTY HOLTFRETER, MICHAEL D. REISIG, DANIEL P. MEARS & SCOTT E. WOLFE, 
FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION OF THE ELDERLY IN A CONSUMER CONTEXT 2, 128 (March 2014), 
https://www.nij.gov/publications/pages/publication-detail.aspx?ncjnumber=245388. See 
also id. at 21–26 (summarizing similar results from earlier surveys). 
42 Id. at 2–3, 32. 








also disincentivize potential abusers from committing financial abuse in the 
first place.44 
A numerical example can illustrate this point. Suppose a potential abuser 
may overreach to purchase a house for a cheap price from a senior who lacks 
mental capacity.45 The potential abuser is sophisticated and self-interested. 
Her expected gain from committing the abuse is $G million; this is her profit 
from purchasing the house cheaply. If effectively enforced, a doctrine of 
mental capacity can avoid the sale of the house and disgorge the ill-gotten 
gain—$G million. More precisely, an exercise of the power of avoidance can 
attract remedies that effectuate the return of the house to the senior and, at 
the same time, the return of the purchase price to the abuser.46 This would 
eliminate the abuser’s profit, leaving her with $0. She would no longer be 
incentivized to commit the abuse because her expected gain from doing so 
would be removed. 
C. Supplementing Tort Law and Criminal Law 
Recent legislative efforts to tackle elder financial abuse tend to make use 
of criminal law and tort law rather than the law of capacity. Many states have 
                                                 
44 See also infra this Dissertation, Appendix B (constructing a formal economic model 
to illustrate the deterrence effects of the power of avoidance). 
45 This example is a stylized modification of Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 1989) (discussed in text accompanying infra notes 64–68). 








introduced criminal sanctions for financial exploitation of seniors and people 
with mental disorders; “financial exploitation” is typically defined as undue 
influence47—a functionally-similar concept to mental incapacity.48 A 
growing number of states have also adopted statutes to disinherit abusers who 
commit undue influence against seniors and people with mental disorders.49 
In addition, many states have introduced a tort of interference with 
inheritance or gift.50 
The law of capacity offers safeguards that are different from, but can 
supplement, the safeguards provided by tort law and criminal law. Criminal 
and tort statutes may deter and sanction a financial abuser, but she may still 
have an incentive to engage in misconduct if her ill-gotten gain exceeds her 
                                                 
47 See generally Lori Stiegel & Ellen Klem, Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n Law & Aging, 
Types of Abuse: Comparison Chart of Provisions in Adult Protective Services Laws, by State, 
AM. BAR ASS’N,  
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/Abuse_Types_by
_State_and_Category_Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018); Lori Stiegel & 
Ellen Klem, Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n Law & Aging, Undue Influence: Context, Provisions, 
and Citations in Adult Protective Services Laws, By State, AM. BAR ASS’N,  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/Undue_Influence_
Context_Provisions_and_Citations_Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). See 
also Nina A. Kohn, Elder (In)Justice: A Critique of the Criminalization of Elder Abuse, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2012) (criticizing statutes that criminalize elder financial abuse). 
48 See infra Section II.B. 
49 See generally Jennifer Piel, Expanding Slayer Rule to Elder Abuse, 43 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY LAW 369 (2015). 
50 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); John 
C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference 
with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335 (2013) (criticizing the tort of interference with 








expected tortious or criminal liability. An appropriately-formulated doctrine 
of mental capacity provides a different kind of remedy: disgorgement of the 
ill-gotten gain.51 This remedy can deter and sanction the abuser by taking 
away what motivated her to engage in misconduct in the first place. 
A modification of the numerical example introduced in Section I.B can 
illustrate the finer differences between the disgorgement remedy and tort or 
criminal liability.52 Suppose the potential abuser—who may overreach to 
purchase a house cheaply from an incapable senior—would be exposed to 
tortious liability if she were to so overreach. Her expected tortious liability is 
$1 million, while her expected gain $G million. If effectively enforced, then 
tort law deters the potential abuser from committing the abuse if $1 million 
> $G million; she is not incentivized to commit the abuse because her 
expected cost in terms of tortious liability is greater than her expected gain. 
However, if $1 million < $G million, her expected gain exceeds her expected 
tortious liability, so she still has an incentive to commit the abuse. On the 
other hand, by avoiding any sale of the house and disgorging any ill-gotten 
gain, an appropriately-formulated doctrine of mental capacity can deter the 
potential abuser even in cases where $1 million < $G million. Such 
                                                 
51 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 
16, 33 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 








disgorgement of her ill-gotten gain would leave her with $0. She is no longer 
incentivized to commit the abuse because her motivation for doing so would 
be removed. 
II. MENTAL CAPACITY TO TRANSACT IN AMERICAN LAW 
Part I has laid out the theoretical basis for using an appropriately-
formulated doctrine of mental capacity to deter and sanction elder financial 
exploitation. This Part explains how such a doctrine is formulated in 
prevailing American law. Part III below will argue that the prevailing 
formulation is ill-suited for resolving typical capacity disputes in the era of 
aging population. 
A. Prevailing Formulation 
In prevailing American law, the mental capacity doctrine balances the 
conflicting policies of protecting incapable individuals and protecting the 
security of transactions.53 To determine whether to avoid an impugned 
transaction, the doctrine directs the court to take two steps: 
(1) ascertain whether the relevant transacting party lacked mental capacity at 
the time of making the transaction; 
(2) consider any imbalance in the substantive and procedural aspects of the 
transaction. 
                                                 








There are several tests for answering the first question of whether a 
transacting party lacked mental capacity. The traditional test is cognitive, 
asking whether a mental disorder or defect results in an inability to 
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the 
transaction.54 To cover non-cognitive forms of mental inability, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts an additional volitional test: 
whether a mental disorder or defect results in an inability to act in a 
reasonable manner in relation to the transaction.55 The modern Restatements 
on property and trusts do not support the volitional test.56 In the last twenty 
years, the majority rule among American courts supports application of the 
volitional test (in addition to the cognitive test) to contracts, gifts of property, 
                                                 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a), cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c), cmt. d, 
reporter’s note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). See, e.g., Shoals Ford, Inc. v. Clardy, 588 So.2d 879 
(Ala. 1991); Pappert v. Sargent, 847 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1993); Board of Regents v. Davis, 74 
Cal.App.3d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Davis v. Colorado Kenworth Corp., 396 P.2d 958 
(Colo. 1964); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. DeLoache, 297 F.Supp. 647 (D.S.C. 1969); 
McPheters v. Hapke, 497 P.2d 1045 (Idaho 1972); Gallagher v. Central Indiana Bank, N.A., 
448 N.E.2d 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Costello v. Costello, 186 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1971); 
DeBauge Bros., Inc. v. Whitsitt, 512 P.2d 487 (Kansas 1973); Ridings v. Ridings, 286 S.E.2d 
614 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Matthews v. Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co., 392 P.2d 369 (Okla. 1964); 
In re Marriage of Davis, 193 89 P.3d 1206 (Or. Ct. App. 2004); Estate of McGovern v. Com. 
State Employees’ Retirement Board, 517 A.2d 523 (Pa. 1986); Brown v. Resort 
Developments, 385 S.E.2d 575 (Ba. 1989); Harris v. Rivard, 390 P.2d 1004 (Wash. 1964); 
Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
Intoxication amounts to incapacity if it satisfies the cognitive or volitional test. Id. § 16. 
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c), 
reporter’s note 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (on mental capacity to make irrevocable gifts); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (on mental capacity to 








and many other forms of lifetime transactions.57 Another form of mental 
incapacity arises from the need to engage a guardian to manage one’s 
personal or financial affairs.58 
A finding of mental incapacity gives rise to a prima facie power to avoid 
the impugned transaction, and only the incapable transacting party or her 
representative may exercise that power.59 However, the power of avoidance 
is subject to equitable qualifications. The second step in applying the mental 
capacity doctrine requires the court to consider any imbalance in the 
                                                 
57 See, e.g., Sparrow v. Demonico, 960 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 2012); Biggs v. Eaglewood 
Mortg., LLC, 582 F.Supp.2d 707 (D. Md. 2008); Hernandez v. Banks, 65 A.3d 59 (D.C. Ct. 
App. 2013); In re Estate of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153 (Me. 2003); LaBarbera v. Wynn Las 
Vegas, LLC, 422 P.3d 138 (Nev. 2018); Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 
S.W.3d 291 (Tenn. 2001); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1998). 
See also Gore v. Gadd, 522 P.2d 212 (Or. 1974). Contra. Dillin v. Alexander Dillin v. 
Alexander, 576 P.2d 1248 (Or. 1978); In re Marriage of Davis, 193 89 P.3d 1206, 1207 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]n some cases, Oregon courts may have applied certain aspects of the 
[volitional] test in determining competency. Nevertheless, the cognitive test appears to be 
the law of this state[.]”).  
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(explaining that the public is deemed to have constructive notice of the guardianship 
proceedings, and that the guardian’s control of the incapable person’s property and the 
court’s supervisory role should not be impaired or avoided); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (Appointment 
of a guardian raises a rebuttable presumption of incapacity to make an irrevocable gift.). 
A guardian is a person who is officially appointed to make decisions on behalf of 
another person. An alternative name for guardian is conservator. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE 
CODE § 5-401 (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER 
PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 401 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). See also APPELBAUM 
& GUTHEIL, supra note 30, at 181–82 (discussing clinical evaluation of disorders giving rise 
to guardianship); Ralph C. Brashier, Conservatorships, Capacity, and Crystal Balls, 87 
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2014) (“A conservatorship order that limits the decedent’s ability 
to contract is very common[.]”). 








substance of the transaction and in the conduct of the parties. The court may 
limit or deny the power of avoidance if the capable transacting party did not 
know the incapacity, had acted in good faith, and could not be restored to the 
status quo ante.60 In some jurisdictions, a lack of knowledge of the incapacity 
would qualify the power of avoidance arising from a volitional basis of 
incapacity, but not from a cognitive basis.61 An unreasonable delay in 
attempting to avoid the transaction also may prevent its avoidance or limit 
the resulting remedy.62 Moreover, courts tend to limit or deny avoidance of 
contracts for necessities of life, such as food, clothing and housing.63 
Farnum v. Silvano can illustrate how the mental capacity doctrine 
operates in practice.64 In that case, Viola—a ninety-year-old woman who 
suffered from dementia and seizure disorder—sold her house for about half 
of its fair market value to Joseph—a twenty-four-year-old friend who mowed 
                                                 
60 Id. § 15 cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
16 cmts. e, g, reporter’s note e (AM. LAW INST. 2011) 
61 These are the jurisdictions that follow RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
15(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Even in cases 
concerning cognitive incapacity, courts may still frame the remedy to account for a lack of 
knowledge of the incapacity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. e, reporter’s note e (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. e, 
reporter’s note e (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
63 Id. § 16 cmt. a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 








her lawn. Viola “trusted and had confidence in [Joseph]”,65 even though he 
“was not a member of her family or someone who had cared for her for long 
duration.”66 Viola was hospitalized several times around the time of the sale. 
Joseph selected and paid for Viola’s lawyer in connection to the sale. Viola’s 
nephew, who was also her guardian, challenged the sale on grounds of mental 
incapacity, fraud, undue influence and constructive trust.67 The 
Massachusetts court ruled against Joseph on the mental incapacity ground 
without resolving the other grounds. The court found that Viola lacked mental 
capacity according to the cognitive test, and considered Joseph’s knowledge 
of her incapacity a “decisive factor”.68 
B. Similarities with the Doctrine of Undue Influence 
Claimants who seek to avoid transactions for want of mental capacity 
usually also rely on the doctrine of undue influence.69 In most jurisdictions, 
a presumption of undue influence arises if the following two questions are 
answered in the affirmative:70 
                                                 
65 Id. at 203. 
66 Id. at 205. 
67 Id. at 203–05. 
68 Id. at 205. 
69 See infra notes 149–50 (discussing the author’s survey of modern transactional 
capacity cases). 








(1) Whether there were suspicious circumstances in the formation of the 
transaction, for example, a transacting party had a “mental weakness”;71 
(2) Whether the transaction took place in a relationship of domination or 
confidence, for example, a relationship “between a hired caregiver and an 
ill or feeble donor or between an adult child and an ill or feeble parent.”72 
If arisen, then the presumption of undue influence would render the 
transaction voidable, and place the burden on the stronger transacting party 
to prove her good faith and the weaker party’s free will and voluntariness.73 
When applied to in cases alleging elder financial abuse, the undue 
influence doctrine is functionally-indistinguishable from the mental capacity 
doctrine.74 In theory, mental capacity is a concept of mental ability to incur 
                                                 
reporter’s note f (AM. LAW INST. 1999) (citations omitted); ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE 
DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 289–90 (10th ed., 2017). 
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3, cmt. e 
(AM. LAW INST. 1999). See, e.g., Starr v. Starr, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 813 (Ca. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“[Undue influence’s] hallmark is high pressure that works on mental, moral, or emotional 
weakness[.]”).  
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1999). 
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. f (AM. 
LAW INST. 1999). 
74 See, e.g., Noland v. Noland, 956 S.W.2d 173, 179 (Ark. 1997). 
 The undue influence doctrine also covers transactions not involving a “mentally weak” 
party. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 









legal responsibility, while undue influence a concept of unfair conduct. In 
practice, these two doctrines raise essentially the same issues: whether the 
elderly transacting party lacked sufficient mental ability, and whether 
equitable considerations justify avoidance. Moreover, both doctrines employ 
vague standards of mental inability and inequitable conduct. 
Hence how the mental capacity doctrine operates in practice is a good 
proxy for how the undue influence doctrine is applied to “mentally weak” 
seniors. In this light, this Chapter will make arguments regarding the mental 
capacity doctrine, noting that the same arguments also apply to the undue 
influence doctrine in elder-financial-abuse cases.75 
C. Gradual Expansion of Scope and Judicial Discretion 
Section II.B above shows that the mental capacity doctrine is formulated 
in terms of vague standards rather than sharp rules. As a result, courts have a 
substantial discretion to determine whether the relevant transacting party 
lacked mental capacity, and whether to avoid the impugned transaction. 
Moreover, upon successful avoidance, the parties become liable to return to 
each other any benefits that they have already received pursuant to the 
                                                 
75 The mental capacity doctrine also informs the development of several other private-
law concepts, such as consent, see, e.g., Jennifer A. Drobac & Oliver R. Goodenough, 
Medical Myths: Exploring Effectiveness, Misinformation and Scientific Rigor, 12 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 471, 473 (2015), and unconscionability, see, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 26, 
at 799–800; Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: a Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 








avoided transaction.76 Vague equitable standards continue to guide judicial 
formulation of the exact remedies.77 In sum, the mental capacity doctrine 
employs vague standards to resolve three issues: 
(1) whether a transacting party lacked mental capacity; 
(2) whether to limit or deny the power to avoid the impugned transaction; 
and 
(3) the remedial consequences of successful avoidance. 
This Chapter will not object to the existing tests of mental capacity, which 
tests apply to resolve the first issue. The vagueness of these tests reflects the 
reality that promulgating rules ex ante would have been too complex and too 
costly.78 First, the social and medical conceptions of mental disorders have 
evolved significantly in the last two centuries.79 It would have been too 
complex and too costly to promulgate rule-like legal tests to determine which 
                                                 
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 15(2), 16(1), 
33(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
77 Id. See also id. §§ 49(3), 50, 52 (different measures of restitutionary liability 
depending on whether the recipient is “innocent” or a “conscious wrongdoer”). 
78 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: an Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Common Law of 
Contract and the Default Rule Project, 102 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2016) (arguing against efforts 
to create substantive default rules that are transcontextual). 
79 See generally CAROL S. NORTH & SEAN H. YUTZY, GOODWIN AND GUZE’S 
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 1-8 (6th ed., 2010) (discussing the history of psychiatric diagnosis); 
BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, ch. 2; Christian Perring, Mental Illness, THE STANFORD 









subset of the large, diverse and growing set of mental disorders should lead 
to avoidance of transaction.80 Second, in the modern economy, the stereotype 
that seniors are “frail, out of touch, burdensome or dependent” is inaccurate 
and outdated.81 Seniors approaching traditional retirement age often do not 
want to retire notwithstanding any physical or mental decline. Many start 
their own businesses or work part-time. Advances in transportation and 
communication technologies also have eased the physical obstacles to 
utilizing knowledge, skills and financial flexibility.82 Hence there is no 
obvious age cutoff that can objectively determine a senior’s mental capacity 
to transact. 
However, a finding of mental incapacity does not necessarily justify 
avoidance of the impugned transaction. This Chapter will challenge the 
prevailing doctrinal theories that govern the second and third issues identified 
above: the limitations on the power of avoidance and the remedial 
consequences of successful avoidance. The rest of this Part will show that 
over the centuries, the mental capacity doctrine has steadily expanded in 
                                                 
80 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 2, at xiii–xl (a standard list of mental 
disorders). Equating mental capacity in the legal sense with mental disorder in the psychiatric 
sense may offend international human rights law. See generally Eliza Varney, Redefining 
Contractual Capacity? The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
the Incapacity Defence in English Contract Law, 2017 LEGAL STUDIES 1. 
81 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON AGEING AND HEALTH 10 (2015), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/186463/1/9789240694811_eng.pdf. 








scope and become less determinate in application. As a result, there is a 
substantial judicial discretion to decide transactional capacity disputes, and 
the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine are meant to guide the exercise 
of that discretion. Part III will challenge these theoretical underpinnings. 
1. Historical Origins 
Compared with its modern form, the mental capacity doctrine was 
significantly narrower in medieval English law.83 Early common law denied 
transactional capacity to individuals who were non compotes mentis—a term 
of art meaning “unsound mind”. Writing in the first half of the seventeenth 
century, Sir Edward Coke divided individuals with an unsound mind into four 
categories: idiots; lunatics who lost their memory and understanding by 
accidents such as sickness or grief; lunatics with lucid intervals; and 
drunkards.84 Idiots were born with an inability to read, count, tell her age, or 
name her parents, while lunatics had had understanding.85 The process of 
establishing idiocy or lunacy commenced with a petition for the appointment 
                                                 
83 Mental incapacity appears in one of the oldest treatises on English common law. See 
2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND vol. 2 at 134–35, vol. 3 at 28, vol. 4 
at 308 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., Belknap Press 1968), 
http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/Unframed/English/. 
84 2 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 246.a. (Robert H. Small ed., 
1853); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 230 (5th ed. 1849). 
85 LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, 








of a commission to engage in a fact-finding mission.86 A finding that the 
individual was an idiot or a lunatic at the time of making the impugned 
transaction provided a basis to avoid it.87 The formal rationale for avoidance 
was a lack of rational and deliberate consent.88 
In medieval common law, the mental capacity doctrine aimed not to 
further the interests of the incapable individual but the interests of his 
expectant heir and family. First, a finding of idiocy or lunacy could result in 
the appointment of a guardian to take control of the individual and his 
property; the guardian was typically a relative.89 Second, there was a 
fundamental maxim that a person could not plead his own unsoundness of 
mind. The original rationale for that “absurd and mischievous” maxim was 
the person could not remember what he did when he was mentally unsound.90 
Instead, it was up to his guardian, expectant heir, executor or administrator 
of his estate to plead his unsoundness of mind.91 
Dissatisfied with the narrow definitions of idiocy and lunacy and with the 
                                                 
86 Id. at 82–83 (citations omitted). 
87 SHELFORD, supra note 85, at 266; 1 STORY, supra note 84, §§ 223–24. 
88 1 STORY, supra note 84, § 223. 
89 SHELFORD, supra note 85, at 130–33. 
90 1 STORY, supra note 84, § 225. 








slow and costly fact-finding commission, common law courts in the long 
eighteenth century began to avoid transactions upon a jury’s finding of 
cognitive deficiency. Ball v. Mannin was a leading case.92 That case 
concerned a John Shinton Ball—an heir of land who was of “weak capacity” 
from minority but had not been found an idiot or a lunatic.93 As soon as he 
reached majority, John executed a deed to create a family trust with his 
inheritance. The trust conferred substantial benefits on his mother and father-
in-law at the expense of his brothers from his mother’s previous marriage 
with his deceased father.94 After John passed away and a failed attempt to set 
aside the trust deed for fraud, his nephew sought avoidance on the basis of 
incapacity.95 Rather than applied the narrow definition of idiocy, the trial 
judge instructed the jury to decide “whether [John] was capable of 
understanding what he did by executing the deed in question, when its general 
purport was fully explained to him.”96 The final appellate court upheld this 
jury instruction.97 
                                                 
92 (1829) 4 Eng. Rep. 1241; 3 Bligh N.S. 1 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.). 
93 Id. Eng. Rep. at 1248; Bligh N.S. at 19. 
94 Id. Eng. Rep. at 1241; Bligh N.S. at 1. 
95 Id. Eng. Rep. at 1242; Bligh N.S. at 2–3. 
96 Id. Eng. Rep. at 1241, 1248; Bligh N.S. at 1, 3, 21. 








While courts of common law saw mental capacity as a threshold concept 
of mental ability, courts of equity were more concerned with the fairness of 
the impugned transaction.98 In addition to idiocy, lunacy and cognitive 
deficiency, equity courts avoided transactions on the basis of a “weakness of 
mind”—a vague standard covering “temporary illness, general mental 
imbecility, the natural incapacity of early infancy, the infirmity of extreme 
old age, or those accidental depressions, which result from sudden fear, or 
constitutional despondency, or overwhelming calamities.”99 Moreover, 
equity courts avoided the transactions of individuals experiencing “excess 
drunkenness”.100 However, that a transacting party was mentally weak (or 
excessively drunk) only gave rise to an inference of fraud, imposition or 
undue influence; the other party could rebut that inference.101 These equity 
cases would gradually develop into the “mental weakness” strand of the 
modern doctrine of undue influence.102 
                                                 
98 In this Part, “common law courts” refer to the Court of Queen’s Bench or King’s 
Bench, the Court of Common Pleas and the common law side of the Exchequer; and “equity 
courts” refer to the Court of Chancery and the equity side of the Exchequer. 
99 1 STORY, supra note 84, § 234. 
100 Id. § 253. 
101 Id. § 235. Even when idiocy or lunacy was found, courts of equity took into account 
whether the transaction was made in good faith, whether the capable transacting party had 
knowledge of the incapacity, whether she had overreached, and whether she could be 
restored to the status quo ante. See 1 STORY, supra note 84, § 231. 








In the nineteenth century, Anglo-American courts clearly felt the impact 
of new developments in psychiatry and medical jurisprudence.103 As 
Professor Susanna Blumenthal wrote, judges were “generally receptive to the 
teachings of the new medical psychology but found it difficult to apply them 
in the courtroom.”104 Judges also often found it desirable to protect the 
interests of the capable transacting party and the security of transactions.105 
As a result, judges began to apply equitable principles to uphold transactions 
that were considered fair, even if a transacting party was mentally-
incapable.106 Diminishing the role of medical evidence, this “pragmatic” 
approach rendered “disparities in mental ability . . . less salient as a matter of 
law.”107  
The “pragmatic” approach taken by nineteenth-century courts produced 
a majority rule that heavily relied on equitable considerations to limit or deny 
the power to avoid transactions on the basis of mental incapacity.108 Under 
                                                 
103 See generally BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 78–79. 
104 Id. at 178. 
105 Id. at 183–84, 193–95. 
106 Id. at 178–79, 184. See also 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY’S EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 928, 948 (3d ed. 1905). 
107 BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 17.  
108 Id. at 184. The minority rule at the time held that mental incapacity rendered the 
transaction void, rather than merely voidable at the option of the incapable individual (or her 








the majority rule, a finding that a transacting party lacked mental capacity 
would only ground a qualified power to avoid the transaction. This power 
would generally be lost if the capable transacting party “proceeded in good 
faith and in nonnegligent ignorance of the incapacity, unless the parties could 
be placed in status quo.”109 These restrictions on the power of avoidance were 
primarily concerned with the conduct giving rise to the transaction and the 
remedial consequences of avoidance. The initial finding of mental incapacity 
was merely a pretext for a judicial inquiry into the equities of the transaction. 
In exercising their substantial discretion to resolve transactional capacity 
disputes, nineteenth-century judges were generally more willing to uphold 
transactions in the business sphere than in the family sphere. As Professor 
Blumenthal observed, while judicial opinions on mental capacity and 
neighboring principles were not uniform,110 judges tended to protect strangers 
who had no reason to suspect incapacity.111 At the same time, judges were 
generally reluctant to uphold contracts and lifetime transfers of property in a 
broad range of family relationships that were considered confidential or 
fiduciary in nature.112 Business and family were “separate doctrinal realms 
                                                 
109 Id. at 184. See also1 STORY, supra note 84, § 231. 
110 BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 184, 181, 230. 
111 Id. at 181, 184. 








that many nineteenth-century judges envisioned and tried to maintained, 
concerned as they were with insulating intimate relations from those of the 
market.”113 In particular, judges were strongly suspicious of formal 
caregiving agreements in families, in which “services and support were 
supposed to be offered freely, without expectation of return.”114 
2. The Realist Revolution 
In the light of the judicial tendency to search for inequitable conduct, 
Realist legal scholars in the early twentieth century reformulated the mental 
capacity doctrine. Most influential was Professor Milton Green’s critique in 
the 1940s. The formalists at the time offered a lack of subjective “meeting of 
the minds” to justify avoidance of a transaction for want of mental 
capacity.115 Professor Green disagreed, arguing that it is impossible to 
ascertain a person’s subjective state of mind.116 In reality, courts examined 
the behaviors of the person, and only paid lip service to the cognitive test of 
incapacity.117 Also common was equally-qualified psychiatrists reaching 
                                                 
113 Id. at 199. 
114 Id. at 221 (citation omitted). 
115 See, e.g., Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9, 20 (1872) (discussed in Green, Operative Effect, 
supra note 9, at 558). 
116 Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 12, at 160–161. 
117 Id. at 161, 163; Green, Major Premise, supra note 12, at 306. Searching for a 
subjective “meeting of the minds” was also inconsistent with the then-emerging, objective 








opposite conclusions regarding mental ability, leading courts to disregard 
expert opinions all together.118 
Professor Green offered two alternative theories. First, his conflicting-
policies theory articulated the public policies at stake: protecting the 
mentally-incapable individual and her family, and protecting the security of 
transactions.119 To Green, these policies were necessarily in conflict because 
the incapable individual’s (or her representative’s) choice of challenging the 
transaction indicated that it was disadvantageous to her.120 Moreover, Green 
offered the abnormality theory: judicial decisions depended on an implicit 
but dominant consideration pertaining to the objective abnormality of the 
impugned transaction. Abnormality manifested “in a transaction which is 
obviously out of line with the institutional pattern of similar transactions” in 
the light of “all of the circumstances” and “what a reasonably competent 
[person] might have made.”121 Fraud or gross inadequacy of consideration 
                                                 
viewpoint to see if it was of such a character as to arouse reasonable expectations.” Green, 
Judicial Tests, supra note 12, at 162. See also Green, Operative Effect, supra note 12, at 4. 
118 Green, Major Premise, supra note 12, 285–86; Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 
N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
119 Green, Public Policies, supra note 12, at 1214.  
120 Id. at 1214. Contra. infra Section III.A.1 (arguing that this is the critical flaw of 
Green’s theories). 








were factors showing abnormality.122 Courts were more likely to avoid a 
transaction if some abnormal factor was present.123 To Green, abnormality 
was both “evidence of a disordered mind” and of potential overreach.124 To 
promote a scientific study of the law and greater predictability in future cases, 
he advocated for explicit consideration of abnormality.125 
In addition to adopting Green’s theories, the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts responded to new developments in psychiatry.126 To supplement 
the cognitive test of incapacity,127 this Restatement introduced a qualified 
volitional test; this new test denies contractual capacity if due to a mental 
disorder or defect, the relevant transacting party is unable to act in a 
reasonable manner in relation to the transaction, and the other party has 
“reason to know”.128 In a treatise, the reporter explained that imposing a 
                                                 
122 Id. at 304–05, 307. 
123 Id. at 305–06. 
124 Id. at 305. Contra. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 29, at 541 (arguing that judicial 
consideration of abnormality deprives the incapable individual of the right to make eccentric 
transactions, the practical result of which is “punishment for deviancy, not protection against 
helplessness[]”). 
125 Green, Major Premise, at 309–11. 
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmts. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
127 Id. § 15(1)(a). 
128 Id. § 15(1)(b), reporter’s note (citing, inter alia, Note, Mental Illness and the Law of 
Contracts, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1020, 1033–36 (1959) (arguing in favor of expanding the 
mental capacity doctrine to cover non-cognitive mental disorders); Note, Contracts-
Competency to Contract of Mentally Ill Person Who Fully Understands Transaction But Is 








knowledge qualifier on the volitional test, but not on the traditional cognitive 
test, was a compromised position between not adding a volitional test at all 
and adding it without qualification.129 However, the modern Restatements on 
property and trusts were unwillingness to adopt the volitional test.130 
Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board of New York was one of the very 
first cases to adopt Green’s theories.131 In that case, the widower of a retired 
school teacher sought to avoid an irrevocable election of retirement benefits 
that the school teacher made while she was under treatment for “involuntary 
melancholiac in depression” (a form of clinical depression).132 The election 
increased her allowance during her lifetime but upon her death, nothing 
would be payable to her designated beneficiary—her widower. She died 
shortly after making the election, so in hindsight, it turned out to be a poor 
financial choice for her family.133 The evidence revealed that she had 
“complete cognitive judgment and awareness” at the time of making the 
                                                 
experts should be allowed to opine on incapacity without regard to legal categories)). Contra. 
Alexander & Szasz, supra note 29, at 542–55 (opposing the adoption of the volitional test). 
129 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.6 at 229–30 (4th ed. 2004). 
130 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c), 
reporter’s note 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2003). 
131 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1969).  
132 Id. at 462. 








election,134 and the administrators of the retirement system were aware that 
she was seeing a psychiatrist.135 The New York Court of Appeals reversed 
the lower court’s dismissal of her widower’s claim for avoidance. The Court 
found the cognitive test out-of-step with psychiatric learning; it failed to 
account for people who could not control their conduct due to a mental 
disorder even though there was no impairment of their cognitive ability. The 
Court went on to adopt the qualified volitional test and Green’s theories.136 
Recent developments continue the steady march to make the mental 
capacity doctrine broad and indeterminate. Further rendering “disparities in 
mental ability . . . less salient as a matter of law[,]”137 the practical differences 
between the cognitive and volitional tests of incapacity are gradually 
disappearing. The recently-published Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment applies the same equitable considerations—including any 
knowledge of the incapacity—to qualify the power of avoidance arising from 
                                                 
134 Id. at 462. 
135 Id. at 465–66. 
136 Id. at 464–65. An earlier New York case adopted the volitional test without the 
knowledge qualifier. See Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765, 768–69 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
137 BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 17. See generally Meiklejohn, supra note 26, at 342, 
387 (analysis of transactional capacity cases from the 1960s to the 1980s showing that courts 
tend to give more weight to lay testimony than to expert testimony, which tendency indicates 








any form of incapacity.138 This departs from the earlier view that insofar as 
contracts are concerned, the knowledge qualifier should only apply to the 
volitional test of incapacity, but not to the cognitive test.139 Moreover, the 
new Restatement takes the view that  “the contours of legal responsibility [in 
transactional capacity cases] are determined, not by measuring ‘capacity to 
contract’ against some a priori standard, but by weighing at each point the 
value of the protection secured against the cost of securing it.”140 This view 
not only reaffirms Green’s theories, it also eschews general and predictable 
rules in favor of granting a substantial judicial discretion to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
* * * 
Centuries of gradual expansion has made the mental capacity doctrine in 
prevailing American law broad in scope and indeterminate in application. 
                                                 
138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 cmt. e, cmt. 
g, reporter’s note e (AM. LAW INST. 2011). A jurisdiction’s failure to adopt the volitional test 
also does not prevent volitional mental disorders from satisfying the cognitive test of 
incapacity. For example, manic depressive disorder—the mental disorder that led to New 
York’s early adoption of a version of the volitional test in Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 
242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963)—has successfully satisfied the cognitive test in 
other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Shoals Ford, Inc. v. Clardy, 588 So.2d 879, 882-83 (Ala. 1991). 
The modern name for manic depressive disorder is bipolar disorder. NORTH & YUTZY, supra 
note 79, at 12. 
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
140 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). See also Meiklejohn, supra note 26, at 352–53, 355 (analysis of 
transactional capacity cases from the 1960s to the 1980s showing that substantive imbalance 








Perhaps for this reason, the doctrine is considered “one of the great 
controversies in American legal history[,]”141 and “more tenuous or spectral” 
than other branches of jurisprudence.142 The doctrine now grants a substantial 
judicial discretion to balance the conflicting policies of protecting incapable 
individuals and protecting the security of transactions. A finding of mental 
incapacity is merely a pretext for a case-by-case assessment of the costs and 
benefits of protection. Theoretical and normative considerations now guide 
the exercise of judicial discretion to avoid transactions and to determine the 
remedial consequences of successful avoidance.143 
III. VARIETIES OF TRANSACTIONS IN THE ERA OF AGING POPULATION 
While nineteenth-century courts tended to treat business and family as 
separate doctrinal spheres,144 both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and 
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment direct modern 
courts to apply the same, transcontextual standards to govern transactions 
with businesses and transactions involving relatives and friends.145 Such 
                                                 
141 Hirsch, supra note 27, at 264. 
142 Waggoner v. Atkins, 162 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ark. 1942) (dismissing an incapacity 
challenge to a sale of interest in land by a seller who drank excessively, used narcotics, and 
brought the challenge three years after restoration of his mental faculties). 
143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33(3) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 
144 See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 








transcontextual standards leave courts to determine the exact legal criteria to 
be applied in particular cases, with the benefit of hindsight.146 Hence, in 
modern times, whether business transactions and family-and-friend 
transactions should be treated differently is a matter of judicial discretion. 
In this light, the author will argue that courts should loosen regulation of 
transactions involving close relatives and friends, but rigorously protect 
potentially incapable individuals from exploitative business practices. In 
modern times, most transactions covered by the mental capacity doctrine 
involve relatives and friends;147 Section III.A below will examine these 
transactions. Section III.B will consider transactions between potentially 
incapable individuals and businesses.  The overarching claim to be advanced 
is that the prevailing doctrinal theories are unduly suspicious of transactions 
that take place in close families and personal relationships.148 However, these 
                                                 
INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 illus.  
2, 4, 7–8 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). See also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political 
Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PENN. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (1995) (explaining 
private legislatures’ incentives to produce standards that delegate substantive discretion to 
courts); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 78 (criticizing efforts to create transcontextual default 
standards). 
146 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 78. 
147 See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
148 This Chapter uses “close family” as a shorthand for a familial relationship that 
satisfies the “core qualities [of] a demonstrated, long-term commitment and the assumption 
of mutual care and financial responsibility[.]” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From 
Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 293, 306 (2016) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter, Scott & Scott, From 
Contract to Status]. See generally id. at 305 (explaining the key attributes of a contemporary 








doctrinal theories remain suitable for regulating transactions with businesses. 
A. Transactions involving Relatives and Friends 
The author’s survey of modern transactional capacity cases shows the 
prevalence of claims by relatives who expect to inherit from the potentially 
incapable individual.149 As Figure 2 shows, in more than half of the cases 
surveyed, the person who sought avoidance was a relative of the potentially 
incapable individual’s.150 Figure 3 further shows that about half of the cases 
surveyed concerned a transaction between the potentially incapable 
individual and a relative or friend. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that the 
impugned transaction was frequently made in the potentially incapable 
individual’s final years of life. These observations suggest that avoidance 
claims were usually sought by a relative to pursue a personal benefit: to 
                                                 
biological relationship, id. at 305, a close family is a family of “affection and dependence”. 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 11 (2009). 
149 This survey covers cases decided in 2013-18 that are listed under Westlaw’s West 
Key Number System, k-92. See infra this Dissertation, Appendix A. The survey excludes 
cases that did not reach issues regarding mental capacity; and cases concerning a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Fiduciary cases raise different issues. See generally this Dissertation, chs. 2, 
3. There are thirty cases in the survey if arbitration agreements are included, and twenty-two 
if arbitration agreements are included. Arbitration agreements raise federal-law issues. See 
infra notes 220–26 and accompanying text. 
150 The sample size of the Westlaw survey is small (thirty). See id. As a robustness check, 
Diagram 1 also compares the results of the Westlaw survey with the results of a sample of 
fifty-five cases decided after 1963 that appear in the case citations supplement to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) and in the footnotes of 
5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 22, § 10:8. 1963 was the year in which the New York 
judiciary first adopted a volitional test of mental capacity. See Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. 








increase her expected inheritance from the potentially incapable individual. 
 
 
Figure 2: Identity of the Claimant (Excl. Arbitration Agreements) 
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Figure 4: Impugned Transaction Made in Old Age (Excl. Arbitration 
Agreements) 
 
1. Claims Driven by Inheritance Expectations 
The survey of modern cases reveals the hidden role of inheritance 
expectations in transactional capacity disputes. Figure 5 below depicts the 
typical procedural posture. The potentially incapable individual is typically 
inactive due to incapacity or death. The size and composition of her estate at 
death depend on the outcome of the avoidance claim against the capable 
transacting party. A successful claim tends to enlarge the estate of the 
incapable individual, and thereby benefits the claimant (who expects to 
inherit some or all of such estate). Thus the mental capacity doctrine can 
potentially impact upon potentially incapable individuals and potential 

























Figure 5: Typical Transactional Capacity Dispute 
 
The prevailing doctrinal theories fail to recognize the role of inheritance 
expectations. The conflicting-policies theory critically depends on the 
assumption the potentially incapable individual finds the impugned 
transaction subjectively disadvantageous; it is for this reason that the policies 
of protecting the individual and protecting the security of transactions are 
necessarily in conflict.151 However, in typical cases, the true claimant is not 
the potentially incapable individual herself; the claimant’s interest may or 
may not be aligned with the individual’s. In cases involving misalignment of 
interest, the individual may actually find the transaction beneficial rather than 
disadvantageous.152 In these cases, the conflicting-policies theory is wrong. 
                                                 
151 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 















Moreover, a hallmark of inheritance disputes is the “worst evidence” 
problem: the testimony of a deceased individual is unavailable.153 The court 
can at best gauge from circumstantial evidence to ascertain the past mental 
state or intention of the deceased. If the impugned transaction took place in 
private, then the court also can only rely on circumstantial evidence to 
ascertain how the capable transacting party had dealt with the deceased. Such 
significant evidential deficiency, together with the legal uncertainty arising 
from the vague standards of mental capacity,154 give the potential 
beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate an opportunity to avoid transactions that 
actually advance the deceased’s testamentary intent. This again challenges 
the conflicting-policies theory. 
2. Estate Planning 
Section III.A.1 has shown that the prevailing, conflicting-policies theory 
wrongly assumes the potentially incapable individual necessarily finds the 
impugned transaction disadvantageous. This Section will argue that the 
widely-accepted abnormality theory is also often wrong; it ignores the fact 
that many near-death transactions are estate-planning instruments. 
                                                 
financial abuse for allowing the state to act without the active participation of victims). 
153 See generally SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 70, at xxxiii, 141, 263–64. See 
also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 50, at 336, 344–46, 365, 376–77 (criticizing the tort of 
interference with inheritance for failing to address the “worst evidence” problem). 








Many near-death transactions captured by the mental capacity doctrine 
are in substance will substitutes—meaning transactions to effectuate transfers 
of wealth at or near death without going through the formal probate system.155 
For example, by creating a joint tenancy in her property with a right of 
survivorship, a potentially incapable individual allows her co-tenant to inherit 
the property when she passes away.156 Professor John Langbein showed that 
over the course of the twentieth century, will substitutes became popular 
estate-planning instruments in the United States.157 As a result, Professor 
Langbein and other scholars called for regulation of will substitutes as estate-
planning instruments rather than as contracts or lifetime gifts.158 Nonetheless, 
                                                 
155 See generally John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the 
Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108 (1984). 
To be sure, near-death contracts and gifts are often “imperfect” will substitutes; unlike 
wills, they cannot be revoked by their makers before death, and they also take effect before 
death. Id. at 1114–15. Perhaps for this reason, prevailing American law applies the test for 
contractual capacity, rather than testamentary capacity, to irrevocable gifts. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(c), cmt. d, 
reporter’s note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). However, if the maker of an irrevocable will 
substitute lacks capacity, then the will substitute become prima facie revocable. The maker 
(or her representative) may exercise the power to avoid the will substitute for want of 
capacity before she dies. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. In other words, mental 
incapacity can render formally irrevocable will substitutes practically revocable. 
156 Langbein, supra note 155, at 1112. See, e.g., Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2001) (discussed in infra notes 259–62 and accompanying text). 
157 Langbein, supra note 155. 
158 See especially id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE 








like their counterparts in the nineteenth century,159 modern American courts 
tend to apply contractual doctrines to resolve capacity disputes over will 
substitutes.160 
Engaging the abnormality theory, judicial application of contractual 
doctrines to will substitutes ignores the inherit differences between estate-
planning instruments and true contracts. First, abnormality means deviation 
from the “norm”, and what may be “normal” in truly contractual dealings is 
different from what may be “normal” in estate-planning. In particular, 
contracts are usually beneficial to both sides, but will substitutes are by their 
nature one-sided—in favor the party who is expected to inherit. Like wills, 
but unlike contracts, will substitutes inherently exhibit substantive imbalance 
regardless of their makers’ mental ability. As a result, substantive imbalance 
is not a reliable indication of poor mental ability. Thus the abnormality theory 
wrongly asserts that substantive imbalance is a sign of mental incapacity.161 
The same problem affects other factors that amount to deviation from the 
contractual “norm” but are consistent with the estate-planning “norm”. 
Second, the abnormality theory assumes the existence of a “norm” the 
deviation from which is suspect, but ascertaining what is “normal” in estate 
                                                 
159 See generally BLUMENTHAL, supra note 26, at 179–80, 199–200. 
160 See generally this Dissertation, Appendix A. 








planning is notoriously hard. Since the mid-twentieth century, families based 
on formal marriage and bloodline are in decline, while unmarried cohabiting 
partnerships, blended families, and other nontraditional family forms are 
becoming more prevalent.162  The task of ascertaining the probable estate plan 
of a typical person must be carried out in the light of the great diversity of 
modern family forms. That task, as Professor Robert Sitkoff and the late 
Professor Jesse Dukeminier wrote in the context of intestate rules, “often 
involves substantial guesswork, as people’s preferences differ, and it is hard 
to know what most people … would want.”163 
Moreover, the abnormality theory is overly cynical in asserting that 
substantive imbalance is a sign of overreach by the capable transacting 
party.164 Will substitutes are typically made to transfer wealth to their makers’ 
                                                 
162 See generally Scott & Scott, From Contract to Status, supra note 148, at 302–03; 
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 70, at 74–75, 90, 108–10; RALPH C. BRASHIER, 
INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 1–4 (2004); Thomas P. Gallanis, The 
Flexible Family in Three Dimension, 28 L. & INEQ. 291, 57–59 (2010); Kathrine M. Arango, 
Trial and Heirs: Antemortem Probate for the Changing American Family, 81 BROOK. L. 
REV. 779, 782–87 (2016) (recent survey of Census statistics and empirical studies on 
American families). 
163 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 70, at 63. Intestate rules are majoritarian default 
rules governing distribution of the probate property of persons who die without a will. Id. at 
63. See also Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: a Proposal for Guided 
Discretion in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787 (2012) (arguing that fixed intestacy 
rules fail to adapt to diverse family structures and proposing guided judicial discretion as an 
alternative); Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
199 (2001) (arguing against the family paradigm in American inheritance law and proposing 
potential reforms outside that paradigm). 








close relatives and friends. In a close familial or personal relationship, 
biological and affective bonds can partially deter misconduct, so can social 
and moral norms.165 Whether these extralegal mechanisms are strong enough 
depends on the nature of the relationship. For instance, Professors Elizabeth 
Scott and Robert Scott argued that intrinsic bonds and informal norms are 
typically sufficient to deter misconduct in close parent-minor child 
relationships.166 More recently, Professor Elizabeth Scott and the author 
argued that extralegal mechanisms can also partially deter misconduct when 
a spouse/partner or an adult child serves as guardian to an elderly incapable 
person.167 However, affective bonds tend to be less effective in such a 
guardianship than in a close parent-minor child relationship. The point is that 
substantive imbalance may or may not be a reliable signal of misconduct by 
the capable transacting party; such signal must be interpreted in the light of 
the presence of intrinsic bonds and informal norms as well as the strength of 
such extralegal mechanisms. It is often wrong for the abnormality theory to 
treat substantive imbalance as evidence of potential overreach. 
                                                 
165 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 2401, 2430, 2433 (1995) [hereinafter, Scott & Scott, Parents]. 
166 Id. 
167 Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary Principles in Family Law, in OXFORD 









It must be clarified that the presence and strength of intrinsic bonds and 
social norms in the relationship between a potentially incapable individual 
and the capable transacting party depend littles on the individual’s 
relationship with the claimant. This clarification matters because in many 
disputed cases, the active litigants all are related to the potentially incapable 
individual, for example, her relations from different marriages.168 The 
relationship between the claimant and the capable transacting party is 
typically acrimonious. However, what matter for deterring misconduct are 
the extralegal mechanisms that regulate the capable transacting party’s 
relationship with the potentially incapable individual, not with the claimant. 
Thus the fact that the disputed cases usually involve litigants who are related 
to each other does not weaken the argument that strong intrinsic bonds and 
social norms can partially deter misconduct in the relationship between the 
potentially incapable individual and her close relative or friend. 
Empirical findings regarding elder abuse in families therefore must be 
cautiously interpreted. Surveys from American jurisdictions consistently 
report that alleged perpetrators of elder abuse are usually related to the 
victim.169 While the exact figures vary, adult children and spouses/partners 
                                                 
168 See, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. 2017) (claims brought by the 
potentially incapable individual’s step-children and step-grandchildren against her niece, 
nephew and others). 








are typically reported as the largest groups of alleged perpetrators.170 Yet 
these findings should not be interpreted to suggest that spouses/partners, adult 
children, or other family members are prone to commit elder abuse. Saying 
elder abusers are likely to be family members is not the same as saying family 
members are likely to be elder abusers.171 That family members are well-
represented in elder abuser statistics may well be driven by the prevalence of 
transactions between seniors and their family members (especially in the 
estate-planning context), rather than by any strong tendency of family 
members to commit elder abuse.172 The author is unaware of any empirical 
finding showing such a tendency. 
                                                 
170 See, e.g., LIFESPAN OF GREATER ROCHESTER, WEILL CORNELL MEDICAL CENTER OF 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY & NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT FOR THE AGING, supra note 40, at 
17, 35. 
171 More formally, let  denote the set of transactions involving seniors. Let A denote 
the subset of  that constitute abuse, and F the subset of  that involve a family member. In 
general, P(F|A)≠P(A|F), where P(F|A) is the conditional probability that a given abusive 
transaction involves a family member, and P(A|F) the conditional probability that a given 
transaction with a family member constitutes abuse. Existing empirical studies consistently 
show a high P(F|A), see supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text, but stop short of 
revealing P(A|F). 
To be sure, Bayes’ theorem implies P(A|F)=P(F|A)P(A)÷P(F), where P(A) is the 
(unconditional) probability that a transaction constitutes abuse, and P(F) the (unconditional) 
probability that a transaction involves a family member. In principle, one can derive P(A|F) 
from P(F|A), P(A), and P(F). Yet the hidden nature of elder abuse seems to prevent empirical 
researchers from ascertaining P(A). See, e.g., LIFESPAN OF GREATER ROCHESTER, WEILL 
CORNELL MEDICAL CENTER OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY & NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT FOR 
THE AGING, supra note 40, at 7. 
172 More formally, Bayes’ theorem implies P(F|A)=P(A|F)P(F)÷P(A), where these 
probabilities are described in supra note 170. A high P(F|A) can be explained by a high P(F), 








Showing undue suspicion of substantive imbalance in transactions 
involving close relatives and friends, the abnormality theory can harm the 
welfare of incapable individuals. Experimental research in psychology and 
behavioral economics shows that individual preferences are often other-
regarding, rather than purely self-regarding. In addition to altruism, a 
common form of other-regarding preferences is reciprocity fairness—
returning kindness for another’s kindness but unkindness for another’s 
unkindness.173 Wills can be the final manifestation of strong other-regarding 
preferences in close and long-term relationships.174 Similarly, one-sided 
contracts, irrevocable gifts, and many other forms of will substitutes can be 
the manifestation of strong other-regarding preferences. Yet the mental 
capacity doctrine tends to regard these transactions with great suspicion; it 
harms the welfare of the incapable individual by rendering her less able to 
pursue valuable other-regarding goals and preferences. 
                                                 
173 See generally SANJIT DHAMI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS chs. 5.2, 5.3, 6.7 (2016) (surveying experimental research on other-regarding 
preferences). See, e.g., Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, 
and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999); Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A 
Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (2000); Gary 
Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. 
ECON. 817 (2002). See also DHAMI, ch. 5.5 (discussing external validity of experimental 
research); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1641, 1646, 1685–90 (2003) (Preferences for reciprocal fairness provide a source of 
self-enforcement in deliberately incomplete contracts). 
174 See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, 









To be sure, there is preliminary evidence that courts tend to exercise their 
substantial discretion to uphold transactions made in close families and 
personal relationships. Based on a doctrinal analysis of transactional capacity 
cases decided in the 1960s to the 1980s, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn 
found that courts were generally willing to consider relational factors and 
tended to uphold transactions made in the course of long-term and close 
relationships that benefited the potentially incapable individual.175 For this 
and other reasons, he concluded that the prevailing doctrinal theories are 
“fundamentally sound”.176 However, neither Professor Meiklejohn’s sample 
of cases nor mine is large enough to generate statistically significant 
results,177 especially in the light of the numerous abnormality factors and 
other variables that may affect judicial decisionmaking.178 To the extent that 
courts indeed tended to uphold transactions involving close relatives and 
friends, they reached the right results for the wrong reasons. Part IV below 
                                                 
175 Meiklejohn, supra note 26, at 364–67, 379, 387. 
176 Id. at 310. The other reasons for Professor Meiklejohn’s conclusion were that courts 
tended to give more weight to lay testimony than to expert testimony, showing their 
avoidance of undue deference to psychiatry, see id. at 342, 387; that substantive imbalance 
was relevant to, but not determinative of, the issue of capacity, see id. at 352–53, 355; and 
the undesirable consequences of guardianship might be mitigated by the widespread 
legislative adoption of durable powers of attorney and limited guardianship, each of which 
preserved transactional capacity, see id. at 379–86. 
177 See id. at 311 note 17, 366–67 note 285; supra notes 149–50 (discussing the author’s 
survey). 








will offer reform suggestions to maximize the likelihood that the right results 
are reached, for the right reasons. 
3. Reward for Informal Caregiving 
In the present era of aging population, the ‘[e]conomic and social costs 
both to society and to potential caregivers [are] increasing, while the tax base 
and the pool of family caregivers, especially women, [are] shrinking.’179 In 
the United States, the burden of providing care to the elderly is primarily 
borne by families rather than by the state. A recent empirical study estimates 
that about 34.2 million Americans provide unpaid care to an adult, with 
nearly half of the care recipients being seventy-five years or older.180 
Caregivers typically provide four years of unpaid care to an aged parent or 
spouse/partner.181 Caregiving is burdensome and time-consuming; it 
generally takes 24.4 hours per week on average, and increases to 44.6 hours 
                                                 
179 Ann M. Soden Ad. E., Family Matters: Some Emerging Legal Issues in 
Intergenerational and Generational Relations, in BEYOND ELDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
LAW AND AGING 119 (Israel Dorn & Ann M Soden eds., 2012). See generally NATIONAL 
ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 
2015 at 12, 66–67 (2015), https://www.caregiving.org/caregiving2015/; Joshua C. Tate, 
Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 120, 134–35 
(2008) [hereinafter Tate, Caregiving]; Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and 
Professional Guardians, 31 STETSON L. REV. 941, 947 (2002) [hereinafter Barnes, 
Corporate and Professional Guardians]. 
180 NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, supra 
note 179, at 17–18. 








per week on average when the care-recipient is a spouse/partner.182 To 
provide care, family caregivers often have to reduce their work hours, 
sacrifice their careers or tap into their retirement savings.183  
In this light, the prevailing doctrinal theories can harm the welfare of 
many seniors by unduly limiting their ability to reward caregiving. Unless 
formally appointed to some fiduciary office,184 family caregivers typically do 
not get paid a salary for providing valuable care. Instead, family caregivers 
may enjoy the emotional reward of caring for loved ones.185 Another common 
form of reward for caregiving is inheritance from the care-recipient’s 
estate.186 Yet the prevailing doctrinal theories pose a heightened risk of 
avoiding will substitutes that truly reflect the testamentary intent of their 
                                                 
182 Id. at 34. 
183 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-382, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
SOME PARENTAL AND SPOUSAL CAREGIVERS FACE FINANCIAL RISKS 23–25 (2019). 
184 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-316(a), 5-417 (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 
120(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(4) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2012). 
185 See generally Scott & Scott, Parents, supra note 165, at 2430–33. 
186 See generally Tate, Caregiving, supra note 179 (Testamentary freedom allows the 
elderly to reward caregivers.). See, e.g., Vig v. Swenson, 904 N.W.2d 489, 493 (N.D. 2017). 
See also Thomas P. Gallanis & Josephine Gittler, Family Caregiving and the Law of 
Succession: a Proposal, 45 U. MICH. J. LAW REFORM 761 (2012) (proposing to give an 
elective share in the decedent’s estate to family caregivers who have provided substantial 








makers.187 As a result, potentially incapable seniors are less able to reward 
caregiving with inheritance. This stultifies the pursuit of valuable other-
regarding preferences. 
Moreover, a limited ability to reward caregiving with inheritance may 
prevent many seniors from securing the services of their preferred family-
and-friend caregivers. Close relatives and friends are not fungible.188 While 
professional caregivers and nursing homes have incentives to develop 
transferable skills and expertise,189 close relatives and friends have an 
intimate relationship with the care-recipient and tend to be empathetic of her 
subjective needs and wishes.190 The marginal benefit of receiving care from 
closes relatives and friends rather than from professional caregivers or 
nursing homes can be significant. A limited ability to reward caregiving with 
inheritance therefore may deprive potentially incapable seniors of the 
services of their preferred family-and-friend caregivers. 
To be sure, care-recipients may use wills rather than will substitutes to 
                                                 
187 See supra Section III.A.2. 
188 See generally Scott & Scott, Parents, supra note 165, at 2415, 2430, 2445. 
189 See Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 179, at 954–55; 
Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-making Standards for 
Guardians: Theory and Reality, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1508 (2012) [hereinafter, Whitton & 
Frolik, Theory and Reality]. See generally infra Section III.B.2. 








leave inheritance to their caregivers.191 Before a care-recipient loses mental 
capacity to make a lifetime transaction, she may make a will to reward her 
caregiver. Prevailing American law formally sets a lower threshold for 
testamentary capacity than for capacity to make contracts, irrevocable gifts 
and other lifetime transactions. The test of testamentary capacity enquires 
into cognitive ability,192 but is easier to satisfy than the traditional cognitive 
test of capacity to make lifetime transactions. In theory at least, an individual 
can lack capacity to make lifetime transactions and yet has capacity to make 
a will.193 Thus some care-recipients who lack capacity to make lifetime 
transactions can still make valid wills to reward their caregivers. However, 
the administration of wills invokes the formal probate system, which can be 
“slow, cumbersome and expensive”.194 Moreover, the subtle differences 
between testamentary capacity and capacity to make lifetime transactions 
                                                 
191 See generally Tate, Caregiving, supra note 179. 
192 The prevailing test of testamentary capacity is: 
[T]he testator or donor must be capable of knowing and understanding in a general 
way the nature and extent of his or her property, the natural objects of his or her 
bounty, and the disposition that he or she is making of that property, and must also 
be capable of relating these elements to one another and forming an orderly desire 
regarding the disposition of the property. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1999). 
193 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 70, at 268–69. 








have practical significance only in borderline cases,195 which are rare. In 
typical cases, individuals who lack capacity to make lifetime transactions 
would likely fail the test of testamentary capacity as well. 
B. Transactions with Businesses 
Section III.A above has argued that the prevailing theories underlying the 
mental capacity doctrine are ill-suited for resolving disputes over transactions 
involving close relatives and friends. Turning now to transactions between 
potentially incapable individuals and businesses,196 this Section will argue for 
continuing application of the prevailing theories. 
1. Need for Heightened Protection Remains 
Unlike transactions involving close relatives and friends, transactions 
between potentially incapable individuals and businesses do not typically 
take place in the estate-planning context. In particular, the author’s survey of 
modern cases suggests that consumer contracts are the most common type of 
transactions with businesses.197 Unlike in the estate-planning context, the 
abnormality theory correctly regards substantive imbalance in transactions 
                                                 
195 The formal differences between testamentary capacity and transactional capacity also 
seem not to affect the cognitive factors that psychiatric experts examine to form an opinion 
regarding mental ability. See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 30, at 181–82. 
196 For simplicity, this Chapter uses the term “business” to describe a company or a 
natural person who transacts with potential incapable individuals with a view to profit. 








with businesses as a signal of mental inability and of overreach.198 However, 
the conflicting-policies theory still ignores inheritance expectations and 
mistakenly assumes that claimants necessarily seek avoidance to advance the 
interests of the potentially incapable individual. There are nonetheless good 
reasons for continuing application of the prevailing theories notwithstanding 
that mistaken assumption.199 
In transacting with businesses, potentially incapable individuals tend to 
be in a position of significant disadvantage. Aside from having a low 
bargaining power, individuals—mentally-capable or not—tend to be 
boundedly-rational in the sense of having cognitive biases, limited willpower, 
and many other forms of systematic mental limitations.200 Research in 
behavioral economics and psychology have shown that businesses can 
exploit these mental limitations to extract extraordinary profits.201 In cases 
                                                 
198 See generally supra Sections II.A, II.C.2. 
199 Contra. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 29, at 547 (arguing for abolition of the mental 
capacity doctrine). 
200 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 
99 (1955); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence 
on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981). See generally Christine Jolls, Cass 
R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 5 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1476–81; Jonathan Baron & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Conceptual Foundations: a 
Bird’s Eye View, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 25–38 
(Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2018). 
201 See generally RAN SPIEGLER, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (2011); Botond Köszegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, 52 J. ECON. 








concerning elderly incapable individuals, the concerns raised by these 
research are particularly pronounced. As Professors Sumit Agarwal, John 
Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson wrote in an influential paper, the 
combination of severe cognitive limitations and substantial wealth can render 
many seniors particularly vulnerable to financial exploitation.202 These 
learned authors further highlighted that market forces and competition are 
inadequate for protecting vulnerable seniors from exploitative business 
practices.203 Moreover, unlike in close families and personal relationships, 
intrinsic bonds and informal norms do not constrain profit-driven businesses. 
Thus the need to protect vulnerable seniors from exploitative business 
practices can justify continuing application of a rigorous mental capacity 
doctrine.204 
2. Example: Contracts with Nursing Homes 
To illustrate how the mental capacity doctrine may operate in the 
consumer context, this Section considers contracts with nursing homes. 
                                                 
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 2, 42, 248 (2012). 
202 Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll, Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, The Age of 
Reason: Financial Decisions over the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulation, 2009 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 51, 51–52, 80. 
203 Id. at 80–81. See also BAR-GILL, supra note 201, at 2, 26–32; EYAL ZAMIR & DORON 
TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 282–83, 285 (2018). 
204 See generally supra Section I.B (discussing how the mental capacity doctrine deters 








About one-third of the modern cases surveyed by the author concerned 
contracts for admitting a senior to a nursing home.205 Contracts with nursing 
homes disproportionately affect seniors who may lack mental capacity, given 
their likely need for professional care in their final years of life. Unlike most 
family caregivers, nursing homes tend to be sophisticated institutions that are 
paid to provide their services. An analysis of contracts with nursing homes 
can therefore offer insights on how the mental capacity doctrine can protect 
elderly incapable individuals from potentially exploitative business practices. 
Elder abuse and low-quality care in nursing homes are alarming 
problems. Nursing-home residents and their families tend to lack the ability 
to assess and monitor the provision of services and quality of care.206 
Advocates of regulation, and even nursing homes themselves, accept that 
market forces are insufficient to assure quality of care and deter abuse.207 
During years 1999 and 2000, “[o]ver thirty percent of the nursing homes in 
the United States—5,283 nursing homes—were cited for an abuse violation” 
that potentially cause harm to nursing-home residents.208 Surveys done in the 
                                                 
205 See infra this Dissertation, Appendix A. 
206 David G. Stevenson, The Future of Nursing Home Regulation: Time For A 
Conversation?, HEALTH FAIRS, Aug. 23, 2018. 
207 Id. 
208 U.S. H.R., COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, 








United States (and other countries) reported that over half of nursing-home 
staff admitted to committing abuse, and almost ninety percent of residents or 
their proxies reported neglect.209 While federal law regulates nursing homes 
through setting forth rights and standards and other mechanisms,210 oversight 
and enforcement efforts have failed to achieve long-lasting improvements.211  
A rigorous mental capacity doctrine can partially deter and sanction elder 
abuse and poor quality of services in nursing homes. First, the doctrine 
enables private suits by potentially incapable individuals or their 
representatives.212 Private suits are especially valuable for holding nursing 
homes accountable when the state takes a lax attitude toward regulation.213 
The author’s survey of modern cases shows that potentially incapable 
individuals who contracted with nursing home typically had passed away by 
                                                 
(2001), http://canhr.org/reports/2001/abusemajorproblem.pdf.  
209 Yongjie Yon et al., The Prevalence of Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings: a 
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 29 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 58, 61 (2018) (citations 
omitted). 
210 See generally Richard Weinmeyer, Health Law: Statutes to Combat Elder Abuse in 
Nursing Homes, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 359 (2014). 
211 See Jordan Rau, Poor Patient Care at Many Nursing Homes Despite Stricter 
Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 5, 2017; Robert Gebelhoff, Opinion, The Hidden Victims of 
Trump’s Deregulatory Agenda: Nursing Home Residents, WASH. POST Mar. 25, 2019. 
212 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 








the time of litigation.214 Like in cases concerning relatives and friends, 
claimants who brought posthumous avoidance claims against nursing homes 
were usually relatives with inheritance expectations; a successful claim 
would tend to increase the size of the claimant’s expected inheritance from 
the elderly individual’s estate. However, unlike in the estate-planning 
context,215 avoidance claims against nursing homes tend not to contradict the 
testamentary intent of the elderly individual; people typically do not intend 
to leave inheritance to their nursing homes. Thus, in cases concerning 
contracts with nursing homes, inheritance expectations can motivate private 
suits that are unlikely to be inconsistent with the interests of the potentially 
incapable individual. 
Second, the abnormality theory—that sanctions deviation from the 
norm—tends to lead to contract avoidance when the nursing home in dispute 
charged more than what typical nursing homes would charge. Upon contract 
avoidance, the nursing home would be obliged to repay the contract price to 
the resident (or her estate), and would become entitle to recover a reasonable 
price commensurate with the services actually provided; such reasonable 
price could match the market price or the costs of the services actually 
                                                 
214 See generally infra this Dissertation, Appendix A. 








provided.216 Thus poor services would attract a low reasonable price. Any 
conscious wrongdoing by the nursing home would also reduce the reasonable 
price that it would receive.217 Moreover, successful avoidance of a contract 
for want of capacity would vitiate any exclusion-of-liability clause therein;218 
the capable contracting party would therefore be prevented from invoking 
any exclusion-of-liability clause to resist subsequent tort actions.219 
To be sure, like many other consumer contracts in the United States,220 
nursing-home contracts tend to contain mandatory arbitration clauses that 
oblige parties to refer their disputes to an arbitral tribunal rather than a 
                                                 
216 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 
16 cmt. a, cmt. e, §§ 49, 54 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
To be sure, the mental capacity doctrine alone is insufficient to induce socially-optimal 
levels of nursing-home services. For instance, setting the reasonable price for nursing-home 
services to equal the market price would not induce efficient outcomes, because the market 
price is not an efficient price. The usual obstacles to efficient bargaining—information 
asymmetry, cognitive biases, limited willpower and the like—are present in the nursing-
home market. See generally supra Section III.B.1; Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & 
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS vol. 1 at 30–46 
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing the obstacles to efficient 
contracting). 
217 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54(4)(a) (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011). 
218 See, e.g., Del Santo v. Bristol County Stadium, Inc., 273 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1960). 
219 See, e.g., id. 
220 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: an Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 








court.221 About one-third of the cases I surveyed concerned an arbitration 
clause that formed part of a nursing-home contract.222 Lacking salience, 
mandatory arbitration clauses can affect consumers regardless of their state 
of capacity.223 Subject to some narrow exceptions, courts are obliged to refer 
to arbitration disputes within the scope of a facially-valid mandatory 
arbitration clause. Disputes concerning mental capacity may or may not be 
one of these exceptions; the Supreme Court has left open the issue of whether 
mental capacity is a matter for a court or an arbitral tribunal to decide in the 
                                                 
221 See also Gebelhoff, supra note 211 (discussing recent efforts to lift a previous ban 
on mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing-home contracts). 
222 See, e.g., John Knox Billage of Tampa Bay, Inc. v. Perry, 94 So.3d 715 (Fa. Ct. App. 
2012) (remanded for evidential hearing to ascertain mental capacity to enter into arbitration 
agreement); Liberty Health & Rehab of Indianola, LLC v. Howarth, 11 F.Supp.3d 684 (N.D. 
Miss. 2014) (denied motion to compel arbitration); Pikeville Medical Center, Inc. v. Bevins, 
2014 WL 5420002 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014); Maynard v. Golden Living, 56 N.E.3d 1232 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2016) (referred to arbitration); Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. 
Chrzanowski, 791 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (remanded for evidential hearing to 
ascertain mental capacity to enter into arbitration agreement); Dalon v. Ruleville Nursing 
and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, 161 F.Supp.3d 406 (N.D. Miss. 2016) (remanded for 
evidential hearing to ascertain mental capacity to enter into arbitration agreement); Cardinal 
v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 46 (Penn. 2017) (referred to arbitration); Richmond 
Health Facilities-Madison, L.P. v. Shearer, 2017 WL 3273381 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (referring to 
arbitration all but claims personal to claimant); Stephan v. Millennium Nursing and Rehab 
Center, Inc., No. 1170524, 2018 WL 4846501 Ala. Oct. 5, 2018) (denied motion to compel 
arbitration). 
223 See generally J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive 
Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 472–73 (Michael Szenberg & Lall 
Ramrattan eds., 2014) (Arbitration clauses form part of those non-salient aspects of 








first instance.224 Lower courts are divided on this issue.225 The prevailing 
academic view is that mental incapacity is similar to unconscionability and 
other usual defenses to contract enforcement, which are typically referred to 
arbitration.226 
The prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing-home 
contracts at most partially undermines the protective function of the mental 
capacity doctrine. Unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise, many 
lower courts can continue to resolve disputes over mental capacity rather than 
refer such disputes to arbitration. Claimants can also invoke the mental 
capacity doctrine before an arbitral tribunal. To be sure, class-action 
arbitration waivers can stultify consumer rights by making it too expensive 
to litigate individually,227 but this problem is mitigated in cases where a 
successful claim would recover a sufficiently large sum of money to the 
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claimant. Thus, at least in high-stake cases, the mental capacity doctrine can 
partially deter and sanction abuse and poor services in nursing homes. 
3. Example: Annuities 
Annuities are another example of transactions with businesses that 
disproportionately affect seniors who may lack mental capacity. Primary a 
retirement-planning product, an annuity is an insurance contract under which 
the insured pays premiums in exchange for a stream of income from the 
insurer.228 For example, a life annuity provides guaranteed periodic payments 
for the remainder of the insured’s lifetime. A common reason for buying an 
annuity is to obtain insurance against the longevity risk of the insured living 
longer than expected and being unable to support her consumption. Another 
common reason is to qualify the insured for Medicaid, which can pay for her 
medical and nursing-home costs. By making a large lump-sum premium to 
the insurer and meeting other criteria, the insured impoverishes herself to 
meet Medicaid’s asset limits.229 
Individuals often make suboptimal decisions regarding annuities. 
Research in behavioral finance and psychology suggest that due to mental 
                                                 
228 See generally Fast Answers: Annuities, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersannuityhtm.html (last visted Jun. 11, 2019). 
229 See generally Am. Council on Aging, How Purchasing a Medicaid Compliant 
Annuity Impacts One’s Eligibility for Medicaid Long-Term Care, MEDICAID PLANNING 
ASSISTANCE, https://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/eligibility-by-annuity (last 








accounting, loss aversion and framing effects, individuals can incorrectly 
perceive annuities as risky gambles rather than insurance products.230 Yet 
common types of annuities, especially fixed annuities that provide guaranteed 
streams of income, are not regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.231 Moreover, commission-driven salespersons may sell 
annuities that are not in the buyer’s best interests without violation of strict 
fiduciary duty.232 In fact, several insurers recently reported booming 
annuities sales and partially attributed the boom to recent weakening of 
fiduciary regulation.233 
If carefully applied, the mental capacity doctrine can partially fill in a gap 
in regulatory protection in the annuities market. Like in cases concerning 
                                                 
230 Wei-Yin Hu & Jason S. Scott, Behavioral Obstacles in the Annuity Market, 63 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 71 (2007); Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life 
Consumption? A Framing Explanation of the under-Annuitization Puzzle, 98 AM. ECON. 
REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 304 (2008). 
231 See generally Fast Answers: Annuities, U.S. SEC. & EX. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersannuityhtm.html (last visted Jun. 11, 2019). 
232 Agarwal et al., supra note 202, at 84–85. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. v. 
U.S. Department of Labor, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (invalidating the Fiduciary Rule 
which the Department of Labor proposed to impose ERISA fiduciary duties on a broad range 
of financial services brokers and advisers); Gregory F. Jacob, Opinion, Is the Fiduciary Rule 
Dead?, REG. REV. (Apr. 10, 2019) https://www.theregreview.org/2019/04/10/jacob-is-
fiduciary-rule-dead/ (discussing the state of the Fiduciary Rule). But see Market Synergy 
Group, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor, 885 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 2018) (upholding the 
Fiduciary Rule). 
233 See Suzanne Barlyn, U.S. Annuities Sales Boom after Fiduciary Rule Kicks the 








nursing-home contracts,234 the doctrine facilitates private suits, including 
those driven by inheritance expectations. Sanctioning deviation from the 
norm, the abnormality theory tends to avoid overpriced annuities. Upon 
avoidance, the insurer would be obliged to repay the incapable individual (or 
her estate) the prepaid premium, and would become entitle to recover a 
reasonable price commensurate with the value of the insurance coverage.235 
The court, however, must be mindful that the value of the insurance coverage 
is not the same as the sum of income payments already received by the 
incapable individual.236 Such sum does not account for the fact that the 
individual had benefited from passing on longevity risk to the insurer. What 
the insurer is entitled to recover should reflect its assumption of the longevity 
risk.237 
4. Availability of Ex-ante Judicial Approval 
A further reason for treating transactions involving relatives and friends 
differently from transactions with businesses is the availability of a process 
                                                 
234 See supra Section III.B.2. 
235 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 16 illus. 
14, § 54 illus. 24 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
236 But see Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board of New York, 250 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 
1969) (discussed in supra text accompanying notes 131–36). 
237 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 54(6), 
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (limiting remedies in cases of prejudicial or speculative delay 








to obtain ex-ante judicial approval. The discussions so far concern judicial 
scrutiny after the fact, that is, judicial scrutiny of a previously-made 
transaction the subject of a claim for avoidance. To minimize the risk of 
avoidance after the fact, a transacting party can petition a state court for 
approval of the transaction before the fact.238 This Section describes the 
process for obtaining ex-ante judicial approval and argues that the availability 
of this process partially justifies heightened regulation of transactions with 
businesses. 
The process for engaging ex-ante judicial scrutiny is part and parcel of a 
state’s guardianship system. To create a guardianship over a potentially 
incapable individual, prevailing American law requires the relevant state 
court (typically the probate court) to be satisfied that the individual lacks 
mental capacity to manage some aspect of her life or property.239 Once the 
individual is found incapable, the court has a discretion to appoint a substitute 
decision-maker—the guardian—to make decisions on behalf of the 
individual. The court can also make a decision on its own. The guardianship 
process has enabled capable transacting parties to obtain ex-ante judicial 
                                                 
238 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 414 (Unif. Law 
Comm’n 2017).  
239 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-401 (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 









approval of transactions that would otherwise be vitiated by mental 
incapacity.240 
Both the procedural and substantive aspects of ex-ante judicial scrutiny 
provide safeguards against financial misconduct. The petitioner is typically 
required to give notice to the potentially incapable individual and any 
interested parties, and disclose any conflict of interest.241 This procedure 
gives the court and any interested parties an opportunity to evaluate the pros 
and cons of the proposed transaction.242 In some cases, independent legal 
representation can also be afforded to the potentially incapable individual.243 
The equitable doctrine of substituted judgment (or its statutory adoption) 
provides the substantive standard for determining whether to grant ex-ante 
judicial approval. This standard typically requires the court to give effect to 
                                                 
240 See, e.g., In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909 (N.J.) (ex-ante judicial approval of large gifts to 
the sons of the incapable individual). See also Lisa S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an 
Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 38–39 
(2007) (bank and financial institutions asking for invocation of guardianship proceedings to 
confirm authority to transact large properties of incapable individuals). 
241 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a) (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 414(a) (Unif. Law 
Comm’n 2017). 
242 In re Castner, 661 A.2d 344, 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995). 
243 See, e.g., In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909 (N.J.). See generally Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n Law 
& Aging, Representation and Investigation in Guardianship Proceedings, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartrepresentation
andinvestigation.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018) (surveying right to counsel in 








what the incapable individual would have wanted if she was capable.244 If her 
wishes are not known, or if giving effect to her wishes would unreasonably 
harm or endanger her, then the court rules according to what is in her best 
interest.245 
Hence, at least in high-stake cases, businesses that wish to transact with 
potentially incapable individuals without bearing the risk of subsequent 
avoidance can take advantage of the process for obtaining ex-ante judicial 
approval. On the other hand, unless advised by lawyers who are familiar with 
guardianship law, lay relatives and friends are unlikely to be sufficiently 
sophisticated and well-informed to invite ex-ante judicial scrutiny. The 
availability of ex-ante judicial scrutiny thus provides a reason for regulating 
transactions with businesses more strictly than transactions with relatives and 
friends. 
C. Summary of Shortcomings 
This Part has argued that the mental capacity doctrine in prevailing 
                                                 
244 See generally infra Section IV.A. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 217(c) 
cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006) (gifting by agent); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-411(a), 5-411 
(c), 5-427(b) (amended 2010) (gifting by guardian); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 414(c) (Unif. Law 
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American law is ill-suited for the era of aging population. Transactional 
capacity disputes typically concern inheritance. Yet the conflicting-policies 
theory fails to recognize that claims to avoid transactions involving relatives 
and friends are usually made to increase the claimant’s expected inheritance, 
rather than to advance the interests of the potentially incapable individual. 
Moreover, the abnormality theory fails to recognize that substantive 
imbalance is an inherent characteristic of estate-planning instruments; it is 
not indicative of mental incapacity or of overreach. Thus the prevailing 
doctrinal theories tend to be overly suspicious of transactions made in the 
estate-planning context. 
On the other hand, these shortcomings of the prevailing doctrinal theories 
do not affect typical transactions between potentially incapable individuals 
and profit-driven businesses. In the business context, claims driven by 
inheritance expectations are unlikely to contradict the testamentary intent of 
the potentially incapable individual. Substantive imbalance in transactions 
with businesses is also a signal of overcharge, if not overreach. Given the 
prevalence of elder financial abuse by businesses, courts should rigorously 
apply the mental capacity doctrine to avoid seemingly exploitative 
transactions and disgorge the ill-gotten gains of exploitation.246 
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IV. LIMITING AVOIDANCE OF TRANSACTIONS WITHIN CLOSE FAMILIES 
AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Guided by Part III, this Part makes reform proposals to loosen regulation 
of transactions between potentially incapable individuals and their close 
relatives or friends. Section IV.A below will elaborate upon a reform 
proposal to limit the power to avoid transactions for want of capacity. Section 
IV.B will make further reform suggestions regarding the consequences of 
successful avoidance. 
A. Adoption of a Substituted-judgment Defense 
The main reform proposal is to make available to close relatives and 
friends a substituted-judgment defense: the power to avoid a transaction for 
want of capacity is lost if the capable transacting party can prove (by the usual 
civil standard of preponderance of evidence) that the incapable individual 
would have made the transaction in a state of capacity. The proposed defense 
is an additional hurtle to successful avoidance; after the claimant successfully 
proves a lack of mental capacity, the capable transacting party can resist 
avoidance by establishing the proposed defense. 
The proposed substituted-judgment defense originates from guardianship 
law and the law of trusts.247 In guardianship and trust cases, when a court is 
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GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 414 
cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f, note to cmt. 








petitioned to make a decision on behalf of an incapable individual, the 
equitable doctrine of substituted judgment (or its statutory adoption) typically 
supplies the decisionmaking standard. As Section III.B.4 has explained, this 
doctrine directs the court to make a decision that the individual would have 
made herself if she had mental capacity. The proposed defense essentially 
imports the doctrine of substituted judgment into cases concerning contracts, 
irrevocable gifts and other lifetime transactions. 
1. Economic Intuition 
A stylized example can illustrate the economic intuition behind my 
proposal to adopt the substituted-judgment defense.248 Suppose that pursuant 
to a hypothetical transaction, an incapable individual transferred P to the 
                                                 
Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A 
Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 739, 742–43 (2012) (surveying financial 
decision-making standards in American guardianship statutes) [hereinafter, Forlik & 
Whitton, A Proposal for Reform]. 
248 This example is a special case of the behavioral-contract-theoretic model that infra 
this Dissertation, Appendix B formally sets up and analyzes. Recent research has developed 
a behavioral contract theory to incorporate well-documented psychological phenomena into 
classical contract-theoretic topics, such as moral hazard, adverse selection and incomplete 
contracts. See generally SPIEGLER, supra note 201; Köszegi, supra note 201. The model 
developed in infra this Dissertation, Appendix B belongs to the class of multi-selves models, 
which have been widely applied to study a variety of legal issues. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 BA. L. REV. 9, 59–62 
(1990) (multi-selves and precommitment mechanisms in marriages); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
AGING AND OLD AGE 84–95 (1995) (multi-selves and aging); Agnieszka Jaworska, Advance 
Directives and Substitute Decision-Making, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY § 3 (Mar. 24, 2009), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/advance-directives/ 
(multi-selves and surrogate decisionmaking); Jennifer Radden, Multiple Selves, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SHELF (Shaun Gallagher ed., 2011) (multi-selves and 








capable party. The value of P is the maximum that the individual was willing 
to transfer in a state of incapacity.249 If the individual had capacity, then her 
valuation would be B. For instance, the value of B may reflect the individual’s 
benefit arising from leaving inheritance to a close relative or friend, or from 
rewarding her caregiver.250 After the individual passed way, the claimant 
decides whether to seek avoidance of the transaction.251 In the event of 
successful avoidance, the claimant recovers P from the capable transacting 
party and pays a reasonable price R for what the individual had received 
pursuant to the avoided transaction. For simplicity, suppose that P and R are 
sufficiently large so that it would be worthwhile for the parties to incur the 
litigation costs (or transaction costs, in the case of a settlement) to resolve 
any capacity dispute. 
In this stylized example, if the claimant’s power to avoid transactions for 
want of capacity is unrestricted, then she has an incentive to seek avoidance 
                                                 
249 This specification captures the scenario of a sophisticated capable transacting party 
acting to maximize her own payoff with the knowledge that she is transacting with an 
incapable individual and with superior bargaining power relative to the incapable individual. 
While this scenario may seem unrealistic and cynical, it captures the problem of elder 
financial abuse. This problem is most pronounced when the potential abuser—the capable 
transacting party—is sophisticated, self-interested, well-informed and superior in 
bargaining. In this scenario, the normative case for maintaining a broad mental capacity 
doctrine is the strongest. Because I propose to narrow the doctrine, I choose to analyze this 
scenario to “stack the cards” against me. 
250 See generally Sections III.A.2–3. 








whenever P > R. Her marginal benefit of seeking avoidance is P – R, which 
is positive whenever P > R. Notice that her incentive to seek avoidance does 
not depend on B—the “true” benefit of the transaction to the incapable 
individual. In particular, in cases of B ≥ P > R, the claimant is incentivized to 
seek avoidance notwithstanding that the individual had benefited from the 
transaction. In these cases, allowing avoidance tends to generate no benefit, 
but can give rise to the error costs of avoiding a transaction that advanced the 
welfare of the incapable individual. Further costs include litigation costs or 
the transaction costs of reaching a settlement. 
This stylized example captures the dynamics of capacity disputes 
involving relatives and friends. Section III.A has shown that inheritance 
expectations can drive claimants to seek avoidance of transactions that 
actually benefitted the incapable individual. The stylized example captures 
this possibility by specifying B ≥ P > R: the claimant is incentivized to seek 
avoidance (P > R), even in cases where the transaction was beneficial to the 
incapable individual (B ≥ P).  The prevailing doctrinal theories mistakenly 
assumes P > B, which inequality means that the transaction was necessarily 
disadvantageous to the incapable individual.252 This mistaken assumption can 
lead to avoidance of transactions that meet the description of B ≥ P. 
                                                 








The economic intuition behind the proposed substituted-judgment 
defense is to preclude avoidance in cases where B ≥ P. In these cases, any 
claim for avoidance does not reflect the “true” benefit of the transaction to 
the incapable individual; in notation, B ≥ P and P > R together imply B > R. 
Recognizing that avoidance in these cases harms the welfare of the incapable 
individual, the proposed defense imposes a restriction on the claimant’s 
power of avoidance. Such restriction thus prioritizes the interests of the 
incapable individual to the extent inconsistent with the claimant’s. 
2. Verification of Subjective Will and Preferences 
The analysis in Section IV.A.1 depends on having sufficient information 
to ascertain whether the facts and circumstances of a particular case meets 
the description of B ≥ P or B < P. Denoting what the incapable individual had 
transacted to the capable party, P is usually readily observable and verifiable. 
However, B—the incapable individual’s valuation if she had capacity—can 
be hard to verify. To be sure, there is no need to ascertain the exact value of 
B; one only need to ascertain whether B is smaller than P or not. This Section 
discusses how the proposed substituted-judgment defense may elicit 
information regarding B relative to P in practice. 
An individual’s own choices made in a mentally-capable state are 
evidence of her subjective will and preferences.253 To elicit such evidence, 
                                                 








the proposed substitute-judgment defense typically looks to the incapable 
individual’s past conduct, transacting patterns, and relational norms.254 To be 
sure, capacity disputes often concern one-off transactions that the individual 
may not have had an opportunity to make in the past.255 However, most cases 
concern seniors who have had a life-time of opportunities to make use of 
estate-planning instruments, such as wills, will substitutes and wish letters.256 
Seniors also tend to have left behind a “memory trail” of informed opinions 
and value preferences in the minds of their family and friends.257 Moreover, 
transactions made in the final years an individual’s life may be the final 
manifestation of property-sharing and gift-giving norms within a close 
familial or personal relationship.258 The substituted-judgment defense directs 
courts to consider the incapable individual’s past relational norms and estate 
plan, in addition to her past conduct and transacting patterns. 
                                                 
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–29 (1993) 
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254 See, e.g., In re Brice’s Guardianship, 8 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1943). 
255 See, e.g., Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
256 See, e.g., In re Miller, 935 N.E.2d 729, 733–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 
257 Terry Carney, Financial Planning Mechanisms for People with Cognitive 
Impairment in Australia, in SPECIAL NEEDS FINANCIAL PLANNING: A COMPARATIVE 
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Dubree v. Blackwell can illustrate how the proposed defense can be 
applied to limit or deny the power of avoidance.259 In that case, Lillie—an 
elderly woman—transferred her house to Edward—her lifelong friend and 
caregiver—a few months before she died. Lillie also changed her bank 
account to a joint account with Edward with a right of survivorship. After 
Lillie passed away, her nephew—who was entitled to inherit her estate—
sought to avoid these transactions on grounds of mental incapacity and undue 
influence.260 Medical experts and lay witnesses gave conflicting testimonies 
regarding her mental ability at the time of making the transactions.261 
Refusing to allow avoidance, the Texas court gave significant weight to a 
long history of property sharing and a close personal relationship between 
Lillie and Edward.262 The court practically applied the substituted-judgment 
defense: Lillie’s past dealings with Edward and their relational norms 
indicated that she would have make the transactions if she had capacity. 
To be sure, there are cases involving conflicting evidence of what the 
                                                 
259 67 S.W.3d 286, 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
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individuals, the doctrine of undue influence is functionally-equivalent to the mental capacity 
doctrine. See supra Section II.B. 
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incapable individual would have wanted if she had capacity.263 In these cases, 
there should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of upholding her 
testamentary intent expressed in any properly-executed will or will substitute. 
Prevailing American law requires that a valid will (or will substitute) be 
executed in a mentally-capable state.264 There are also formality requirements 
to be satisfied. For example, an attested will needs to be in writing, signed by 
the individual and attested by several witnesses.265 Similarly, to create a 
revocable trust of interest in land—a form of will substitute—the individual 
needs to put the instrument in writing and sign it.266 Estate-planning 
instruments that satisfy formality requirements are solid evidence of the 
individual’s wishes. Formality requirements are also imposed to caution the 
individual against making ill-considered choices. Moreover, formality 
requirements may protect the individual from fraud and imposition. Finally, 
formality requirements function to facilitate standardization, so that 
testamentary intent expressed in wills (or will substitutes) can be 
                                                 
263 See generally Whitton & Frolik, Theory and Reality, supra note 189, at 1492–93. 
264 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1999). 
265 See generally id. § 3.1. Courts may excuse some harmless errors in executing a will. 
See generally § 3.3. 









distinguished from other expressions of intent.267 Thus properly-executed 
wills and will substitutes should be afforded special evidential weight in the 
application of the proposed substituted-judgment defense. 
A variation of the facts in Farnum v. Silvano can illustrate the practical 
operation of the proposed presumption.268 Recall that in that case, an elderly 
incapable woman—Viola—sold her house for about half of its fair market 
value to her young friend—Joseph—in whom she had trust and 
confidence.269 Suppose that under her validly-executed will, her nephew 
Harry was entitled to inherit her house. Harry brought the avoidance claim to 
recover his expected inheritance. The proposed substituted-judgment defense 
would enshrine what Viola would have wanted if she had capacity. In cases 
of conflicting evidence, the proposed presumption would operate to uphold 
Viola’s testamentary intent expressed in her validly-executed will: to gift her 
house to Harry. The result would be avoidance of the sale to Joseph. 
The proposed presumption in favor of upholding testamentary intent 
expressed in valid wills and will substitutes should nonetheless be rebuttable. 
                                                 
267 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. c. (AM. 
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As Professor Adam Hirsch observed, estate-planning instruments made in the 
past can be obsolete.270 These “stale” instruments are practically “frozen” 
upon their makers losing mental capacity.271 For instance, a will made long 
before the loss of capacity may fail to provide for a caregiver who primarily 
gives care to the incapable individual in her final years of life. Yet a desire to 
reward caregiving may well be consistent with the individual’s past 
transactional preferences before she lost capacity.272 The will is “stale”; 
circumstances have changed such that the incapable individual would likely 
update her estate plan if she had capacity.273 Thus clear and convincing 
evidence of “staleness” of the relevant will or will substitute should rebut the 
proposed presumption. The heightened standard of proof reflects the 
consideration that due evidential weight should be afforded to testamentary 
instruments that comply with formality requirements. 
Adopting the substituted-judgment defense would not undermine the role 
of psychiatric evidence. The defense merely adds an additional qualification 
on the power to avoid transactions for want of capacity; there continues to be 
                                                 
270 Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 609 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Text and Time]. 
271 Id. at 615–16. 
272 See, e.g., Dubree v. Blackwell, 67 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 








a need to ask the threshold question of whether the individual lacked 
sufficient mental ability at the time of making the impugned transaction.274 
In other words, the substituted-judgment defense would become a second 
obstacle to successful avoidance; the threshold question of mental ability 
remains the first obstacle. After the adoption of the substituted-judgment 
defense, psychiatric experts may continue to shed light on mental ability. 
However, adoption of the substituted-judgment defense would preclude 
judicial consideration of whether the impugned transaction is abnormal (in 
the sense of deviating from the transactions of reasonably competent 
people).275 What a particular individual would have done if she had capacity 
depends little on what other people tend to do. In the notation of the stylized 
example, whether B ≥ P or B < P is specific to the individual; B does not 
depend on other people’s preferences and choices. What the individual would 
have done may well be deviant or eccentric.276 Unlike evidence of the 
individual’s own conduct, transacting patterns and relational norms, evidence 
of what other people tend to do has little bearing on whether B ≥ P or B < P. 
In other words, evidence of abnormality is largely noise. Hence, contrary to 
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prevailing doctrinal theories,277 introducing the substituted-judgment defense 
would preclude consideration of abnormality factors. 
3. Comparison with the Best-Interest Standard 
As an alternative to the substituted-judgment standard, guardianship law 
and the law of trusts sometimes apply the best-interest standard to make a 
decision on behalf of an incapable individual. This standard directs courts to 
do what is objectively best for a reasonable or rational person in like 
circumstances.278 This standard is highly sensitive to context. While the 
individual’s known wishes are a factor in determining what amounts to her 
best interest,279 the court may also consider her financial circumstances, tax 
liabilities, general economic conditions, and many other factors.280 
This Section explains why I prefer to qualify the power to avoid 
transactions for want of capacity with the substituted-judgment standard 
rather than the best-interest standard. First, the best-interests standard is more 
                                                 
277 See generally supra Sections II.A, II.C.2. 
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UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-314(a), 5-418(b) (amended 2010). 
280 See, e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE 








likely to lead to paternalistic decisions; decisionmakers may act according to 
their own values, stereotypes and prejudices.281 In re Keri can illustrate this 
point.282 In that case, the sons of an elderly incapable woman—Keri—wanted 
to move her from her own house into a nursing home. Keri’s will left her 
estate to her sons, but they would likely receive nothing if her assets were 
spent on her nursing-home costs.283 The sons thus devised a plan to accelerate 
her eligibility for Medicaid reimbursement of her nursing-home costs. They 
planned to sell Keri’s house and transfer a significant proportion of the 
proceeds to themselves.284 The practical effect of the sons’ plan was to shift 
the financial burden of supporting Keri from themselves to the state. An 
application of the substituted-judgment standard would allow the plan to the 
extent consistent with what Keri would have wanted if she had capacity.285 
An application of the best-interest standard, on the other hand, can allow 
courts to rule according to their own assumptions regarding what tends to 
benefit a reasonable (or rational) person in Keri’s position. For instance, 
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approving the sons’ plan, the New Jersey court in In re Keri assumed that it 
was in the best interest of an incapable individual to increase her children’s 
inheritance at the expense of the state.286 Some other courts make the opposite 
assumption to disapprove similar plans.287 In extreme cases, some courts even 
act on their own notion of public policy and own view regarding the interests 
of the taxpayers.288 
Second, the substituted-judgment standard tends to be more determinate 
and less informationally-demanding to apply than the best-interest standard. 
The substituted-judgment standard tends to focus judicial attention upon the 
incapable individual’s past behaviors. By comparison, in addition to past 
behaviors, the best-interest standard expands the judicial inquiry into a broad 
range of contextual factors. Moreover, as Professors Elizabeth Scott and 
Robert Emery argued, the largely-private nature of family life keeps much 
relevant information hidden from outsiders, such as a court.289 Another 
problem pertains to the need to weigh or rank inherently incommensurable 
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best-interest factors.290 Overall, the best-interest standard can only be less 
determinate and more informationally-demanding to apply than the 
substituted-judgment standard. 
Generating a high degree of indeterminacy, the best-interest standard is 
ill-suited for resolving inheritance disputes in American jurisdictions. 
American legislatures have consistently rejected proposals to expand judicial 
discretion in the law of inheritance.291 While rules can be informationally-
demanding and costly to promulgate ex ante, standards can generate high 
compliance costs and litigation costs to litigants and high decisional costs to 
courts.292 Introducing a substantial judicial discretion to resolve inheritance 
disputes also heightens the risk of judges acting in accordance with 
“prejudices—particularly those against traditionally disfavored groups such 
as unmarried cohabitants, homosexuals and nonmarital children[.]”293 Thus, 
being more determinate than the best-interest standard, the substituted-
judgment standard is more suitable for resolving inheritance disputes. 
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4. Inability to Respect “New” Expressions of Preferences? 
Showing great deference to the incapable individual’s past conduct, 
transacting patterns and relational norms, the substituted-judgment standard 
tends to neglect her transactional preferences expressed in a state of 
incapacity. If these “new” expressions of preferences contradict the 
individual’s past wishes and behaviors, then the substituted-judgment 
standard may be subject to the criticism by some Critical Legal Theorists that 
it may effectuate extreme paternalism294 and deprivation of personal 
autonomy and dignity.295 The tendency to respect the past seems to prioritize 
the individual’s capable “past self” over her incapable “present self”.296 
This Section will defend the proposed substituted-judgment defense 
against that criticism. First, if adopted to qualify the mental capacity doctrine, 
the substituted-judgment defense would increase the likelihood of 
transactions surviving avoidance claims. Critical Legal Theorists criticize 
courts for paternalistically avoiding, not upholding, transactions affected by 
                                                 
294 Kennedy, supra note 281, at 633, 641–44 (criticizing the mental capacity doctrine as 
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incapacity.297 Thus the proposed defense avoids their criticism. 
Second, adoption of the substituted-judgment defense does not alleviate 
the need to prove mental incapacity. If the individual was capable of choosing 
subjectively-beneficial transactions at the time of transacting, then the court 
should hold that she had capacity at that time; there would then be no 
occasion for applying the substituted-judgment defense. Critical Legal 
Theorists are really directing their criticisms at the existing threshold tests of 
mental incapacity,298 rather than the qualifications on the resulting power of 
avoidance. The substituted-judgment defense would become one such 
qualification, and therefore avoids their criticism. 
Third, to remove any possibility of paternalism and deprivation of 
personal autonomy would require a complete eradication of the mental 
capacity doctrine. It would also require complete eradication of other 
functionally-similar doctrines, especially undue influence (when applied to 
“mentally weak” individuals);299 eradication of the mental capacity doctrine 
would have no practical impact if those who seek avoidance could just argue 
undue influence instead. Such complete eradication would neglect the 
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alarming problem of elder financial exploitation.300 Complete eradication 
would also encourage courts to stretch other doctrines (or invent new 
doctrines) to resolve cases that would have been covered by the mental 
capacity doctrine. This happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
when courts created the cognitive-incapacity test (and the “mental weakness” 
strand of the undue influence doctrine) due to their dissatisfaction with 
guardianship law.301 At the very least, retaining and reforming the mental 
capacity doctrine force courts to be transparent about their attitude toward 
mental disorders and elder financial exploitation. 
B. Consequences of Successful Avoidance 
Section IV.A has argued for the adoption of the substituted-judgment 
standard to preclude avoidance in cases where the incapable individual would 
have entered into the impugned transaction if she had capacity. That proposal 
aims to uphold transactions that meet the description of B ≥ P in the stylized 
example developed in Section IV.A.1: the incapable individual’s “true” 
valuation (B) of what she received pursuant to the transaction is no smaller 
than what she transacted away (P). This Section now turns to cases where B 
< P. 
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1. Beneficial Goods and Services 
A finding that a transaction should be avoided for want of capacity leads 
to the question of what remedies should follow.302 The mental capacity 
doctrine is a double-edged sword; the possibility of avoidance ex post may 
discourage capable parties from entering into mutually-beneficial 
transactions with incapable individuals ex ante.303 This Section proposes to 
optimize the remedial consequences of successful avoidance to preserve 
incentives to supply beneficial goods and services. 
A modification of the stylized example introduced in Section IV.A.1 can 
illustrate the economic intuition underlying my present proposal. Suppose 
that, in the stylized example, the capable transacting party had incurred the 
costs of C to supply some good or service to the incapable individual. (If such 
costs were uncertain at the time of supplying the good or service, then let C 
denote the expected costs.) Suppose further that B—the “true” benefit of the 
good or service to the incapable individual—was nonetheless smaller than 
what she transacted away, P. Thus B < P; the proposed substituted-judgment 
defense would not preclude avoidance of the transaction. The successful 
claimant would recover P from the capable transacting party and would pay 
a reasonable price R to capable transacting party. The issue is what R should 
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The capable transacting party should be entitled to recover her costs if she 
can prove (by preponderance of evidence) that such costs were no greater 
than the benefits of the transaction to the incapable individual; in notation, R 
= C whenever B ≥ C. In these cases, the transaction facilitated the provision 
of some good or service that advanced joint welfare. Although avoidance 
should be allowed because the incapable individual had paid too much (B < 
P), the capable transacting party should be allowed to recover her costs. 
Without such recovery, suppliers of beneficial goods and services would be 
discouraged from benefiting incapable individuals and advancing joint 
welfare. 
The elder-care problem can illustrate the practical implications of these 
economic arguments. Section III.A.3 has shown that there is a shortage of 
family caregivers. Care-recipients tend to benefit from receiving care; 
incentivizing caregiving would promote their individual welfare. Caregiving 
also promotes joint welfare if the benefits to the care-recipients exceed the 
costs to the caregivers. Thus, to the extent that a caregiver and a care-recipient 
have made a transaction with an explicit or implicit intention of facilitating 
valuable caregiving, welfare considerations would generally caution against 
avoidance. In some cases, however, the transaction may impose too high a 








avoidance should be allowed (and would not be precluded by the proposed 
substituted-judgment defense), caregiving could still be joint-welfare-
enhancing (in notation, B > C). If B > C, then welfare considerations would 
justify allowing the caregiver to recover her costs (C). 
To determine whether to allow recovery of C, the court should ask 
whether the incapable individual would have paid C for what she had 
received under the avoided transaction, if she had capacity; in notation, 
whether B ≥ C or B < C. This question is different from the question of 
whether the individual would have made the transaction if she had capacity; 
in notation, whether B  P or B < P.304 The recovery-of-costs question 
(whether B ≥ C) pertains to whether to allow recovery of C notwithstanding 
avoidance of the transaction, while the avoidance question (whether B  P) 
determines whether the transaction should be avoided. 
To illustrate the finer differences between the recovery-of-costs question 
and the avoidance question, consider again Farnum v. Silvano, in which an 
elderly woman sold her house for about half of its market price to her young 
friend.305 If asked in that case, the avoidance question would be whether the 
woman would have sold her house at such a low price if she had capacity. 
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The recovery-of-costs question, on the other hand, would be whether the 
young friend should be allowed to recover the costs of any services provided 
to the elderly woman. Suppose the young friend could prove that he had 
indeed provided valuable services, and that the elderly woman would have 
been willing to pay the costs of providing these services if she had capacity. 
Then the young friend should be allowed to recover these costs, even if the 
sale of the house was vitiated. 
To be sure, an alternative to the present proposal is to set R = B. If courts 
could observe and verify the exact value of B, then allowing avoidance and 
setting R = B would tend to maximize joint welfare. In this hypothetical 
scenario, the capable transacting party’s payoff in the event of avoidance 
would be B – C (excluding litigation or transaction costs); the same as joint 
welfare. Hence she would have an incentive to make transactions that 
advance joint welfare. At the same time, the incapable individual’s payoff in 
the event of successful avoidance would be at least 0. If the incapable 
individual were to pay R, then she received B and paid R = B. Alternatively 
and more commonly, if a third-party—the claimant—were to pay R, then the 
incapable individual received B and paid nothing. Hence setting R = B would 
not harm the welfare of the incapable individual. 
However, the author’s proposal to set R = C tends to be less 








transacting party presumably knows her own costs of transacting, C, and can 
provide information regarding C to courts and other third parties. On the other 
hand, there tends to be significant informational challenges to observe and 
verify B—the exact value the incapable individual would assign to the 
transaction if she had capacity. As Section III.A.1 has shown, typical capacity 
disputes concerned potentially incapable individuals who had passed away 
by the time of litigation. While evidence of her past transacting patterns and 
preferences may shed light on B relative to C (in order to ascertain whether 
B ≥ C), such evidence would unlikely be sufficient to enable a precise 
inference of the exact value of B. Moreover, there is no obvious proxy of B. 
Market prices are usually poor proxies of B in cases concerning relatives and 
friends; transactions involving relatives and friends do not take place in a 
marketplace.306 The price P stipulated by the avoided transaction also tends 
to be a poor proxy of B because of the antecedent finding that the incapable 
individual would not have paid P if she had capacity.307 Hence the author 
proposes to set R = C rather than R = B. 
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In many cases, there may be insufficient evidence to ascertain whether B 
≥ C or B < C. In particular, caregiving provided in a familial or personal 
relationship—which is largely private—can be hard to describe and 
document.308 Insufficient records can prevent family-and-friend caregivers 
from proving the value of their services to courts or other third parties. 
Focusing on cases of evidential deficiency, this Section will argue that the 
mental capacity doctrine should still allow recovery of costs if the avoided 
transaction facilitated the provision of necessities of life to the incapable 
individual. 
The traditional formulation of the mental capacity doctrine has a 
necessaries exception: transactional incapacity grounds only a severely 
limited power to avoid contracts for the supply of necessities of life.309 Dating 
back to mediaeval English law, the necessaries exception aims to preserve 
incentives to supply necessaries to incapable individuals.310 Centuries of case 
law has classified some goods and services as objective necessaries; these 
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include food, clothing, housing, and medical services.311 Courts typically 
respect the existing classification unless there is evidence proving that the 
relevant good or service is not subjectively beneficial to the incapable 
individual.312 Hence,  in the presence of evidential deficiency, the necessaries 
exception sets a majoritarian default position that tends to reduce the potential 
error costs of avoidance without much sacrifice of its potential benefits. 
There remains the question of what suppliers of necessaries should 
recover from the incapable individual (or her estate). In the traditional view, 
the necessaries exception denies the power to avoid contracts for necessaries, 
so the incapable individual is liable to pay the contract price for the necessary, 
even if she has not yet received it.313 Modern American law generally allows 
avoidance, but imposes on the incapable individual (or her estate) a liability 
in restitution to pay for any necessaries that she has already received;314 such 
restitutionary liability is backward-looking, and does not arise if neither 
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contracting party has performed.315 Under the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, the incapable individual’s (or her 
estate’s) restitutionary liability is a matter of judicial discretion, which 
depends on factors such as her subjective valuation (to the extent 
ascertainable), market prices, the costs of supplying the necessary, any 
inequitable conduct, and any knowledge of the incapacity.316 
The capable transacting party’s costs of supplying the necessary should 
be the preferred measure of recovery. As Section IV.B.1 has argued, when an 
avoided transaction facilitated the supply of a good or service that generated 
more benefits to the incapable individual than costs to the supplier, the 
supplier should be allowed to recover such costs. A cost-based measure of 
recovery promotes the incapable individual’s own welfare and as well as the 
joint welfare of all contracting parties. This argument applies to transactions 
for the supply of necessaries; necessaries are just a class of goods and services 
that benefit the incapable individual from an objective perspective, subject 
always to any evidence of subjective valuation indicating the contrary. Unless 
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there is evidence showing that the incapable individual would not have paid 
the costs of supplying the particular necessary if she had capacity,317 such 
costs should be the preferred measure of recovery. 
The proposed cost-based measure of recovery is more determinate than 
the flexible approach under the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment.318 First, if the capable transacting party can provide sufficient 
evidence to prove her costs of supplying the necessary, then she can just 
recover such costs under the proposed measure; the judicial inquiry is 
narrowed to one factor—the capable party’s costs—and there is no residual 
discretion to substitute an alternative measure. By comparison, the flexible 
approach under the Restatement would expand the scope of judicial inquiry 
to cover a broad range of contextual factors and alternative measures.319 
Second, if the capable party cannot provide sufficient evidence to prove her 
costs, then the proposed cost-based measure would look for the best 
approximation of her costs. In these cases, the proposed cost-based measure 
would leave room for judicial discretion, but no broader than under the 
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Restatement.320 Thus, in these cases, the proposed measure is no more 
indeterminate, no more complex and no more informationally-demanding to 
apply than the Restatement approach. 
C. Summary of Proposed Reforms 
Taking a law-and-economics approach, this Part proposes reforms to the 
mental capacity doctrine in relation to transactions involving close relatives 
and friends. The main proposal is to introduce a substituted-judgment defense 
to qualify the power to avoid transactions for want of capacity. This defense 
precludes avoidance in cases where the incapable individual would have 
made the impugned transaction if she had capacity. The other reforms focus 
on cases where an avoided transaction facilitated the supply of a good or 
service (especially a necessity of life) that generated more benefits to the 
incapable individual than costs to the capable transacting party. In these 
cases, the capable party should be allowed to recover her costs.  These 
reforms all aim to promote the welfare of the incapable individual and the 
joint welfare of all transacting parties.  
In sum, under the proposed reforms, the mental capacity doctrine would 
take the following form when applied to a transaction between a potentially 
incapable individual and her close relative or friend: 
                                                 








(1) The impugned transaction should not be avoided if the individual had 
mental capacity at the time of making the transaction. 
(2) Even if the individual lacked mental capacity, the transaction should still 
not be avoided if the capable transacting party can establish the 
substituted-judgment defense: the incapable individual would have made 
the transaction if she had capacity. 
(3) If the individual lacked mental capacity and the capable party fails to 
establish the substituted-judgment defense, then the transaction should be 
avoided. The capable party should return any benefit that she received 
pursuant to the avoided transaction. Her recovery from the incapable 
individual (or the individual’s estate) are as follows: 
a. Suppose the capable party can prove that the incapable individual 
would have paid the costs of supplying her benefits under the 
avoided transaction, if she had capacity. In this case, the capable 
party should recover such costs. 
b. Suppose the capable party supplied a necessary to the incapable 
individual pursuant to the avoided transaction. Then the capable 
party should recover the costs of supplying the necessary. 
c. The capable party does not recover in other cases. 
CONCLUSION 








the doctrine grants a power to avoid exploitative transactions and disgorge 
the ill-gotten gains of exploitation. On the other hand, a survey of modern 
cases reveals that avoidance claims were typically brought by a claimant who 
expected to inherit from the potentially incapable individual.321 Rather than 
the individual’s interests, the claimant could be driven by a desire to increase 
her expected inheritance. Yet prevailing doctrinal theories mistakenly assume 
that the interests of the claimant and of the potentially incapable individual 
are necessarily aligned.322 Theoretical and normative considerations are 
meant to guide the exercise of a substantial judicial discretion to assess the 
costs and benefits of avoidance on a case-by-case basis.323 Distorted by 
flawed theoretical considerations, the mental capacity doctrine tends to harm 
the welfare of many seniors by unduly limiting their ability to benefit their 
close relatives and friends, reward informal caregiving, and recruit their 
preferred caregivers. 
Taking a law-and-economics approach, this Chapter proposes to limit the 
operation of the mental capacity doctrine in close families and personal 
relationships. The prevailing doctrinal theories pay insufficient attention to 
the important differences between transactions involving close relatives and 
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friends on the one hand, and transactions with businesses on the other hand. 
Most cases transactions involving close relatives and friends take place in the 
estate-planning context. In this context, a broad power of avoidance tends to 
incentivize avoidance claims that may defeat the testamentary intent of the 
potentially incapable individual. In contrast, avoidance claims against 
transactions with businesses (such as nursing-home contracts and annuities) 
are unlikely to affect the estate plan of the potentially incapable individual. 
The author thus proposes to limit the extent of avoidance of transactions 
involving close relatives and friends. When applied to these transactions, the 
mental capacity doctrine should not generate a power of avoidance if the 
incapable individual would have made the transaction in a state of capacity. 
However, the doctrine should continue to apply with full rigor to transactions 
between potentially incapable individuals and profit-driven businesses. 
In sum, the problem of elder financial abuse ought to be resolved in a way 
that advances the welfare of the elderly, as defined by their own will and 
preferences. Too broad and indeterminate, the mental capacity doctrine in 
prevailing American law is ill-suited for resolving typical capacity disputes 
in the era of aging population. The doctrine ought to be reformulated to deter 
and sanction elder financial abuse without undue intrusion into close families 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical:1 Mary, a ninety-seven-year-old 
woman, entrusted the management of her bank accounts to her son, 
Chauncey. Just before Christmas, Chauncey took money out of Mary’s 
accounts to buy himself and her grandchildren gifts. Mary was in the habit of 
making Christmas gifts to family members for as long as everyone could 
remember. After Mary passed away, her daughter Fern became entitled to a 
share of Mary’s estate. Fern now sues Chauncey and the grandchildren to 
recover those gifts bought with Mary’s money. The question that this Chapter 
                                                 









aims to resolve is who should succeed in this and similar cases. 
The issues presented in the above hypothetical deeply divide legislatures, 
courts and scholars in the United States. Like most fiduciaries, Chauncey had 
a significant discretion over the management of Mary’s property. Presuming 
the worst from him,2 orthodox fiduciary law imposes rigorous and 
comprehensive duties. Most demanding among these is the duty of undivided 
loyalty: that Chauncey must avoid a conflict of his duties to Mary and his 
personal interests.3 Many courts would inflexibly enforce that duty to hold 
Chauncey liable for using his position to enrich himself and the 
grandchildren.4 It is irrelevant that Mary was in the habit of making similar 
gifts in the past. The result is that Fern successfully recovers the gifts (or their 
value) from Chauncey; the grandchildren also can be liable in some 
circumstances.5 The apparent harshness of this result has led many 
legislatures and courts to ease the burden of fiduciary regulation. For 
example, many states have enacted statutory provisions to permit small gifts, 
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4 See generally infra Section I.C. 
5 In re Tillman, 137 N.E.2d 172, 175–77 (Ohio Prob. Ct. Darke Cty. 1956). See infra 








while others go further to abrogate the duty to avoid conflicts of interest.6 
Scholars and practitioners consistently call for clarification of fiduciary duty,7 
even though clarification may be found in at least three modern 
Restatements.8 
How best to regulate fiduciaries who provide property-management 
services to the elderly is the puzzle that animates this Chapter. Guardianships 
and powers of attorney commonly facilitate provision of these services. 
Under prevailing American law, if an adult is mentally incapable of managing 
her property,9 then a court may appoint a guardian to manage her property 
                                                 
6 See generally infra Section I.D. These are jurisdictions that adopt UNIF. POWER OF 
ATTORNEY ACT (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006). See generally Legislative Fact Sheet – Power 
of Attorney, Unif. Law Comm’n, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Power%20of%20Attorney 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2018). 
7 See, e.g., Nina A. Kohn, Elder Empowerment as a Strategy for Curbing the Hidden 
Abuses of Durable Powers of Attorney, 59 RUTGERS L. REV 1, 15–17, 52 (2006); Lisa S. 
Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 
STETSON L. REV. 7, 25–27 (2007) (discussing survey responses on fiduciary duties of 
agents). 
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.03, 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
9 A functional concept in law, mental incapacity typically means insufficient mental 
ability to undertake some task. See generally Am. Comm’n Law & Aging, Capacity 
Definition & Initiation of Guardianship Proceedings, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartcapacityandin
itiation.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018) (surveying definitions of incapacity in 
American guardianship statutes). Courts tend to have “maximal flexibility” in determining 
whether an individual is mentally-incapable. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, 
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 181 (4th ed., 2007). Clinical evaluation 
typically examines the individual’s awareness of situation, factual understanding of issues, 








for her, especially when her needs cannot be met by a less restrictive 
alternative.10 The guardianship regime can generate cost, emotional stress 
and embarrassment, as well as deprive liberty and autonomy.11 Individuals 
who anticipate the possibility of mental or physical decline in the future may 
avail themselves of alternative legal regimes. In particular, while she is 
mentally-capable, an individual may execute a durable power of attorney to 
appoint an agent to act on her behalf. The power of attorney starts to operate, 
or remains valid, when the individual becomes mentally-incapable.12 
Fiduciary law can deter and sanction elder financial abuse by guardians 
and agents—an alarming problem in an era of aging population.13 While the 
private nature of elder financial abuse makes it difficult to obtain reliable 
statistics, one nationwide survey suggests that every year, about 5.2 percent 
of Americans age sixty years or over potentially experience financial 
                                                 
own environment, and the extent of demands on her. See id. at 181–82. 
10 See infra note 32 and accompanying text. Guardians who manage property are also 
often called conservators. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-401 (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 401 
(Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). Because this Chapter only concerns property managers, all 
“guardians” discussed here refer to guardians who manage property. 
11 See infra note 141; David J. Feder & Robert H. Sitkoff, Revocable Trusts and 
Incapacity Planning: More than Just a Will Substitute, 24 ELDER L.J. 1, 27, 28 (2016). 
12 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 104 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.06 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 








mistreatment by a family member.14 Some even describe a power of attorney 
as “a license to steal”.15 Although tort law or criminal law may deter and 
sanction a financial abuser, she may still have an incentive to engage in 
misconduct if her ill-gotten gain exceeds her expected tortious or criminal 
liability. Fiduciary law can disgorge her ill-gotten gain;16 it deters and 
sanctions the abuser by taking away what motivated her to engage in 
misconduct in the first place. 
Taking a law-and-economics approach, this Chapter aims to optimize the 
fiduciary duties of guardians and agents in order to promote welfare. The 
main claim is that orthodox fiduciary law unnecessarily deters guardians and 
agents from supporting elderly incapable individuals to pursue valuable 
other-regarding goals and preferences. This is because the pursuit of other-
regarding goals and preferences benefits someone other than the incapable 
individual—a violation of the sole-interest duty of loyalty. Most other 
fiduciaries could have avoided liability by obtaining the fully-informed 
                                                 
14 Ron Aciero et al., Prevalence and Correlates of Emotional, Physical, Sexual, and 
Financial Abuse and Potential Neglect in the United States: the National Elder Mistreatment 
Study, 100 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 292, 292, 296 (2010). These authors broadly defined 
“financial mistreatment by family member” to mean family member “spent money”, “did 
not make good decisions”, “did not give copies”, “forged signature”, “forced respondent to 
sign a document” or “stole money”. Id. at 294. See also id. at 292 (summarizing the consistent 
results of earlier surveys). 
15 Whitton, supra note 7, at 29. 
16 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 








consent of their beneficiaries.17 However, an incapable individual typically 
cannot give a valid consent. Thus, deterring the pursuit of other-regarding 
preferences, orthodox fiduciary law can harm the welfare of elderly incapable 
individuals. This is particularly problematic in cases concerning close 
families and personal relationships.18 Moreover, in these cases, orthodox 
fiduciary law fails to recognize that biological and affective bonds, as well as 
social and moral norms, already partially disincentivize close relatives and 
friends from committing misconduct.19 
This Chapter thus proposes to loosen the fiduciary regulation of close 
relatives and friends in order to accommodate strong intrinsic bonds and 
other-regarding preferences.20 In particular, fiduciary law ought to permit 
those conflicts of interest that the elderly incapable individual would have 
authorized if she was mentally-capable.21 On the other hand, in cases where 
                                                 
17 See infra Section I.E. 
18 See infra Section II.B. 
19 See infra Section II.B.2. 
20 While the present analysis focuses on guardians and agents, it can be extended to other 
fiduciaries who serve incapable individuals. For example, a person can become a de facto 
fiduciary on the basis of a relationship of trust and confidence. See, e.g., McHugh v. Jeffries, 
183 S.W.2d 309 (Ark. 1944); Eagerton v. Fleming, 700 P.2d 1389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). See 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (restitutionary liability arising from misconduct in a relationship of trust 
and confidence). 








intrinsic bonds and other-regarding preferences are weak, the need to deter 
and sanction misconduct calls for strict fiduciary regulation. These cases 
mainly concern professional guardians and agents who charge fees for their 
services. Hence, for professionals, I propose to strengthen fiduciary 
regulation by harnessing their reputational concerns.22 
This Chapter should be interesting to several groups of scholars and 
practitioners. Economic analysis of fiduciary law neglects the special issues 
arising from mental incapacity;23 this Chapter fills in that gap. While some 
disability-rights and doctrinal scholars have studied the fiduciary duties of 
guardians and agents,24 they have not considered the law’s potential to align 
or misalign incentives. Moreover, the present subject matter falls squarely 
within the interests of those who work in trusts and estates, and elder law. 
Finally, this Chapter offers guidance and reform proposals to legislatures—
which are regularly pressed to reform guardianship law and agency law—and 
to courts—which regularly resolve disputes involving property managers of 
the elderly. 
                                                 
22 See generally infra Part IV. 
23 See generally infra Sections I.B, I.E, II.A–B. 
24 See, e.g., Robert B. Fleming & Rebecca C. Morgan, Standards for Financial Decision-
making: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Issues, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1275; Kohn, supra note 7; 
Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decision-Making, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW ch. 13 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019); 








Part I below offers an overview of fiduciary law and its economic 
foundations. Part II argues that existing fiduciary law and theory fail to 
accommodate the special characteristics of mental capacity cases. Parts III 
and IV then propose reforms to promote welfare. 
I. FIDUCIARY REGULATION OF GUARDIANS AND AGENTS 
This Part will first discuss the two main legal devices designed to 
facilitate provision of property-management services to mentally-incapable 
individuals: guardianship and power of attorney. It will then introduce the 
standard economic theory of fiduciary relationships, and use that theory to 
explain the two main models of fiduciary law in American jurisdictions. 
A. Property Managers of Elderly Incapable Individuals  
Population aging is old news. Since the last century, the percentage of 
Americans age sixty-five or over [hereinafter, seniors] has tripled. The 
population of seniors is estimated at 43.1 million in 2016 (15.2 percent of the 
population), and is projected to reach ninety-six million by 2060.25 In the 
modern economy, the stereotype that seniors are “frail, out of touch, 
burdensome or dependent” is outdated.26 Physical or mental decline 
                                                 
25 U.S. ADMIN. COMMUNITY LIVING, 2017 PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS 1–2 (2018) 
https://acl.gov/sites/default/files/Aging%20and%20Disability%20in%20America/2017Old
erAmericansProfile.pdf. 
26 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON AGEING AND HEALTH 2015 at 








nonetheless remains prevalent. In particular, recent studies estimate that 
Alzheimer’s dementia affects about 5.5 million (one in ten) seniors.27 “[One 
in three] seniors dies with Alzheimer’s or another dementia. It kills more than 
breast cancer and prostate cancer combined.”28 The combination of longevity 
and mental decline can explain the increasing demand for property-
management services to mentally-incapable seniors.29 
The state has long claimed a power as parens patriae—meaning “parent 
of the nation”—to make decisions on behalf of mentally-incapable 
individuals. The formal legal institution created by that power is commonly 
called guardianship. To create a guardianship under prevailing American 
law, the relevant state court (typically the probate court) must first be satisfied 
that the individual lacks mental capacity to manage some aspect of her life or 
property. Mental capacity is a legal and functional concept that accounts for 
cognitive functioning, the specific tasks to be undertaken, and concerns for 
autonomy and protection.30 The presence of some mental or physical disorder 
in the medical sense is typically neither sufficient nor necessary for the 
                                                 
27 Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-
dementia/facts-figures (last visited Dec. 8, 2018). 
28 Id. 
29 See, e.g., Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 27. 








individual to lack mental capacity in the eyes of the law.31 Once the individual 
is found incapable of managing some aspect of life or property, the court has 
a discretion to appoint a substitute decision-maker—the guardian—to make 
decisions regarding that aspect of life or property. To safeguard the autonomy 
and dignity of the individual, modern guardianship statutes tend to mandate 
that guardianship be created only as a last resort, when there is no less 
restrictive alternative to facilitate the decision-making assistance needed.32 
Most individuals subject to guardianship are seniors experiencing cognitive 
disorders, especially dementia.33 
While a guardianship is officially created, a power of attorney is a private 
instrument through which an individual—the principal—authorizes another 
person—the agent—to act on behalf of the principal.34 There was an old 
                                                 
31 See APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 181. See also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xiii–xl (5th ed., 2013) 
(providing a standard list of mental disorders). 
32 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-401 (amended 2010). While the guardianship 
system under id. is “fairly representative”, Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 27, the Uniform 
Law Commission recently promulgated UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND 
OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 401(b) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). To cover 
both the representative statute and the modern trend, this Chapter cites the relevant sections 
of both of these uniform legislation. 
33 See, e.g., Jean Callahan, Requel Malina Romanick & Angela Ghesquiere, 
Guardianship Proceedings in New York State: Findings and Recommendations, 37 BIFOCAL 
83, 85–86 (2016); In re Caminite (Amelia G.), 57 N.Y.S.3d 724, 726 (N.Y. Nassau Cty. Ct.). 
Another common class of individuals subject to guardianship are those who have suffered 
some brain injury, and the guardianship is created to manage the tort judgment or settlement 
arising from that injury. See, e.g., In re Estate of O’Hare, 34 N.E.3d 1126 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015); 
In re Tinsmon, 79 N.Y.S.3d 854 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2018). 








common law rule that avoids the agent’s authority upon the principal losing 
mental capacity. The rationale was that the agent could only do what the 
principal was able to do. Abolishing that common law rule, modern power of 
attorney statutes permit a durable agency to commence, or remain valid, upon 
the principal losing mental capacity.35 These statutes allow individuals to 
choose their own representatives in the event of losing mental capacity, and 
to avoid the cost, emotional stress and embarrassment of invoking the official 
guardianship regime.36 In fact, the principal can even stipulate a sui generis 
definition of “incapacity” and provide a procedure for determining whether 
that definition is met.37 
B. Economic Foundations of Fiduciary Law 
The economic theory of relational contracts provides a framework for 
understanding the problem of misuse of power by guardians and durable 
agents. This Section will introduce the key components of that framework: 
the guardian or agent’s broad discretion; a lack of satisfactory monitoring 
mechanisms; and the resulting moral hazard problem. Sections I.C–E below 
                                                 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
35 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 104 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.06 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
36 See, e.g., Feder & Sitkoff, supra note 11, at 28–30. 








will use this framework to explain how fiduciary law can deter and sanction 
misconduct.38 
1. Broad Fiduciary Discretion 
In a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary tends to have a broad discretion 
over how to provide her services. At the time of creating the relationship, the 
creator is unlikely to give comprehensive, rule-like instructions to the 
fiduciary. This reflects the reality that it is impossible to anticipate all future 
contingencies, and that it is prohibitively costly to account for all those 
contingencies that can be anticipated. In other words, the “contract” that 
governs the fiduciary relationship is incomplete, leaving the fiduciary to 
respond to unaccounted-for contingencies by exercising her discretion.39 
For example, at the time of drafting an order to appoint a guardian, the 
                                                 
38 This Section adopts the “agency costs” framework. Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Economic theories of fiduciary law typically use the 
“agency costs” framework. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995) (on parents’ fiduciary duties as mandatory law); 
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (on fiduciary duties 
as penalty-defaults). An alternative economic theory conceives fiduciary law as supplying 
potentially efficient solutions to holdup problems. See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of 
Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299 (1993); Richard R. W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023 (2006). See generally Richard R. W. Brooks, The Economics of 
Fiduciary Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW ch. 35 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. 
Miller, Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (discussing various economic theories of fiduciary law). 
39 Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 199. See also Scott & Scott, supra note 38, at 2417 
(Performance of caring duty is complex and subject to uncertainties, and requires responses 








court is unable to give rule-like instructions that leave the guardian with no 
discretion regarding how to respond to all future contingencies. Satisfactory 
property-management (or care-taking) requires the guardian to perform a 
broad range of tasks in the light of changing circumstances. Even a simple 
task like buying groceries requires a comparison of prices, which differ across 
grocery stores and fluctuate over time; it would be prohibitively costly and 
unrealistic for the court to tell the guardian exactly where to shop and how 
much to spend. As predicted by economic theory, the available empirical 
observations suggest that courts typically give guardians a broad discretion.40 
For similar reasons, at the time of drafting a durable power of attorney, 
the drafter is unlikely to give rule-like instructions telling the agent exactly 
what to do in every eventuality that may arise in the future. Nothing prevents 
the power of attorney from containing rule-like instructions in respect of 
some eventualities, but it would be prohibitively costly and unrealistic to 
cover all eventualities. 
2. Ineffective Monitoring 
Fiduciaries are typically subject to limited or no monitoring. First, that 
                                                 
40 See, e.g., Alison Barnes, The Liberty and Property of Elders: Guardianship and Will 
Contests as the Same Claim, 11 ELDER L.J. 1, 7–8 (2003) [hereinafter Barnes, The Liberty 
and Property of Elders]; Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness–A 
Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 279 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 294 
(2011); Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 








the beneficiary lacks the specialized skills necessary to take the relevant 
actions without assistance is often the very reason of engaging the fiduciary; 
the same reason prevents the beneficiary from effectively monitoring the 
fiduciary.41 Second, any observable and verifiable output tends to be 
imperfectly probative of the fiduciary’s unmonitored actions. What is 
typically observable and verifiable is some imperfect signal of the fiduciary’s 
actions, such as incomplete reports.  
The problem of ineffective monitoring affects guardianships and agency 
relationships. First, in the case of guardianship, the individual subject to 
guardianship lacks mental capacity; this tends to place significant restrictions 
on her own monitoring efforts. While modern guardianship statutes 
increasingly provide for public monitoring by courts or state agencies,42 they 
typically remain a recipient of information proffered by the parties.43 Limited 
funding, heavy caseloads and shortages in staffing are all constraints that 
                                                 
41 Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 199. See also Scott & Scott, supra note 38, at 2419–21 
(discussing the limits of monitoring mechanisms in the family context). 
42 ADMIN. CONF. U.S., SSA REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE: SURVEY OF STATE GUARDIANSHIP 
LAWS AND COURT PRACTICES 21–22 (Dec. 24, 2014), https://www.acus.gov/report/ssa-
representative-payee-survey-state-guardianship-laws-and-court-practices. See also id. at 21–
22 (almost nine-tenth of respondents to survey answering all or most guardianship-of-
property cases require inventory filing and annual financial accounting). 
43 Alison Barnes, The Virtues of Corporate and Professional Guardians, 31 STETSON L. 








prevent courts or state agencies from engaging in extensive monitoring.44 For 
instance, about one-fifth of the respondents to a 2014-survey of American 
guardianship law and practice answered that financial accountings by 
guardians were not completely audited or evaluated.45 
Second, ineffective monitoring is also a problem in the typical agency 
relationship.46 The agent continues to act when the principal loses mental 
capacity. Public monitoring is also limited or non-existent, given the private 
nature of the agency relationship.47 
3. Moral Hazard 
The combination of broad discretion and ineffective monitoring suggests 
that the fiduciary may exploit the problem of moral hazard: the exact action 
taken by the fiduciary—such as any actual wrongdoing—can be hidden from 
others.48 Moreover, the true costs and benefits of the fiduciary’s chosen 
action are usually not fully-known to others; this prevents an accurate 
                                                 
44 Id. at 980–84. 
45 ADMIN. CONF. U.S., supra note 42, at 25. 
46 Kohn, supra note 7, at 38. See also id. at 42–45, 52 (proposing to require agents to 
communicate with their elderly principals in order to promote better monitoring and 
participation by these principals). 
47 See generally infra notes 71, 298 and accompanying text (discussing the accounting 
and reporting duties of agents). 








inference of the action taken by the fiduciary based on her financial gains and 
losses alone. Assuming her interests do not align perfectly with her 
beneficiary’s, the fiduciary has incentives to exploit the moral hazard 
problem.49 
In re Conservatorship of Smith v. Vandevort illustrates the moral hazard 
problem.50 In that case, a long-term partner and caregiver of an elderly 
woman became her guardian of property when she lost mental capacity. After 
taking his office, the guardian opened a joint bank account with the woman, 
and started moving money from the woman’s own accounts into that joint 
account. The motive behind these actions was that upon the woman passing 
away, the guardian would become the sole owner of the joint account, while 
the woman’s heirs would become entitled to the accounts in her own name.51 
There was a problem of moral hazard because no one other than the guardian 
would know for sure whether he had actually overreached to get the woman 
to open the joint account with him. The guardian’s financial gain alone was 
insufficient to support an inference of actual wrongdoing; the woman might 
well have wished to benefit her guardian, who was her caregiver and long-
                                                 
49 Id. at 199. See infra Part II (explaining and challenging this assumption). 
50 237 So.3d 852 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing and remanding trial court’s summary 
dismissal of breach-of-fiduciary duty claim). 









C. Prohibition of Conflicts of Interest 
To deter and sanction exploitation of the moral hazard problem, 
American jurisdictions impose fiduciary duties on guardians and agents. This 
Section introduces the strict model of fiduciary law, which is based on the 
fiduciary duties of trustees.52 This model represents the orthodoxy for both 
guardians and agents.53 Section I.D below will discuss the modern trend to 
adopt a relaxed model for agents. 
Jurisdictions that follow the strict model of fiduciary law impose rigorous 
and comprehensive duties on guardians and agents. The most demanding of 
these is a duty of undivided loyalty. Subject to some narrow exceptions,54 the 
duty of loyalty prohibits the guardian or agent from acting other than in the 
sole interest of the incapable individual. In particular, the guardian or agent 
breaches her sole-interest duty by entering into transactions that involve a 
                                                 
52 A trustee holds the legal title of some property for the benefit of one or more other 
person, or for the benefit of charity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). Guardians and agents are not trustees because they do not hold legal title of the 
incapable individual’s property. 
53 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-418(a) (amended 2010) (applying trust fiduciary law to 
guardians); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 418 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (“While a [property guardian’s] 
role is not identical to that of a trustee, many principles of trust law are relevant[.]”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958); Lawrence A. Frolik, Is 
a Guardian the Alter Ego of the Ward?, 37 STETSON L. REV. 53, 66–67 (2007) [hereinafter, 
Frolik, Alter Ego]. 








substantial conflict between her duties to the incapable individual and her 
personal interests.55 There is a “no further inquiry” rule holding that it is 
generally immaterial whether a conflicted action is taken in good faith or 
results in no loss.56 There is also a rule against self-dealing that prohibits the 
guardian or agent from entering on her own account any transaction involving 
the incapable individual’s property.57 Unless permitted by statute, 
commingling her own property (or someone else’s property) with the 
property of the incapable individual also breaches her sole-interest duty.58 
The main exemption to the duty of loyalty is that the guardian or agent may 
                                                 
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2007); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 425 
(Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (voiding transactions tainted with “substantial conflict between 
the [property guardian’s] fiduciary duties and personal interests”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 
5-423 (amended 2010) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. LAW. INST. 
1958). Unlike many other duties of a fiduciary, the sole-interest duty of loyalty is typically 
expressed in negative terms, which duty obliges the fiduciary to avoid conflicts rather than 
positively to take some action. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2007). 
56 Langbein, supra note 2, at 931, 934–35. 
57 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
ACT § 425 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (“A transaction affected by a substantial conflict 
includes a . . . transaction involving the [guardianship] estate entered into by the [guardian 
of estate].”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-423 (amended 2010) (same). See, e.g., Matter of 
Brownell, 447 N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (N.Y. Delaware County Ct. 1981) (Guardian violated the 
rule against self-dealing by charging the guardianship property to pay for her caring of the 
incapable individual’s dog.). 
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 84 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). See, e.g., In re 
Campione, 872 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (family guardian in breach of duty 
of loyalty on grounds including commingling guardianship funds). See generally Langbein, 









receive reasonable remuneration for providing her services, but only if the 
incapable individual can afford to pay her.59 
A breach of the sole-interest duty of loyalty makes available a broad range 
of remedies. These include rescission of any impugned transaction, 
injunction to restrain a prospective breach, loss-based remedies to 
compensate any loss to the incapable individual, and gain-based remedies to 
disgorge the errant guardian’s or agent’s ill-gotten gain.60 A third party who 
participates in or benefits from a breach also can become liable,61 although 
many jurisdictions condition such liability on the third party having sufficient 
knowledge of the breach.62 The duty of loyalty is also expressive;63 its 
morality rhetoric suggests that a finding of breach can impose informal social 
                                                 
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(4) (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
60 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).  
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 17 cmt. c, 43 
cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
62 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 108 (AM. LAW INST. 2007); UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 1012 (2000). See, e.g., Smallwood v. Lupoli, 107 968 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517–19 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (applying Palmetto Partners, L.P. v. AJW Qualified Partners, LLC, 
921 N.Y.S.2d 260, 265–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), which imposes a knowledge requirement 
on third-party liability). 
63 Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: the Law of Financial 
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY 
LAW  118–21 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Hanoch Dagan & Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Reinterpreting the Status-Contract Divide: the Case of Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, 








costs of guilt and moral opprobrium.64 Moreover, the court may remove the 
errant guardian or agent from her office.65 The court also may reduce or 
remove the errant guardian’s or agent’s remuneration.66 
The duty of loyalty is peculiarly fiduciary, but it is not the only duty that 
guardians and agents owe. They also owe duties to act within the scope of 
their authority,67 and to act with reasonable care and prudence.68 In particular, 
the duty of care and prudence requires guardians to invest and manage the 
property of the incapable individual as a prudent investor or person would.69 
Moreover, many jurisdictions impose periodic accounting and reporting 
                                                 
64 Scott & Scott, supra note 38, at 2425–26. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 
545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, Ch. J.). 
65 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 37 cmt. b, 65 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 
2012); In re Helen S., 13 N.Y.S.3d 516, 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
66 See infra note 307–11 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.07, 8.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-314(a), 5-410(b) (amended 2010) (court to decide scope of 
guardian’s authority); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 411(c), (d) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017) (same). 
68 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
ACT § 418(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-418(a) (amended 2010); 
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(b)(3) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
69 UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
ACT § 418 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); Fleming & Morgan, supra note 24, at 1302–05. 
Imprudent transactions involving a conflict of interest violate the duty of care and prudence, 
in addition to the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Green v. Lombard, 343 A.2d 905,908–10 (Md. 








duties on guardians.70 Agents also tend to own accounting and reporting 
duties, but these duties are less onerous than guardians’.71 
Orthodox fiduciary law is prophylactic;72 it overdeters the guardian or 
agent to ameliorate the misalignment of her personal interests and the 
incapable individual’s.73 That misalignment is what gives rise to incentives 
to exploit the moral hazard problem.74 As Professor Robert Sitkoff wrote, the 
sole-interest duty of loyalty deters a fiduciary from placing herself in a 
position of conflict by disgorging any personal gain arising from that 
position.75 The disgorgement remedy adds to the usual deterrence effect of 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-317, 5-420 (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT §§ 420, 
423 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). 
71 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12(3) (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
and infra note 297 and accompanying text. 
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“The rationale 
[underlying the duty of loyalty] begins with a recognition that it may be difficult for a trustee 
to resist temptation when personal interests conflict with fiduciary duty.”); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 cmts. b, d, h (AM. LAW INST. 2011); 
Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 199. 
73 But see Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U L. REV. 1045 (conceiving fiduciary 
duties as providing optimal deterrence). 
74 See supra Section I.B.3. 
75 Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 201–02, 206–07. See also Scott & Scott, supra note 38, at 









compensatory remedies.76 Alternatively, Professor Henry Smith conceived 
the function of fiduciary law as preventing opportunism in the sense of 
behaviors that are detrimental to social welfare but cannot be cost-effectively 
defined, detected and deterred by explicit ex-ante rulemaking.77 Because self-
dealing and non-avoidance of conflicts are correlated with opportunism, 
fiduciary law regards such conduct as proxies and presumptions of 
opportunism.78 As a prophylactic measure, fiduciary law requires the 
fiduciary to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest, regardless of any bad 
faith or fraud on her part.79 This prophylactic objective explains the 
availability of disgorgement remedies to strip the fiduciary of any personal 
profit arising from conflicted transactions.80 Compensatory remedies further 
strengthen the deterrence function.81 
In re Estate of O’Hare can illustrate the practical implications of the sole-
interest duty of loyalty.82 This case concerned a young woman—Sarah—who 
                                                 
76 Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 202, 206–07. 
77 Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW  261, 264, 267, 271, 273 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
78 Id. at 262, 271. 
79 Id. at 271.  
80 Id. at 273–74.  
81 Id. at 274, 280. 








suffered injuries at birth and obtained a substantial property as a result of a 
medical malpractice settlement. Sarah’s mother—Virginia—was her primary 
caregiver and became the guardian of her property when she reached 
majority. When Sarah’s stepfather relocated interstate for his job, the family 
moved into a house purchased with Sarah’s funds. Virginia also used Sarah’s 
funds to pay family expenses and a caregiver’s salary to herself.83 The Illinois 
court held Virginia in breach of fiduciary duty because she used Sarah’s funds 
to benefit the family as a whole rather than Sarah specifically.84 
An instructive aspect of this case is the way that the court enforced the 
duty of loyalty in the presence of informational deficiency. Virginia did not 
give prior notice to the court regarding her uses of Sarah’s funds, and kept 
poor records.85 The information that the court could observe and verify 
mainly consisted of these poor records, Virginia’s personal gain, the family’s 
gain, and a reduction in Sarah’s funds. However, gift-giving and property-
sharing are common in close families.86 The mere fact that Sarah’s family 
benefited from her funds could not indicate that Virginia engaged in any 
actual wrongdoing. To the contrary, the court thought Virginia provided 
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“excellent care” to Sarah.87 What animated the court’s ruling against Virginia 
was not evidence of actual wrongdoing, but her conflict of interest. 
D. The Best-interest Standard 
This Section introduces an alternative formulation of the duty of loyalty, 
under which the guardian or agent is permitted to take a conflict-of-interest 
action if it is in the best interest of the incapable individual. The best-interest 
standard directs an objective, multifactorial analysis of context-sensitive facts 
and circumstances. The incapable individual’s known wishes are the 
predominant factor in determining what amounts to her best interest.88 Other 
factors include the individual’s financial circumstances, eligibility for public 
benefits, and tax consequences of the proposed action.89 
A leading advocate of the best-interest standard, Professor John Langbein 
argued that the sole-interest duty of loyalty generates more costs than 
benefits.90 In his view, the main problem with the sole-interest duty is the 
                                                 
87 In re Estate of O’Hare, 34 N.E.3d 1126, 1131 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015). 
88 See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-314(a), 5-418(b) (amended 2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 
81.20(a)(6)(i), 81.20(a)(7) (McKinney 2016); ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 509–10 (10th ed., 2017) (discussing In re Kurrelmeyer, 2008 
WL 7810419 (Vt. Super.), aff’d, 992 A.2d 316 (Vt. 2010)). 
89 See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006).  
90 Langbein, supra note 2, at 933. Langbein’s arguments specifically address trusteeship, 
but scholars and law reformers have made similar arguments in relation to other fiduciary 
relationships. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational 
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1126–30 (1981) (discussing fiduciary duties of parties to 








overdeterrence of actions that benefit both the beneficiary and the fiduciary.91 
According to Langbein, the old English Court of Chancery developed the 
sole-interest duty to address the concern that a trustee could easily conceal 
his own wrongdoing.92 This concern reflected the “grievous shortcomings” 
in fact-finding processes at the time, but it no longer reflects the efficacy of 
recordkeeping and fact-finding processes in modern times.93 In the language 
of economic theory, Langbein challenged the assumption that the fiduciary is 
always poorly monitored. Replacing the sole-interest duty with the best-
interest standard would enable a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
Proposals to introduce the best-interest standard have partially informed 
                                                 
conflict-of-interest rules or standards to parents in close families); UNIF. POWER OF 
ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006). 
91 Langbein, supra note 2, at 933. 
92 Id. at 932, 944–45. Cf. Joshua Getzler, Interdisciplinary Review of Fiduciary Law: 
“As If.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 973, 981–85 (2011). The 
modern conception of fiduciary law originally took shape against a culture of corruption and 
incompetence among private and public officials, including Lord Chancellors and Masters 
of the English Court of Chancery. In the early eighteenth-century, Lord Chancellor King, an 
anticorruption reformer and former Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, succeeded 
as Lord Chancellor after presiding over the impeachment of his predecessor. Lord Chancellor 
King adopted a prophylactic policy in “a run of stringently moralistic decisions” to restore 
the integrity and reputation of his Court, id. at 983–94, including Keech v. Sandford (1726) 
25 Eng, Rep. 223; Sel. Cas. Ch. 61, a leading case in fiduciary law, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 78 reporter’s note on cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 reporter’s note b (AM. LAW INST. 2011). An 
anticorruption sentiment also might underlie Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard 
v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), another leading case in fiduciary law. Getzler, 
id. at 985 (citations omitted). 








the development of modern agency law. Under modern power of attorney 
statutes, an agent may defend a conflicted transaction by proving that she 
acted with care, competence and diligence for the best interest of her 
principal.94 The availability of this defense largely abrogates the sole-interest 
duty.95 Such departure from the orthodoxy reflects “the practical reality that 
most agents are family members who have inherent conflicts of interest with 
the principal arising from joint property ownership or inheritance 
expectations.”96 However, modern agency law continues to prohibit agents 
from engaging in self-dealing transactions.97 Similarly, agents are prohibited 
from using their principals’ property for their own (or a third party’s) 
purposes.98 Both of these prohibitions derive from the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty.99 Hence the best-interest standard seems to have displaced the sole-
interest duty to a great extent, but not completely. 
                                                 
94 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006). This standard 
is consistent with Langbein’s proposal. See generally Langbein, supra note 2; supra Section 
I.D. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01, reporter’s note a (AM. LAW INST. 
2006) (“[A]n agent's loyal service to the principal may, concurrently, be beneficial to the 
agent.”). 
95 Langbein, supra note 2, at 933–34. 
96 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006). See also 
Langbein, supra note 2, at 935–36. 
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.03 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 








The best-interest standard also has a role to play in modern guardianship 
law. In addition to her sole-interest duty of loyalty, a guardian owes a stand-
alone duty to exercise her discretion to advance the known wishes of the 
incapable individual.100 If the individual’s wishes are not known, or if giving 
effect to her wishes would unreasonably harm or endanger her, then the 
guardian owes a duty to act in her best interest.101 
In re Keri illustrates how the best-interest standard can permit actions that 
benefit both the incapable individual and her guardian or agent.102 In that 
case, the two sons of an elderly incapable woman—Keri—took care of her in 
her house for as long as they could; one of the sons was her agent. When the 
sons could no longer avoid placing her in a nursing home, they devised a plan 
to accelerate her eligibility for Medicaid reimbursement of her nursing home 
costs. They planned to sell Keri’s house and transfer a significant proportion 
of the proceeds to themselves.103 Their justification was that under Keri’s 
                                                 
100 This duty reflects the doctrine of substituted judgment. See generally infra Section 
III.A. 
101 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-314(a), 5-418(b) (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 
418(c) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). See generally Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, 
The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal 
for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 739, 742–43 (2012) (surveying financial decision-
making standards in American guardianship statutes). 
102 853 A.2d 909 (N.J.). 








will, they would receive her estate when she passed away, but they would 
likely receive nothing if her assets were spent on her nursing home costs.104 
Applying the best-interest standard, the New Jersey court approved the sons’ 
plan. The court found that the plan would likely increase the amount that she 
would leave to her sons and that she would not have disapproved the plan if 
she was mentally-capable.105 The plan would not have been approved if the 
court were to enforce the sole-interest duty of loyalty, because the sons had a 
conflict of interest.106 
E. Operation as Default Law 
Both the orthodox and relaxed models of fiduciary law are contractarian; 
they conceive fiduciary law as supplying mostly default duties to fill in the 
gaps in the incomplete “contract” between the fiduciary and the 
beneficiary.107 This reflects the prevailing doctrinal position that fiduciary 
law generally yields to party modification. By modifying the terms of the 
                                                 
104 Id. at 911–12, 917–18. 
105 Id. at 913, 917–18. Although the New Jersey court formally discussed both the best-
interest standard and a substituted-judgment standard to be discussed in infra Section III.A, 
it really only applied the best-interest standard. See Frolik, Alter Ego, supra note 53, at 82. 
106 See In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 918–19 (N.J.). 
107 See especially Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary 
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993). But see Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW  242 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller 








instrument underlying the fiduciary relationship, the creator or the 
beneficiary may modify the duties of the fiduciary.108 Similarly, the 
beneficiary may consent to a departure from default fiduciary law before it 
takes place, or ratify it afterward.109 The fiduciary must make a fair-and-frank 
disclosure and the beneficiary’s consent or ratification must be fully-
informed;110 information asymmetry, cognitive biases, limited willpower and 
some other obstacles to efficient bargaining can justify the imposition of 
these procedural safeguards.111 The beneficiary or creator can therefore 
discharge the fiduciary from compliance with almost all of her fiduciary 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 64, 65 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“[A]n agent’s 
fiduciary duties to the principal vary depending on the parties’ agreement and the scope of 
the parties’ relationship.”). The instrument underlying the fiduciary relationship is the power 
of attorney in the case of an agency relationship, and the court order that appoints the 
guardian in the case of a guardianship. 
109 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 97 (AM. LAW INST. 2012). The fiduciary law literature 
often denotes by “authorization” or “consent” an ex-ante permission to take the conflicted 
action or transaction, and by “ratification” or “release” an ex-post permission. See, e.g., 
Langbein, supra note 2, at 963–64; Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 58 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, Robert H. 
Sitkoff eds., 2019). For simplicity, this Chapter uses “authorization” to denote both, and 
emphasizes timing where relevant. 
110 Matthew Conaglen, The Extent of Fiduciary Accounting and the Importance of 
Authorisation Mechanisms, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 548, 563 (2011). See also Sitkoff, supra note 
38, at 201–02. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(3), cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 
2007) (fair-and-frank disclosure requirements). 
111 See, e.g., Dagan & Scott, supra note 63, at 22. See generally Benjamin E. Hermalin, 
Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
vol. 1 at 30–46 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (discussing the obstacles 








duties. The only potential exception is a mandatory core of fiduciary law that 
holds the fiduciary liable for breaches taken in bad faith or with 
indifference.112 Overall, fiduciary law places few restrictions on a private 
individual’s power to authorize departures from adherence to strict fiduciary 
duties. Call that power the power of authorization. 
The essentially-default nature of fiduciary law supplies the standard 
objection to reform proposals to legitimize conflict-of-interest transactions 
that are welfare-enhancing.113 To see this, suppose the fiduciary has an 
opportunity to commit an efficient breach of the sole-interest duty of loyalty. 
This means that the benefits arising from non-compliance are greater than the 
costs, so the breach would generate a positive (net) welfare gain. If the 
fiduciary seeks authorization from the beneficiary, then they can negotiate 
and form an agreement on how to share the welfare gain. The disclosure 
requirements help to facilitate an arms-length negotiation at this juncture, 
which negotiation likely leads to a distribution of the welfare gain to both the 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 96 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Aside 
from protecting the principal, the mandatory core of fiduciary law reduces the information 
costs of a third party who deals with the fiduciary. Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 205–06. 
113 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 43 
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011). Contra. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fiduciary Law and 
Psychology, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 717–19 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. 
Miller, Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) (The empirical literature on disclosure of conflicts of 
interest suggest that “[d]isclosures appear to increase the provision of biased advice and 









fiduciary and the beneficiary. On the other hand, if the fiduciary acts without 
prior authorization, and is later found in breach, then her personal gain would 
be disgorged. Thus the fiduciary would be better off acting with the 
beneficiary’s authorization than without. In sum, by simultaneously imposing 
the sole-interest duty on the fiduciary and granting the power to authorize any 
departure to the beneficiary, orthodox fiduciary law can incentivize the 
fiduciary to take a welfare-enhancing action and share the resulting welfare 
gain with the beneficiary. (This line of reasoning critically depends on the 
beneficiary having mental capacity, as Part II below will explain.) 
A numerical example can illustrate how the sole-interest duty and the 
power of authorization operate in tandem. Suppose the fiduciary has an 
opportunity to take an action that generates $100 to herself but harms the 
beneficiary by $30. Taking this action without authorization would constitute 
a breach of the sole-interest duty; a conflict of interest arises when the 
fiduciary gains at the beneficiary’s expense. If the fiduciary were sanctioned 
for committing such a breach, then her gain of $100 would be disgorged; this 
outcome would leave the fiduciary with $0 and the beneficiary with $100 – 
$30 = $70.114 On the other hand, if the fiduciary were to seek prior 
authorization from the beneficiary, then they could agree on how to share the 
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net gain of $70. The exact shares would depend on their respective bargaining 
powers. For example, the beneficiary could get $50 while the fiduciary $20. 
The numbers are unimportant, because the fiduciary is incentivized to seek 
authorization as long as she can obtain more than $0. 
F. Rule versus Standard 
The extent of indeterminacy also affects the choice between the sole-
interest duty of loyalty and the best-interest standard. Brightline rules 
stipulate in advance the exact legal criteria to be applied in individual cases. 
Vague standards, on the other hand, leave courts to determine the criteria with 
the benefit of hindsight. Compared to rules, standards typically generate 
greater compliance costs and litigation costs to litigants as well as greater 
decisional costs to courts.115 On the other hand, rules may be more 
informationally-demanding and costlier to promulgate ex ante, especially 
when the facts are complex and future contingencies are hard to foresee or 
describe.116 
Scholars have criticized the best-interest standard for its 
indeterminacy.117 Breach-of-fiduciary duty claims typically involve a 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: an Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557 (1992). 
116 Id. at 621–22. 
117 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 








guardian or an agent who is in a familial relationship with the incapable 
individual.118 The best-interest standard grants a broad judicial discretion to 
consider a variety of factors.119 Yet, as Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert 
Emery argued, the largely-private nature of family life keeps much relevant 
information hidden from outsiders, such as a court.120 Another problem 
pertains to the need to weigh or rank inherently incommensurable best-
interest factors.121 In stark contrast, the sole-interest duty of loyalty supplies 
a highly determinate rule: whether there is an unauthorized conflict of 
interest, and if there is, does it fall within a recognized exception? This 
inquiry typically ends with finding some unauthorized financial benefit—an 
observable and verifiable piece of information—to the guardian or agent (or 
a third party).122 
                                                 
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 226 (1975). See also 
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undesirable that the costs of extirpating the entire class of transaction (a rule) are less than 
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118 See supra notes 33, 96 and accompanying text. 
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Orthodox fiduciary law imposes the sole-interest duty of loyalty to 
remove the fiduciary from situations involving a conflict of her interests with 
the beneficiary’s. Overdetering the fiduciary, the sole-interest duty 
ameliorates the misalignment of interest that gives rise to perverse incentives. 
With most successes in modern agency law, reform proposals have led to the 
adoption of a best-interest standard to permit conflicted transactions that 
simultaneously benefit the fiduciary and the beneficiary. Those who resist 
proposals to relax the sole-interest duty often point to the default nature of 
fiduciary law:  assuming the beneficiary is mentally-capable, she can 
authorize her fiduciary to enter into in conflicted transactions that are 
welfare-enhancing. 
II. FIDUCIARY LAW AS MANDATORY LAW 
This Part will argue that orthodox fiduciary law is be too strict on close 
relatives and friends, while proposals to introduce the best-interest standard 
are too lenient on professionals. As Section II.A below will elaborate, 
underlying these arguments is an observation that when applied to incapable 
individuals, fiduciary law tends to operate as mandatory law rather than 
default law. 
A. Mandatory Application to Mentally-incapable Individuals 








Confined to cases concerning mentally-incapable individuals, fiduciary 
law becomes problematic because it no longer operates as default law. There 
are severe restrictions on an incapable individual’s power to authorize 
departures from strict fiduciary law. First, under the law of trusts, a 
beneficiary must have mental capacity in order to validly exercise her power 
of authorization.123 Because American courts typically apply trust fiduciary 
law to guardians,124 this mental-capacity requirement removes the power of 
authorization from individuals subject to guardianship.125 Some courts even 
disregard conflict-authorizing agreements formed before the individual’s loss 
of capacity.126 
Second, even if mental capacity is not a formal requirement for a valid 
exercise of the power of authorization, it can be very costly to “litigation-
proof” any consent obtained from an elderly incapable individual. To 
                                                 
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 97(a), cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
124 See generally supra Section I.C. 
125 See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Hanson, 682 N.W.2d 207 (Neb. 2004); In re 
Conservatorship of Rininger, 500 N.W.2d 47, 49, 51 (Iowa 1993). Contra. Mullins v. 
Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183 (Miss. 1987) (sustaining an incapable individual’s gifts to his sister-
guardian upon satisfaction of (1) good faith on part of the sister-guardian, (2) the individual’s 
full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and their consequences, and (3) clear and 
convincing evidence that the individual exhibited independent consent and action). 
126 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Saylor, 121 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2005) (“[A]ny 
arrangement between [the guardian and the incapable individual] which subsisted prior to 
the imposition of the [guardianship] does not necessarily determine the standard of care 
which the [guardian] owes[.]”); In re Estate of Clark, 772 P.2d 299, 302 (Mont. 1989) (same 








minimize the risk of overreach at the time of obtaining authorization, 
fiduciary law requires that the fiduciary make a fair-and-frank disclosure and 
that the beneficiary’s consent be full-informed. Given the typical bases of 
mental incapacity are dementia and similar degenerative conditions,127 the 
guardian or agent may need to incur the cost of engaging a medical 
professional to verify and document the quality of consent.128 Even consent 
given in the presence of a lawyer can be suspicious to a court, especially if 
the lawyer has previously acted for the fiduciary.129 
Third, in most cases, the elderly incapable individual cannot forbear a 
potential breach of fiduciary duty by not commencing proceedings, nor can 
she testify to support her guardian or agent. Breach-of-duty claims are usually 
brought by those relatives who would personally benefit from a finding of 
breach. These claimants often expect to inherit a share of the elderly 
incapable individual’s estate, and they sue the guardian or agent in order to 
increase the value of that estate.130 Litigation tends to take place after the 
                                                 
127 See supra notes 33 and accompanying text. The typical reasons for needing unpaid 
care are also older age and Alzheimer’s or dementia. See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR 
CAREGIVING & AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 2015 at 17–18 
(2015), https://www.caregiving.org/caregiving2015/. 
128 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N LAW & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
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individual has passed away, denying her the opportunity to give evidence to 
support her guardian or agent. Even if she is alive at the time of litigation, her 
mental incapacity can make it difficult or impossible to give evidence.131 
Many jurisdictions also do not guarantee her representation by an 
independent counsel.132 
Fourth, conflict-of-interest transactions are often gifts to the incapable 
individual’s close relatives and friends. Modern guardianship statutes prevent 
guardians from making large gifts without prior judicial approval.133 (Section 
II.A.2 below will discuss the shortcomings of the mechanism for obtaining 
prior judicial approval.) Modern power of attorney statutes also deny agents 
of a general power to make large gifts without an express provision in the 
power of attorney.134  
                                                 
from a deceased incapable individual’s previous marriage seeking to recover to the 
deceased’s estate conflict-of-interest payments to his guardian and surviving spouse). 
131 See, e.g., In re Caminite (Amelia G.), 57 N.Y.S.3d 724, 729 (N.Y. Nassau Cty. Ct.). 
132 See generally Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n Law & Aging, Representation and 
Investigation in Guardianship Proceedings, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/chartrepresentation
andinvestigation.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018) (surveying right to counsel in 
American guardianship statutes). Cf. In re Zhuo, 53 Misc.3d 1121 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2016) 
(holding that incapable individuals have a constitutional right to counsel in guardianship 
proceedings). 
133 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-411(a)(1), 5-427(b) (amended 2010); UNIF. 
GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 
414(a)(1) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). 
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2. Alternative Ways to Authorize Departures from Fiduciary Law 
There are two alternative ways to authorize departures from strict 
fiduciary law, but neither is a substitute for a private individual’s power of 
authorization. First, as Section II.C below will explain in detail, judicial 
approval may legitimize a potential breach.135 A problem with the judicial-
approval mechanism is the cost of going to court. Modern statutes also 
typically require prior judicial approval to legitimize conflicted 
transactions.136 Unsophisticated guardians and agents—in particular, 
relatives and friends—usually are not aware of the requirement of judicial 
scrutiny, let alone the importance of timing.137 
Second, the instrument underlying the guardianship or agency 
                                                 
cannot make gifts unless expressly or implicitly authorized by power of attorney.). 
135 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a) (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 425 (Unif. Law 
Comm’n 2017); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 cmt. f, note to cmt. f, re. subsection 
(5) (AM. LAW INST. 2007); Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 460 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) 
(discussing an equity court’s “supervisory jurisdiction” to give instructions to trustees on the 
legitimacy of doubtful transactions). 
136 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a) (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 425 (Unif. Law 
Comm’n 2017); Kohn, supra note 24, at 257. But see DeWald v. Morris, 397 S.W.2d 738, 
742–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (A guardian’s failure to seek prior judicial approval of a 
conflict-of-interest payment does not “militate against the propriety” of the payment, but 
exposes her to the risk of having the payment invalidated ex post facto.). 
137 Langbein, supra note 2, at 984–85. See, e.g., In re Estate of O’Hare, 34 N.E.3d 1126, 
1128–29 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015) (lay guardian of her incapable daughter failing to seek prior 








relationship may authorize departures from strict fiduciary law. In the case of 
agency, the principal may authorize departures in the power of attorney 
before she becomes mentally-incapable. Similarly, in the case of 
guardianship, the court that appoints the guardian may authorize departures 
in the order of appointment.138 However, the instrument underlying the 
guardianship or agency relationship tends to be incomplete. As the relational 
contracts literature has recognized,139 the drafter of a document to govern a 
long-term relationship is typically unable to foresee all future contingencies; 
the cost of accounting-for every foreseeable contingency is also prohibitively 
high. The resulting incomplete document then fails to respond to unforeseen 
or unaccounted for contingencies when they arise. This observation squarely 
applies to guardianships and agency relationships. Elderly incapable 
individuals now have a high life expectancy, and tend to need years of 
assistance.140 In the case of guardianship, it would be unrealistic and too 
                                                 
138 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 
426, especially at 432–33, 439–40 (1976); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of 
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the 
Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). Cf. e.g. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual 
Relationships in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 28 (1963) (alternative, 
norms-based approach to relational contracts); IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL 
CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) (same). 
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costly for the court to decide in advance the desirability of departures from 
strict fiduciary law in all contingencies. For the same reason, powers of 
attorney drafted before the onset of mental or physical decline typically 
cannot consider in advance the desirability of all future departures from strict 
fiduciary law. 
B. Mandatory Prohibition of Conflict of Interest in Close Families 
and Personal Relationships 
Section II.A shows that when applied to guardians and agents who serve 
mentally-incapable individuals, fiduciary law practically operates as 
mandatory law rather than default law. In this light, the following will argue 
that mandatory application of the sole-interest duty of loyalty usually does 
little to align incentives, and can become a genuine obstacle to welfare 
enhancement.141 
A preliminary observation is that fiduciary law—either the orthodox form 
                                                 
141 Welfare enhancement is consistent with the pursuit of personal autonomy, which has 
emerged as one of the underlying policies of modern disability law in the United States. See, 
e.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
ACT § 302 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). There is also an international movement to make 
disability law more respectful of autonomy. See generally Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature December 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; 
Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, 
Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124 (2014); Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for 
the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 117 PENN STATE L. REV. 1159 
(2013). In the language of economic theory, modern disability law seeks to advance the 
welfare of the incapable individual as evaluated by her choices, to the extent possible. See 








or the relaxed form—does not formally recognize that there is a spectrum of 
guardians and agents. These fiduciaries differ in their relationship with the 
elderly incapable individual and in the degree of sophistication. The available 
empirical evidence suggests that most guardians and agents are lay persons 
who are closely related to, or friends with, the incapable individual.142 In 
particular, courts prefer to appoint the individual’s spouse or adult child as 
guardian unless large and complex property is involved.143 While close 
relatives and friends constitute one extreme of the spectrum, the other 
extreme comprises private professionals who charge fees for their services. 
These professionals are typically lawyers, financial advisers, mental health 
professionals, or institutions.144 Across the spectrums are sophisticated 
relatives and friends,145 and publicly-funded professionals.146 To highlight 
                                                 
142 Surveys typically reveal that roughly three-quarters of all guardians are relatives or 
friends of incapable individuals. See, e.g., ADMIN. CONF. U.S., supra note 42, 16; Callahan, 
Romanick & Ghesquiere, supra note 33, at 85; Lawrence K. Marks, Court-Appointed 
Fiduciaries: New York’s Efforts to Reform a Widely Criticized Process, 77 ST. JOHN’S L.R. 
29, 33 (2003) (citations omitted); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FIDUCIARY 
APPOINTMENTS 9 (2005), available at https://www.nycourts.gov/reports/fiduciary-2005.pdf. 
See also supra note 96 (Agents are mostly relatives of their incapable principals.). 
143 See, e.g., Barnes, The Liberty and Property of Elders, supra note 40, at 24. 
144 Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 43, at 943. 
145 See, e.g., Black v. Black, 422 P.3d 592 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018) (A family guardian—
“a tenured law professor who has written on the subject of corporate directors' fiduciary 
duties”—got prior approval to make conflicted transactions to benefit himself and his 
children, but were later held in breach of fiduciary duty for failing to disclose his conflicts to 
the court.). 








the inflexibility of orthodox fiduciary law, the following will compare and 
contrast how it regulates the two extremes of the spectrum: close relatives 
and friends versus professionals. 
1. Ubiquity of Conflicts 
Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous in close families and personal 
relationships.147 Relative-and-friend guardians and agents can have conflicts 
arising from psychological involvement with the incapable individual and 
financial interests in her property, for example, shared residence, joint 
ownership or inheritance expectations.148 The following will argue that 
mandating avoidance of conflicts in close families and personal relationships 
can narrow the pool of candidates who can provide safe and reliable fiduciary 
services to incapable individuals. This is particularly problematic given the 
current shortage of elder caregivers.149 
                                                 
147 This Chapter uses “close family” as a shorthand for a familial relationship that 
satisfies the “core qualities [of] a demonstrated, long-term commitment and the assumption 
of mutual care and financial responsibility[.]” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From 
Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 293, 306 (2016) (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 305 (explaining the 
key attributes of a contemporary family that is based on adult relationships). Rather than 
based on biological relationship, id. at 305, a close family is a family of “affection and 
dependence”, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 11 (2009). 
148 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 cmt. (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006); APPELBAUM 
& GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 205; Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 
43, at 956–57. 
149 See, e.g., Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 43, at 947; Clare 








It may be instructive to consider first the pool of professional fiduciaries 
who may provide property-management services to elderly incapable 
individuals. In relation to the law governing financial fiduciaries, Professors 
Hanoch Dagan and Sharon Hannes argued that rigorous legal regulation 
makes it safe and reliable to delegate decision-making authority to 
professionals who have superior knowledge, skills and experience.150 Their 
argument can be extended to professional guardians and agents, who tend to 
have acquired specialist knowledge and skills through training and repeated 
dealings with many incapable individuals.151 The prophylactic nature of 
orthodox fiduciary law makes it safe and reliable to delegate authority to 
these professionals. Thus orthodox fiduciary law expands the pool of safe and 
reliable candidates to include professionals with superior knowledge, skills 
and experience. Incapable individuals can then benefit from the safe and 
reliable provision of specialist services. 
By comparison, when applied to close relatives and friends with 
mandatory force, orthodox fiduciary law can narrow the pool of safe and 
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150 Dagan & Hannes, supra note 63, at 105. These authors argued that expanding the 
pool of safe and reliable candidates for fiduciary appointment advances autonomy. Id. at 93. 
151 Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 43, at 954–55. Cf. 
APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 188 (Due to the tendency to standardize or 









reliable candidates for fiduciary appointment. Unlike professionals, close 
relatives and friends have acquired their specialist knowledge, skills and 
experience from having an intimate relationship with the incapable individual 
and being empathetic of the individual’s will and preferences. Compared to 
professionals, close relatives and friends are far more likely to have conflicts 
of interest.152 Compliance with the sole-interest duty of loyalty would require 
the close relative of friend to remove her conflicts. The costs of doing so can 
deter her from taking on the fiduciary office. Thus onerous fiduciary duties 
can narrow the pool of safe and reliable,153 but nonprofessional, candidates 
for fiduciary appointment. 
In re Estate of O’Hare can illustrate this point.154 Recall that the mother-
guardian in that case—Virginia—kept poor records and did not seek prior 
judicial approval for using her incapable daughter Sarah’s funds to benefit 
the whole family. Holding Virginia liable for breaching the sole-interest duty, 
the Illinois court removed her from her office as Sarah’s guardian. This was 
notwithstanding her good intentions and the “excellent care” that she had 
provided to Sarah. As a result, Sarah, whose own attitude toward her mother’s 
                                                 
152 Perlin, supra note 141, at 1181; Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, 
supra note 43, at 956–57; APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 205–06. 
153 See generally infra Section II.B.2 (discussing the extralegal mechanisms that deter 
misconduct in close families and personal relationships). 








behaviors were not apparent on the report of the case, had to incur the costs 
of replacing her mother with a public guardian.155 Moreover, this outcome 
could discourage Sarah’s other close family members from taking on the 
guardianship role. 
Another illustrative case is Moore v. Self.156 In that case, an elderly 
woman—Catherine—acquired accounts and real property as joint tenants 
with her daughter Nancy with rights of survivorship. Catherine subsequently 
became mentally-incapable, and Nancy applied for and accepted appointment 
as Catherine’s guardian. After Catherine passed away, her sons sued Nancy 
to recover the jointly-held properties to Catherine’s estate.157 There was no 
allegation or evidence of any actual wrongdoing by Nancy. Nancy did not 
attempt to preserve the value of the jointly-held properties to benefit her 
individual survivorship rights; she even placed a small proportion of the 
jointly-held accounts in Catherine’s own account.158 Yet the Georgia court 
ruled in favor of the sons. Holding Nancy in breach of the sole-interest duty 
of loyalty, the court took the view that if Nancy “intended to claim title to the 
                                                 
155 Id. at 1129–31. 
156 473 S.E.2d 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
157 Id. at 508. 
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jointly-held accounts and real property as the survivor after her mother’s 
death, she should not have applied for and accepted the guardianship.”159 
Given the ubiquity of joint property ownership in close families, the court’s 
ruling could dissuade close relatives and friends from seeking and accepting 
fiduciary appointment. 
2. Intrinsic Bonds and Social Norms 
In a close familial or personal relationship, financial conflicts do not 
necessarily lead to significant misalignment of incentives, nor do they usually 
warrant extensive legal regulation. In respect of the parent-minor child 
relationship, Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott argued that the 
biological and affective bonds among the members of a close family, together 
with social and moral norms, have a dominating effect in aligning 
incentives.160 These incentive-alignment effects explain the law’s preference 
for engaging close family members as fiduciaries.161 By comparison, 
extralegal mechanisms are less effective in aligning incentives in cases 
                                                 
159 Id. at 510. 
160 Scott & Scott, supra note 38, at 2430, 2433. The law and economics literature often 
denote by “bonding” a device that functions to align incentives. See, e.g., id. at 2403. To 
avoid confusion with “bonds” in the insurance sense, see generally infra Section IV.C, this 
Chapter uses “incentive-alignment” to denote what these authors meant by “bonding”. 








involving estranged families.162 The extent of formal legal regulation of a 
parent-minor child relationship should depend on the strength of extralegal 
mechanisms.163 
Extralegal mechanisms can also align incentives when a close relative or 
friend serves as guardian or agent to an elderly incapable individual.164 The 
individual’s spouse/partner or adult child is typically the preferred guardian 
or agent.165 Close relatives and friends tend to serve as guardian or agent on 
an unpaid basis.166 This tendency is consistent with the available evidence on 
unpaid caregivers, which evidence reveals the critical role of intrinsic bonds 
and informal norms in close families. A recent empirical study estimates that 
about 34.2 million Americans provide unpaid care to an adult, with nearly 
half of the care recipients being seventy-five years or older.167 Caregivers 
typically provide four years of unpaid care to an aged parent or a 
                                                 
162 Id. at 2442–51. 
163 Id. at 2452. 
164 See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary Principles in Family Law, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW ch. 12 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller, Robert 
H. Sitkoff eds., forthcoming 2019). 
165 See, e.g., Unif. Guardianship, Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements 
Act § 410 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-413(a) (amended 2010); 
Kohn, supra note 7, at 2–3. 
166 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (WILLS & DON. TRANS.) § 8.3 cmt. g 
(2003). 
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spouse/partner. Caregiving is burdensome and time-consuming; it generally 
takes 24.4 hours per week on average, and increases to 44.6 hours per week 
on average when the care-recipient is a spouse/partner.168 Yet orthodox 
fiduciary law cynically ignores the presence of well-intended family 
fiduciaries who are motivated by biological and affective bonds as well as 
social and moral norms. 
In close families or personal relationships, where intrinsic bonds and 
informal norms tend to be strong, there is typically no need to impose the 
sole-interest duty of loyalty. Extralegal mechanisms can more cost-
effectively align the guardians’ or agent’s incentives with the incapable 
individual’s. In the language of economic theory, the fiduciary exploits the 
moral hazard problem to the extent that her incentives are misaligned with 
the beneficiary’s. When intrinsic motivations and informal norms become 
more effective in aligning incentives, the fiduciary becomes less likely to 
exploit her discretion.169 This then diminishes the need for incentive-
                                                 
168 Id. at 20–21, 34. To provide care, family caregivers often have to reduce their own 
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U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-382, RETIREMENT SECURITY: SOME 
PARENTAL AND SPOUSAL CAREGIVERS FACE FINANCIAL RISKS 23–25 (2019). 
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alignment by strict legal regulation.170 
To be sure, courts can strictly enforce the sole-interest duty of loyalty, 
and reward the errant guardian or agent with remuneration that commensurate 
with her services.171 For example, in In re Estate of O’Hare, the mother-
guardian was allowed to keep some of her caregiver’s salary notwithstanding 
her breach of the sole-interest duty of loyalty.172 However, monetary 
remuneration can have complex effects in close familial and personal 
relationships. While monetary remuneration can generate incentives to 
provide fiduciary services, it can also “crowd out” intrinsic motivations.173 
Tying monetary remuneration to fiduciary service can commodify the 
                                                 
170 The incentive-alignment effects of intrinsic bonds and social norms in the 
relationship between the guardian (or agent) and the incapable individual depend little on the 
guardian’s (or the agent’s) relationship with another person. This clarification matters 
because many disputed cases concern someone other than the elderly incapable individual 
bringing claims against the guardian (or agent). See generally Barnes, The Liberty and 
Property of Elders, supra note 40. The active litigants are often related to the elderly 
incapable individual, for example, her children from different marriages. See, e.g., In re 
Conservatorship of Hanson, 682 N.W.2d 207 (Neb. 2004). The relationship between the 
claimant and the guardian (or agent) is typically acrimonious. However, it is the 
characteristics of the guardian’s (or agent’s) relationship with the incapable individual, not 
with the claimant, that matter for aligning incentives. Thus the fact that the disputed cases 
often involve litigants who are related does not weaken the argument that strong intrinsic 
bonds and social norms can align incentives in the relationship between the guardian (or 
agent) and the incapable individual. 
171 See generally infra Section IV.D. 
172 34 N.E.3d 1126, 1129–30 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015). 
173 Empirical research shows that the likelihood such “crowding out” is increased when 
the monetary remuneration is small relative to the services provided. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy 








underlying familial or personal relationship.174 Relatives and friends who 
request remuneration also risk signaling that they are driven by money rather 
than intrinsic bonds and moral norms.175 An additional complication is the 
risk of signaling distrust of the relative or friend;176 the signal may be that the 
court or the incapable individual believes the relative or friend would shirk 
her responsibilities without monetary reward. Moreover, services provided in 
a familial or personal relationship—which is largely private—can be hard to 
describe and document;177 insufficient records can stand in the way of a 
request for remuneration.178 
However, in cases concerning professional guardians and agents, 
extralegal mechanisms are unlikely to be strong enough to justify weakened 
formal regulation. While professionals may be constrained by social and 
moral norms, they tend not to be constrained by biological and affective 
                                                 
174 See generally Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, 
and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551 (1999). 
175 See Benjamin Ho & David Hoffman, Trust and the Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 307–08 (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler 
eds., 2018) (explaining the likely causes of “crowding out”). But see APPELBAUM & 
GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 206 (Remuneration can inculcate seriousness and responsibility to 
a lay fiduciary, and reduce her emotional conflicts.). 
176 See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 489, 492 (2003). 
177 See supra Scott & Emery, supra note 117, at 74. 








bonds. Moreover, professionals serve a multitude of incapable individuals; 
rather than becoming intimate with and empathetic for a specific incapable 
individual, professionals have the incentive to develop transferable skills and 
expertise.179 In particular, institutional guardians often standardize and 
bureaucratize, especially when under budgetary pressures.180 These 
tendencies can weaken any intrinsic bonds between a professional and each 
incapable individual she serves. 
It must be clarified that the author does not suggest that formal legal 
regulation is completely unnecessary when a close relative or friend serves 
as guardian or agent to an elderly incapable individual. Intrinsic bonds and 
informal norms can be strong in these relationships, but not as strong as in a 
close parent-minor child relationship.181 Moreover, the incentive-alignment 
effects of intrinsic bonds can be asymmetric. For example, a parent’s 
affection for her child can be stronger than the child’s affection for the parent. 
Thus, as Professor Elizabeth Scott and the author recently argued, the 
strength and direction of affective bonds and informal norms can explain the 
                                                 
179 See Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 43, at 954–55; Linda 
S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-making Standards for Guardians: 
Theory and Reality, 3 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1508 (2012) [hereinafter, Whitton & Frolik, 
Theory and Reality]. 
180 APPELBAUM & GUTHEIL, supra note 9, at 188. 








contrast between American law’s deference to parents who take care of minor 
children, and its imposition of formal fiduciary duties on adult children who 
serve as guardians to their elderly parents.182 Hence I do not argue for the 
complete removal of guardians’ and agents’ formal fiduciary duties; I argue 
that the rigor of these duties ought to depend on the strength of intrinsic bonds 
and informal norms in typical cases. 
3. Other-Regarding Preferences 
Experimental research in psychology and behavioral economics shows 
that individual preferences are often other-regarding, rather than purely self-
regarding. Other-regarding preferences can take various forms. One form is 
altruism, and other forms include preferences for reciprocity fairness—
returning kindness for another’s kindness but unkindness for another’s 
unkindness—and inequality aversion—deriving value from comparing 
oneself with another person.183 In close families and personal relationships, 
strong other-regarding preferences can manifest in gift-giving norms and 
                                                 
182 See generally Scott & Chen, supra note 164. 
183 See, e.g., Ernest Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and 
Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999); Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, ERC: a Theory 
of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 166 (2000); Gary Charness & 
Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817 
(2002). See generally SANJIT DHAMI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS chs. 5.2, 5.3, 6.7 (2016) (surveying experimental research on other-regarding 
preferences). See also id. ch. 5.5 (discussing external validity of experimental research); 
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
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property-sharing arrangements. For instance, gift-giving is often reciprocated 
in long-term relationships.184 
While the subsequent arguments do not depend on which exact form of 
other-regarding preferences is involved, reciprocity fairness stands out as 
particularly relevant. A recent survey reveals that almost half of unpaid 
caregivers take care of their aged parents, with spouses/partners being the 
next largest category of care-recipients.185 Adult children and 
spouses/partners are also the most common categories of guardians and 
agents.186 Reciprocity fairness can partially explain what motivates adult 
children to take care of their aged parents; a child receives care from her 
parents in her minority, and she later returns the favor in her parents’ old age. 
Similarly, couples who receive unpaid care from each other may well 
reciprocate in their old age.  
In cases where other-regarding preferences are strong, mandatory 
application of the sole-interest duty of loyalty tends to harm welfare. Strict 
enforcement of the sole-interests duty typically leads to a one-sided 
distribution of welfare gains—in favor of the incapable individual and no one 
                                                 
184 See generally Leslie, supra note 174, at 564–78. 
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note 127, at 20. See also id. at 21 (“As caregiver age rises, it is more likely they care for their 
spouse.”). 








else.187 This remains the case even in the absence of harm to the incapable 
individual. A one-sided distribution is far from optimal if the incapable 
individual has strong other-regarding preferences. Such one-sidedness is 
particularly stark in cases concerning close relatives and friends, because they 
usually do not receive remuneration for providing fiduciary services 
(especially when the incapable individual’s estate is small).188 This is in 
contrast to cases involving professional guardians and agents who charge fees 
for their services.189 Moreover, providing services to the incapable individual 
can generate high opportunity costs; the guardian or agent becomes less 
available to generate income to herself.190 The sole-interest duty thus forces 
the incapable individual to be selfish; her welfare is harmed whenever she 
has other-regarding preferences. 
An illustrative case is In re Conservatorship of Hanson,191 in which a 
married couple formed an agreement years before the husband became the 
subject of a guardianship. Pursuant to the agreement, Mr Hanson regularly 
                                                 
187 For instance, in the numerical example discussed in Section I.E, strict enforcement 
of the sole-interests duty gives all of the welfare gain of $70 to the beneficiary and none of 
it to the errant fiduciary. 
188 Barnes, Corporate and Professional Guardians, supra note 43, at 954. 
189 Id. at 943–44, 949–50. 
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paid Mrs Hanson for the added expense of his living in her home. After her 
appointment as guardian to her husband, Mrs Hanson continued to receive 
payments without prior judicial approval. When Mr Hanson passed away, his 
children from his former marriage sought to recover the payments that Mrs 
Hanson received during the period of guardianship. The Nebraska court 
found a breach of the sole-interest duty of loyalty on the basis of self-dealing, 
and disgorged those payments from Mrs Hanson. This was notwithstanding 
a lack of sinister motive on her part.192 The court also deliberately paid no 
attention to “family financial management in the family’s accustomed 
manner.”193 In the language of economic theory, the strict enforcement of the 
sole-interest duty harmed Mr Hanson’s welfare by denying his preferences to 
benefit his wife. 
Another illustrative case is In re Campione.194 This case concerned an 
elderly incapable woman whose guardian—Carol—was one of her daughters. 
Carol commingled her own funds with her mother’s funds, and purchased 
property in her own name with her mother’s funds. Because these funds were 
previously held on trust for her benefit, Carol mistakenly thought they 
belonged to her. After her mother passed away, some of Carol’s relatives 
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succeeded in their claim to recover the relevant property and guardianship 
funds from Carol. The court did not enquire into whether Carol’s actions 
reflected her familial understanding with her mother. It was also unclear 
whether, if she were mentally-capable, the mother would have wanted to 
share her funds with Carol.195 What was clear, however, was that Carol would 
not have been able to enjoy her mother’s funds even if her mother wanted her 
to. 
C. Incentives to “Game the System” 
A further reason for regulating professional guardians and agents more 
strictly than close relatives and friends is to ensure that judicial scrutiny of 
professional conduct is more rigorous before the fact than after the fact. This 
Section argues that relaxed fiduciary regulation can blur the distinction 
between judicial scrutiny before the fact and after the fact, which in term 
gives professionals a perverse incentive to avoid judicial scrutiny before the 
fact. 
The distinction between judicial scrutiny of suspicious conduct before the 
fact and after the fact is critical for the operation of fiduciary law. The 
discussions so far concern judicial scrutiny after the fact, that is, when the 
guardian or agent is sued for having committed the suspicious conduct. To 
                                                 








minimize the risk of liability after the fact, the guardian or agent can petition 
the relevant state court for approval before committing the suspicious 
conduct.196 To obtain such ex-ante judicial approval, the guardian or agent is 
typically required to give notice to the incapable individual and any interested 
parties, and disclose any conflict of interest.197 This procedure gives the court 
and any interested parties an opportunity to evaluate the pros and cons of the 
suspicious conduct.198 In some cases, independent legal representation can 
also be afforded to the incapable individual;199 her own view on the 
suspicious conduct can be expressed directly or through legal counsel to be 
extent possible. If properly granted, prior judicial approval protects the 
guardian or agent from liability for any potential breach of fiduciary duty. 
However, a failure to comply with the notification and disclosure procedures 
                                                 
196 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2010); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, 
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Comm’n 2017). 
198 In re Castner, 661 A.2d 344, 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995). 
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would withdraw the protection afforded by prior judicial approval.200  
The equitable doctrine of substituted judgment (or its statutory adoption) 
provides the substantive standard for determining whether to grant prior 
judicial approval. This standard typically requires the court to give effect to 
what the incapable individual would have wanted if she was capable.201 If her 
wishes are not known, or if giving effect to her wishes would unreasonably 
harm or endanger her, then the court applies the best-interest standard.202 In 
particular, the court can pre-approve transactions tainted with a conflict of 
interest, especially if there is evidence showing that such approval would 
carry out the incapable individual’s wishes.203 
                                                 
200 See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Jordan, 616 N.W.2d 553, 558–
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Comm’n 2017). See generally Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted 
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MICH. J. L. REFORM 739, 742–43 (2012) (surveying financial decision-making standards in 
American guardianship statutes). See, e.g., In re Tinsmon, 79 N.Y.S.3d 854 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 
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In respect of professional guardians and agents, the availability of prior 
judicial scrutiny weakens the case for relaxed judicial scrutiny after the 
fact.204 An examination of proposals to replace the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty with the best-interest duty can illustrate this point.205 If the best-
interest standard governs judicial scrutiny after the fact, then the distinction 
between judicial scrutiny before the fact and after the fact essentially 
disappears; both the substantive and procedural aspects of ex-ante and ex-
post judicial scrutiny become very similar, if not identical. This implies that 
a given suspicious conduct has roughly the same chance of passing judicial 
scrutiny before the fact and after the fact. As a result, sophisticated guardians 
and agents are encouraged to avoid ex-ante scrutiny of suspicious conduct, 
and “chance it” if and when they get sued.206 
A numerical hypothetical can illustrate what may happen if the distinction 
between judicial scrutiny before the fact and after the fact is blurred. Suppose 
a sophisticated professional guardian has an opportunity to take an action that 
generates $50 to herself and harms the incapable individual by $100. 
                                                 
204 However, prior judicial scrutiny is not a substitute for a private individual’s power of 
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Monitoring and detection of misconduct are far from perfect,207 so that with 
50% probability, the guardian can take the action without getting sued later. 
The incapable individual’s own wishes are not known in this case, so judicial 
scrutiny of the action can only be done in the light of evidential uncertainty 
regarding the harm done to her; the court would never know for sure whether 
the action is truly harmful. Due to such evidential uncertainty, an application 
of the best-interest standard would approve the action with 60% probability, 
and prohibit it with 40% probability.208 These probabilities are the same 
whether judicial scrutiny is undertaken before the fact or after the fact. 
In this hypothetical, given some technical assumptions to simplify 
analysis,209 the professional guardian’s expected monetary outcome for 
seeking prior judicial scrutiny is $50  60% + $0  40% = $30. On the other 
hand, if she “chances” it by taking the action without prior scrutiny, then her 
expected monetary outcome is $50  60%  50% + $0   40%  50% = $15. 
She is twice-better off taking the action and risking judicial scrutiny after the 
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fact than inviting judicial scrutiny before the fact. Thus the professional 
guardian has the incentive to take the action and risk judicial scrutiny after 
the fact. 
The above result critically depends on two factors: that the professional 
guardian enjoys a positive probability of taking the action without getting 
sued; and that the action has the same chance of surviving judicial scrutiny 
before the fact and after the fact. While the real world is obviously more 
complex, the above numerical hypothetical illustrates a broader problem that 
arises from assimilating the standards for judicial scrutiny of fiduciary 
conduct before the fact and after the fact. The problem is that sophisticated 
guardians and agents can be encouraged to “game the system” when they 
have a good chance of evading judicial scrutiny completely and a similarly-
rigorous standard of scrutiny applies in the event that they get sued. 
The “gaming-the-system” problem primarily affects cases concerning 
professional guardians and agents, because they tend to be sophisticated and 
well-informed of the law. By comparison, lay relatives and friends are 
unlikely to be aware of, and exploit, the similarities and differences between 
ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny. Moreover, professionals tend to be able to 
spread the risk and cost of liability across the multitude of incapable 
individuals they serve. Hence, compared to relative and friends, professionals 








seeking prior scrutiny. 
D. Summary 
This Part has argued that fiduciary law practically applies by mandatory 
force to guardians and agents; mentally-incapable individuals usually cannot 
authorize departures from adherence to strict fiduciary duty. Unable to be 
modified, fiduciary law—both the orthodox form and the relaxed form—can 
be detrimental to welfare. Orthodox fiduciary law tends to harm welfare in 
cases where the guardian or agent is a close relative or friend of the incapable 
individual. These cases tend to exhibit strong intrinsic bonds and informal 
norms, as well as other-regarding preferences. In these cases, mandatory 
application of the sole-interest duty of loyalty adds little in terms of incentive-
alignment, but can discourage the guardian or agent from supporting the 
incapable individual to pursue valuable other-regarding goals and 
preferences. Moreover, given the ubiquity of conflicts of interest in close 
families and personal relationships, strict enforcement of the sole-interest 
duty can discourage relatives and friends from seeking and accepting 
fiduciary appointment to provide valuable services. 
On the other hand, strict fiduciary regulation remains justified in cases 
concerning professional guardians and agents. In these cases, intrinsic bonds 
and other-regarding preferences are unlikely to be strong. Professionals also 








advantage of the mechanism for obtaining ex-ante judicial authorization of 
suspicious conduct. Moreover, relaxed fiduciary regulation can give 
professionals perverse incentives to “game the system”; reducing the rigor of 
judicial scrutiny of suspicious conduct after the fact can discourage 
professionals from seeking judicial authorization before the fact.  
III. INTRODUCING A SUBSTITUTED-JUDGMENT DEFENSE 
This Part and Part IV below will make reform suggestions to loosen 
fiduciary regulation of close relatives and friends and tighten fiduciary 
regulation of professionals. More precisely, this Part will propose to retain 
the sole-interest duty of loyalty and make available a substituted-judgment 
defense to close relatives and friends who serve as guardians or agents. This 
defense protects the guardian or agent from liability for exposing herself to a 
conflict of interest if she can prove that: 
(1) the incapable individual would have authorized the conflict if she was 
mentally-capable and fully-informed; and 
(2) mental incapacity was the only reason that prevents the individual from 
validly authorizing the conflict on her own.210 
Section III.A below will explain that the proposed defense aims to 
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approximate a valid exercise by the incapable individual of the power to 
authorize departures from strict fiduciary law. Section III.B will compare the 
proposed defense with the best-interest standard—the main reform 
alternative. Section III.C will suggest that fiduciary law should not relax its 
usual rigor on account of assent to suspicious conduct given after the 
appointment of guardian or agent. 
A. Approximation of the Power to Authorize Departures from 
Adherence to Overbroad Fiduciary Duties 
As Part II has shown, by removing a fiduciary’s unauthorized profits 
arising from a conflict of interest, the sole-interests duty of loyalty 
incentivizes her to seek authorization from her beneficiary. Valid 
authorization requires the fiduciary to make a fair-and-frank disclosure, so 
that the beneficiary is fully-informed. The combination of the sole-interest 
duty and the power of authorization thus facilitates agreements to permit the 
conflict and share the welfare gain arising from it, assuming the parties are 
mentally-capable.211 However, in cases concerning incapable individuals, 
mental incapacity tends to stultify the power to authorize departures from 
strict fiduciary law.212 The proposed substituted-judgment defense 
approximates the outcome that arises from a valid exercise of the power of 
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authorization: the guardian or agent is allowed to keep her personal gain in 
cases where the incapable individual would have authorized the relevant 
conflict if she was mentally-capable and fully-informed. 
1. Relaxation of Mandatory Fiduciary Law 
When made available to close relatives and friends, the proposed 
substituted-judgment defense prevents the sole-interest duty of loyalty from 
stultifying the pursuit of other-regarding goals and preferences. A capable 
individual who wishes to be other-regarding may exercise her power to 
authorize a conflict of interest; this can facilitate a relatively even distribution 
of welfare gains between her and her fiduciary (or a third party). The 
proposed defense performs a similar function for an incapable individual. It 
does so by allowing the conflicted guardian or agent to defend a distribution 
of welfare gains that enriches herself (or a third party) to the extent that such 
distribution would have been authorized by the incapable individual. The 
proposed defense thus permits the guardian or agent to support the incapable 
individual to pursue non-selfish goals and preferences.213 
The proposed defense also eases the burden of fiduciary regulation on 
close relatives and friends. Section II.B.1 has argued that compliance with 
strict fiduciary law can require close relatives and friends to incur the costs 
                                                 








of removing conflicts of interest. Such costs can be substantial because 
conflicts are ubiquitous in close familial and personal relationships. The 
propose defense can reduce the costs of removing conflicts; it does so by 
permitting those conflicts that are consistent with what the incapable 
individual would have wanted. When the costs of complying with fiduciary 
law are reduced, close relatives and friends are more likely to take on the 
fiduciary office. 
Moreover, the proposed defense accommodates strong intrinsic bonds 
and informal norms. Mandatory enforcement of strict fiduciary law ignores 
the fact that these extralegal mechanisms can partially and more cost-
effectively align incentives.214 Loosening fiduciary regulation of close 
relatives and friends, the proposed defense thus leaves room for extralegal 
mechanisms to deter misconduct. 
2. Evidence of Subjective Will and Preferences 
To ascertain what the incapable individual would have wanted if she was 
capable, the proposed substitute-judgment defense typically looks to 
evidence of her past conduct, transacting patterns, and relational norms.215 
The individual’s own choices made in a mentally-capable state are evidence 
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of her subjective will and preferences.216 To be sure, breach-of-fiduciary duty 
claims often concern one-off transactions that the incapable individual may 
not have had an opportunity to make in the past.217 However, most incapable 
individuals are seniors who have had a life-time of opportunities to make use 
of testamentary instruments, such as wills and wish letters.218 They also tend 
to have left behind a “memory trail” of informed opinions and value 
preferences in the minds of their family and friends.219 Moreover, 
transactions made near the end of an individual’s life may be the final 
manifestation of property-sharing and gift-giving norms within close familial 
or personal relationships.220 The substituted-judgment defense directs courts 
                                                 
216 See generally Agnieszka Jaworska, Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-
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to consider the individual’s past relational norms and succession plans, in 
addition to her past conduct and transacting patterns. 
In re Miller provides an example of how courts should apply the 
substituted-judgment defense.221 That case concerned Xenia, a wealthy 
elderly woman who had a long history of giving to the community. When she 
lost mental capacity, one of her children—William—and a close family 
adviser started managing her property as her agents. The two agents 
continued to use her money toward philanthropy, and on maintaining a family 
home to be inherited by William.222 After Xenia passed away, one of her other 
children sued the agents for breach of fiduciary duty. The Indiana court 
applied a substituted-judgment analysis to rule in favor of the agents. In so 
ruling, the court aimed to uphold Xenia’s known wishes as manifested by 
what she had historically said and done as well as the wish letters that she and 
her husband wrote to their children.223 
In re Campione224 can illustrate how the proposed substituted-judgment 
defense may operate in marginal cases. Recall that in that case, the court 
restored to the estate of an elderly incapable woman those guardianship funds 
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that her daughter-guardian—Carol—had commingled and used to benefit 
herself.225 Strictly enforcing the sole-interests duty of loyalty, the court did 
not give significance to the limited and inconclusive evidence of property 
sharing in that family.226 The proposed substituted-judgement defense would 
have incentivized Carol (or her legal representative) to adduce more evidence 
of her mother’s will and preferences before she lost capacity, and would not 
shield Carol from liability if such evidence were not adduced. The proposed 
defense would facilitate the pursuit of other-regarding goals and preferences 
only to the extent supported by evidence. 
In cases involving conflicting evidence of what the incapable individual 
would have wanted if she had capacity,227 there should be a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of respecting her testamentary intent expressed in any 
properly-executed will (or will substitute).228 The individual must have 
executed the testamentary instrument when she was mentally-capable.229 The 
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testamentary instrument also generally needs to comply with formality 
requirements. For example, an attested will needs to be in writing, signed by 
the individual and attested by several witnesses.230 Similarly, a revocable 
trust of interest in land created in the individual’s lifetime—a will 
substitute—needs to be in writing and signed by her.231 Formality 
requirements function to generate solid evidence of the individual’s wishes. 
Another function is to caution the individual against making ill-considered 
choices. A further function is to protect the individual from fraud and 
imposition. Finally, formality requirements perform the channeling function 
of facilitating standardization, so that testamentary instruments can be 
distinguished from other expressions of intention.232 Thus properly-executed 
testamentary instruments should be afforded special weight in the application 
of the proposed substituted-judgment defense. 
In cases involving insufficient evidence of what the incapable individual 
would have wanted if she had capacity, the criterion for judicial scrutiny of 
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fiduciary conduct (after the fact) should fall back to the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty.233 In these cases, the substituted-judgment standard would provide 
no practical guidance on what to do.234 Moreover, as Section III.A.4 below 
will explain further, relaxed fiduciary regulation is not justified when 
evidence of strong intrinsic bonds and other-regarding preferences is absent. 
Thus, in cases of insufficient evidence, the sole-interest duty should continue 
to prohibit previously-unauthorized conflicts of interest; a substituted-
judgment analysis would be unnecessary and useless in these cases. 
3. Doctrinal Support 
The proposed substituted-judgment defense has doctrinal support. First, 
courts already tend to apply the substituted-judgment standard when they 
scrutinize suspicious fiduciary conduct before the fact.235 This criterion can 
facilitate ex-ante judicial approval of transactions that benefit the close family 
members of an incapable individual.236 With some qualifications to be 
explained in Section III.B.3 below, the proposed defense largely extends the 
substituted-judgment standard to govern judicial scrutiny of suspicious 
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conduct after the fact. Such extension in particular protects those relative-
and-friend guardians and agents who seek legal advice and assistance only 
after being sued. 
Second, courts also sometimes apply a substituted-judgment analysis in 
cases concerning non-fiduciaries. For example, in Dubree v. Blackwell, an 
elderly woman gifted her house to her lifelong friend and caregiver, and 
changed her own bank account to a joint account with the friend (with a right 
of survivorship).237 After the woman passed away, her nephew—the sole 
beneficiary of her estate—sought to avoid these transactions on grounds of 
mental incapacity and undue influence. Medical experts and lay witnesses 
gave conflicting testimonies on the woman’s mental conditions at the time of 
transacting.238 The Texas court upheld these transactions upon taking into 
account a long history of property sharing between the woman and her 
friend.239 Guided by the woman’s past transacting patterns and relational 
norms that took place when her capacity was not in doubt, the court 
essentially applied a substituted-judgment analysis. 
Moreover, the proposed substituted-judgment defense extends and 
improves upon several existing exemptions in fiduciary law, most of which 
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protect close relatives and friends.240 The proposed defense subsumes an 
existing exception that may permit conflicts pre-dating the creation of the 
fiduciary relationship. For example, a couple may become joint owners of 
some property before one of them is appointed guardian to the other. The 
guardian will inherit the property upon the death of her spouse—the 
incapable individual. Before the individual passes away, the guardian may be 
tempted to transfer the jointly-owned property to herself, or to preserve its 
value by spending the incapable individual’s solely-owned resources. 
Conduct like these are suspicious because, contrary to a prohibition of the 
sole-interest duty of loyalty, they benefit the guardian or agent. Some courts 
permit the guardian to benefit from a pre-appointment conflict if the 
suspicious conduct results in no actual harm to the incapable individual.241 
Some other courts disagree, holding the guardian in breach of the sole-interest 
duty even if she has done no more than merely accepting her appointment 
without renouncing the pre-existing conflict.242 The proposed defense sides 
with those courts that permit pre-appointment, harmless conflicts; such 
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conflicts are consistent with strong intrinsic bonds and other-regarding 
preferences, which should be respected. 
Finally, a court of equity has a discretion to excuse an errant guardian or 
agent in whole or in part from her liability for a breach of fiduciary duty.243 
That discretion can excuse a breach that the fiduciary has taken to further her 
beneficiary’s interests.244 In such a case, the proposed defense achieves the 
same practical outcome as an exercise of judicial discretion to excuse the 
fiduciary in whole. However, the proposed defense reduces the 
indeterminacy arising from judicial discretion, and relieves the fiduciary of 
the guilt and moral opprobrium accompanying a finding of disloyalty. 
4. Preservation of Existing Protection 
Two conditions restrict the availability of the proposed substituted-
judgment defense: first, the guardian or agent bears the burden of proving (by 
the usual civil standard of preponderance of evidence) that the incapable 
individual would have authorized the suspicious conduct or transaction if she 
was capable; and second, mental incapacity is the only reason that prevents 
                                                 
243 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 cmt. (d) (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Modern 
guardianship and power of attorney statutes typically preserve the principles of equity. See, 
e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-103 (amended 2010) (applying trust fiduciary law to 
guardians); UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, AND OTHER PROTECTIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 103 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017); UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 
121 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2006). 








the individual from making a valid authorization. Failing any of these 
conditions, the proposed defense does not diminish the usual rigor and 
breadth of orthodox fiduciary law. Mental incapacity justifies a relaxation of 
the fiduciary prophylaxis only to the extent of its stultification of a private 
individual’s power to authorize suspicious conduct.245 The following will 
argue that the two conditions preserve the usual operation of orthodox 
fiduciary law when mental incapacity does not justify weakened fiduciary 
regulation. 
First, by placing the burden of proof on the guardian or agent, the 
proposed defense preserves the usual operation of orthodox fiduciary law in 
cases of insufficient evidence. In these cases, the guardian or agent remains 
able to seek prior judicial scrutiny according to the best-interest standard;246 
substituted judgment is no longer the juridical standard due to evidential 
deficiency. The process of prior judicial scrutiny may impose significant 
costs on the guardian or agent, and tend demand a high degree of 
sophistication from her. However, these problems also affect fiduciaries who 
serve mentally-capable individuals. In other words, what really prevents the 
guardian or agent from seeking judicial authorization is not mental 
incapacity, but is another aspect of fiduciary law that applies equally to 
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capable and incapable individuals. Moreover, it is hard to attribute 
significance to mental incapacity in the absence of sufficient evidence on 
what the individual would have wanted if she was capable. Hence the 
proposed defense does not interrupt the usual operation of orthodox fiduciary 
law in cases of insufficient evidence. In particular, the proposed defense does 
not subvert the fiduciary prophylaxis when there is no evidence of potential 
displacement of other-regarding preferences. 
Second, the “only reason” condition—that the proposed defense protects 
the guardian or agent only if mental incapacity is what prevents a valid 
authorization by the incapable individual—preserves those restrictions on 
modification of fiduciary law that give equal protection to capable and 
incapable individuals. The “only reason” condition is imposed to ensure that 
any modification of fiduciary law by the proposed defense does not go 
beyond what is necessary to address the special problems arising from mental 
incapacity. In particular, the “only reason” condition preserves the mandatory 
core of fiduciary law, because the individual could not modify it even if she 
were mentally-capable.247 Moreover, in a rare case involving a limited 
guardianship that does not withhold the individual’s power of 
authorization,248 the “only reason” condition is not satisfied. Thus imposition 
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of the “only reason” condition preserves the guardian’s incentives to seek 
authorization from the individual when she can still validly exercise the 
power of authorization. 
B. Comparison with the Best-interest Standard 
The best-interest standard is the main alternative to the substituted-
judgment standard and to the sole-interest duty of loyalty.249 Under this 
alternative, even without prior authorization, a guardian or an agent can retain 
some benefit to herself if her conduct advances the best interest of the 
incapable individual. Empirical research has shown that guardians who apply 
the best-interest standard often consider the family of the incapable 
individual.250 The best-interest standard thus relaxes mandatory fiduciary 
regulation in close families and personal relationships; inevitable conflicts 
can be accommodated, and intrinsic bonds and other-regarding preferences 
recognized and respected. This Section argues that the proposed substituted-
judgement defense should be preferred to proposals to adopt the best-interest 
standard.  
1. Indeterminacy 
The proposal to adopt the substituted-judgement defense leads to a greater 
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degree of determinacy than proposals to introduce the best-interest standard. 
Under my proposal, in cases involving sufficient evidence of what the 
incapable individual would have wanted, the proposed substituted-judgment 
defense requires that her wishes be given effect. By comparison, in addition 
to factors that are relevant to applying the substituted-judgment standard, the 
best-interest standard requires consideration of many other factors.251 Thus 
the best-interest standard can only tend to produce greater indeterminacy and 
be more informationally-demanding to apply. This tendency generates 
greater decisional costs and error costs than the substituted-judgment 
standard. 
Similarly, in cases where evidence of what the incapable individual 
would have wanted is deficient, my proposal leaves the sole-interest duty of 
loyalty to guide judicial scrutiny of fiduciary conduct. Courts tend to look for 
some financial benefit—typically in the form of money or property—to the 
guardian or agent (or a third party). Such financial benefit is usually 
observable and verifiable.252 By comparison, the best-interest standard 
requires consideration of a broader range of context-specific factors.253 Thus, 
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given insufficient evidence to apply the substituted-judgment standard, 
falling back to the sole-interest duty tends to lead to a more predictable 
outcome than the best-interest standard.254 
To be sure, elsewhere the author has argued that English and Australian 
fiduciary law should adopt a best-interest defense to protect family guardians 
and agents from liability for noncompliance with the sole-interest duty.255 
That best-interest defense imposes objective restrictions on the extent to 
which a family guardian or agent can assist the incapable individual to pursue 
subjective will and preferences.256 The Anglo-Australian best-interest 
defense is also less determinate than the substituted-judgment defense that I 
propose for adoption in American jurisdictions.257 My proposal to introduce 
a best-interest defense in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions but not in American 
jurisdictions reflects the substantial differences between American and 
Anglo-Australian inheritance law and policy.  
First, much litigation involving guardians and agents takes place in the 
inheritance context. Testamentary freedom is more heavily regulated in 
Anglo-Australian law than in prevailing American law. In prevailing 
                                                 
254 See supra Section I.F. 
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American law, an individual’s freedom of testation is qualified only by a few 
restrictions, such as her spouse’s optional share in her estate.258 Anglo-
Australian jurisdictions, on the other hand, have adopted family provision 
statutes to oblige individuals to make adequate provisions for their families 
and dependents.259 For example, Anglo-Australian law qualifies an 
individual’s freedom of testation with a duty to provide for her dependent 
children (including adult children), while prevailing American law imposes 
no such duty.260 Thus it is realistic and consistent with inheritance law and 
policy to introduce objective restrictions of testamentary freedom in Anglo-
Australia fiduciary law, but not in American fiduciary law. 
Second, the qualifications of testamentary freedom tend to be rules in 
prevailing American law but standards in Anglo-Australian law. Formulated 
in terms of standards, Anglo-Australian family provision statutes confer a 
substantial discretion on courts. For example, Anglo-Australian courts have 
a discretion to decide whether a claimant for family provision relief is a 
‘dependent’, and if so, how much provision from the deceased’s estate should 
                                                 
258 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 1999); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 88, 1–2, ch. 8. 
259 See generally JOHN G ROSS MARTYN ET AL., THEOBALD ON WILLS ch. 11 (18th ed., 
2016); ROSALIND CROUCHER & PRUE VINES, SUCCESSION: FAMILIES, PROPERTY AND 
DEATH: TEXT AND CASES ch. 15 (4th ed., 2013). 








be made.261 In contrast, showing a strong preference for rules, American 
legislatures have consistently rejected proposals to introduce family 
provision statutes.262 
In this light, adoption of the best-interest standard would have different 
implications in American jurisdictions and in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions. 
Adopting the best-interest standard in American jurisdictions would 
introduce unwanted indeterminacy in the inheritance context. On the other 
hand, the typical Anglo-Australian inheritance dispute already exhibits a high 
degree of indeterminacy. Fiduciary claims against guardians and agents tend 
to be part and parcel of broader disputes over inheritance. Guardians and 
agents who are in a close relationship with the incapable individual have a 
strong case for family provision relief. When an inheritance dispute is viewed 
as a whole, introducing a best-interest analysis adds little to the high degree 
of indeterminacy already arising from family provision statute. In other 
words, in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, the marginal indeterminacy arising 
from adoption of a best-interest analysis would be negligible.263 Hence, 
unlike in American jurisdictions, adoption of the best-interest standard in 
                                                 
261 See generally CROUCHER & VINE, supra note 259, paras. 2.35–36; ROSS MARTYN ET 
AL., supra note 259, paras. 11–049, 11–068. 
262 See generally SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 88, at 569–70. 








Anglo-Australian jurisdictions would make little difference in terms of legal 
indeterminacy. 
2. Room for Paternalism 
Another reason for rejecting the best-interest standard is that it leaves 
more room for paternalism and discrimination than does the substituted-
judgment standard. A subjective notion, the substituted-judgment standard 
permits a conflict of interest if the incapable individual would have 
authorized it. The best-interest standard, on the other hand, traditionally 
directs courts to do what is objectively best for a reasonable or rational person 
in like circumstances.264 The best-interests can be a vehicle for paternalism 
and discrimination; rather than the incapable individual’s wishes, the 
decisionmaker may act according to her own values, stereotypes or 
prejudices.265 
Cases involving Medicaid or tax planning are illustrative.266 These cases 
                                                 
264 See generally text accompanying supra notes 88–89; Jaworska, supra note 216, § 1; 
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typically involve guardians who seek prior judicial approval to make large 
gifts of an elderly incapable individual’s estate in order to qualify the 
individual for certain Medicaid or tax benefits. The family members of the 
individual are typically the intended recipients of such gifts. The practical 
effect of these gifts is typically to shift the financial burden of caring for the 
individual from her family to the state. An application of the substituted-
judgment standard would allow these gifts to the extent consistent with what 
the incapable individual would have wanted.267 Courts that apply the best-
interest standard, on the other hand, can rule according to their own 
assumptions regarding whether a reasonable (or rational) person would have 
benefitted from helping her family at the expense of the state. For example, 
while the court in In re Keri assumed that it was in the best interests of an 
incapable individual to increase her children’s expected inheritance at the 
expense of the state,268 other courts often make the opposite assumption.269 
In extreme cases, courts may even act on their own notion of public policy 
and own view regarding the interests of the taxpayers.270 
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3. Incentives to “Game the System” 
Section II.C has shown that a problem with proposals to replace the sole-
interest duty with the best-interest standard is that essentially the same criteria 
end up governing judicial scrutiny before the fact and after the fact. This can 
generate incentives to “game the system”; sophisticated guardians and agents 
are encouraged to avoid ex-ante scrutiny of suspicious conduct with the hope 
of escaping sanction after the fact.271 The following will argue that, unlike 
proposals to adopt the best-interest standard, the proposed substituted-
judgment defense does not generate incentives to “game the system”. 
Recall that the criterion for judicial scrutiny of suspicious conduct before 
the fact is typically the substituted-judgment standard if there is sufficient 
evidence of what the incapable individual would have wanted if she was 
capable. If such evidence is deficient, then courts tend to rule according to 
what is in the best interest of the individual.272 Introducing the proposed 
substituted-judgment defense would lead to ex-post scrutiny according to the 
substituted-judgment standard in cases of sufficient evidence, but would fall 
back to the sole-interest duty of loyalty in cases of insufficient evidence. 
Hence, in cases of insufficient evidence, the criterion for ex-ante judicial 
scrutiny tends to be the best-interest standard, while the sole-interest duty 
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continues to guide ex-post judicial scrutiny. Table 1 below summarizes these 
similarities and differences. 
 
 Before the fact After the fact 





Sole-interest duty of 
loyalty 
Table 1: criteria for judicial scrutiny of suspicious conduct, under the 
author’s proposal 
 
Table 1 shows that, under my proposal, judicial scrutiny of suspicious 
conduct tends to be more demanding after the fact than before the fact; in 
cases of insufficient evidence, the sole-interest duty is more rigorous than the 
best-interest standard.273 In other words, unlike proposals to adopt the best-
interest standard, my proposal to introduce the substituted-judgment defense 
does not lead to convergence of the criteria for judicial scrutiny before the 
fact and after the fact. My proposal thus limits any incentive to “game the 
system”; judicial scrutiny remains more demanding after the fact than before 
the fact. 
                                                 








C. Disrespecting Assent Expressed after the Guardian or Agent 
Takes Office? 
The proposed substitute-judgment defense tends to show great deference 
to the incapable individual’s past transacting patterns and relational norms, 
which took place before the appointment of her guardian or agent. However, 
the proposed defense is unlikely to excuse a breach of the sole-interest duty 
of loyalty on the basis of assent expressed after the guardian or agent took 
office. This is unlikely to be a problem in most cases; courts usually cannot 
access evidence of expressions of assent from an individual in an incapable 
state anyway.274 Cases involving such expressions of assent nonetheless 
exist, and this Section explains the author’s reluctance to relax the fiduciary 
prophylaxis in these rare cases. 
Two cases can illustrate how orthodox fiduciary law treats assent to 
suspicious conduct expressed after the guardian or agent takes office. 
Consider first In re Conservatorship of Rininger.275 In that case, Darrel—the 
incapable individual—had paranoid schizophrenia and was the beneficiary of 
a trust created by his father’s will. In his final years of life, Darrel was very 
close to and dependent upon his twin sister, who was his caregiver. After 
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seeking advice from his professional guardian but without obtaining prior 
judicial approval, Darrel used his trust income to purchase properties with his 
twin sister as joint owners. When the Darrel passed away, his estranged 
children sought compensation from the professional guardian. These children 
argued that the guardian breached the sole-interest duty of loyalty by 
allowing Darrel’s purchase to go ahead. Ruling in favor of the children, the 
Iowa court held the professional guardian liable to reimburse Darrel’s estate 
for the value of the relevant properties. In so ruling, the court disregarded the 
professional guardian’s sincerity and good intentions and the “substantial 
evidence” that Darrel wanted to help his twin sister with her poor financial 
situation.276 
A less obvious case is Conservatorship of Smith v. Vandevort.277 Recall 
that in that case, an elderly woman and her guardian opened a joint account 
together after the guardian took office. The guardian then started moving 
money from the woman’s own accounts into that joint account; he would 
become the sole owner of the account upon the woman passing away. The 
Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s summary dismissal 
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of the breach-of-fiduciary duty claim that followed.278 Finding the claim 
viable, the Court of Appeals drew a distinction between opening a joint 
account before and after the guardian was appointed; it was permissible to 
open a joint account before appointment, but not after appointment.279 This 
is a subtle example of respecting past expressions of assent, but not new 
expressions; by going to the bank with her guardian to open a joint account,280 
the elderly incapable woman could be said to have expressed assent to her 
guardian using the joint account to enrich his own pockets. 
Cases like these reveal the problem of evidential uncertainty in judicial 
scrutiny of suspicious conduct after the fact. Actual wrongdoing is hard to 
observe and verify. Guardians and agents tend to be in a position to obtain 
expressions of assent from incapable individuals. For example, an intimate 
caregiver can use her position to procure from the incapable individual a 
manifestation of assent to a harmful transaction. 
For the reasons that follow, the sole-interest duty of loyalty should not be 
relaxed on account of assent to suspicious conduct expressed after the 
appointment of guardian or agent. First, although not a substitute for a private 
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individual’s power to authorize departures from strict fiduciary law,281 the 
process for obtaining prior judicial approval can scrutinize post-appointment 
expressions of assent. Before the guardian or agent takes advantage of a post-
appointment expression of assent, she can invoke the process for obtaining 
prior judicial approval.282 That process is imperfect, but it nonetheless 
partially facilitates the pursuit of valuable goals and preferences that are 
expressed post-appointment.283 
Second, and more importantly, the guardian or agent can argue that the 
individual was mentally-capable at the time of expressing her assent. If the 
individual was functionally competent, then she should be held to be capable 
of giving valid assent.284 If the individual was capable, then the issue for the 
court becomes whether the guardian or agent had complied with the 
procedural safeguards to obtain the individual’s fully-informed authorization 
to engage in the suspicious conduct.285 For example, in In re Conservatorship 
of Rininger,286 the guardian could have argued that Darrel was mentally-
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capable at the time of gifting his twin sister, and that he had authorized the 
conflicted transactions with the guardian’s detailed advice.287 Whether the 
guardian had breached his duty would then depend on judicial evaluation of 
the Darrel’s functional competency to give such authorization, and of the 
guardian’s compliance with the procedures for obtaining authorization. That 
judicial evaluation can determine whether to uphold Darrel’s authorization. 
D. Summary 
This Part proposes to loosen the fiduciary regulation of close relatives and 
friends by introducing a substituted-judgment defense. Effectuating what the 
incapable individual would have wanted if she was capable, the proposed 
defense tends to respect intrinsic bonds and other-regarding preferences. The 
proposed defense preserves the fiduciary prophylaxis in cases of insufficient 
evidence. The usual operation of orthodox fiduciary law is also preserved 
when mental incapacity is not what really prevents the individual from 
authorizing the suspicious conduct on her own. Introducing the proposed 
defense thus amounts to taking an intermediate position between strict 
application of the sole-interests duty of loyalty and complete departure from 
it. This intermediate position tends to restore the welfare-enhancing property 
of fiduciary law. This position also tends to preserve the usual rigor of the 
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fiduciary prophylaxis in cases where it is unlikely to displace other-regarding 
goals and preferences. 
IV. HARNESSING REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS 
The proposed substituted-judgment defense should not be made available 
to professional guardians and agents. As Part II has argued, strict fiduciary 
regulation is too onerous in cases concerning close families and personal 
relationships, but it continues to perform valuable incentive-alignment 
functions in cases concerning professionals.288 Thus, while Part III above 
proposes to loosen fiduciary regulation of close relatives and friends, this Part 
offers suggestions to tighten fiduciary regulation of professionals. 
More precisely, this Part will propose an interrelational reporting duty 
that requires professional guardians and agents to report proven misconduct 
to all courts and individuals who contemplate to engage their services.  As 
Sections IV.A–B below will explain, this duty aims to harness, as much as 
possible, the reputational concerns of professionals who serve multiple 
incapable individuals. Regardless of whether she is serving an incapable 
individual, a professional fiduciary often has reputational concerns that may 
deter her from committing misconduct.289 The following will argue that the 
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proposed interrelational reporting duty further harnesses the reputational 
concerns of professionals. 
A. Repeated Dealings between Courts and Professionals 
A preliminary observation is that the relationship between a professional 
guardian or agent and the relevant state court can involve repeated dealings 
and interactions.290 Professional guardians and agents serve multiple 
incapable individuals. At least in theory, the court can acquire knowledge of 
a professional through multiple proceedings and ongoing dealings. Upon 
discovering a wrongdoing by the professional, the court may impose informal 
reputational sanctions, such as denial of future appointments. Such informal 
reputational sanctions are in addition to the usual sanctions for breaches of 
fiduciary duty.291  
By comparison, reputational sanctions tend to have limited effects on 
                                                 
Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2033 (1987) (That any ongoing relationship 
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290 For each potentially incapable individual, there is typically only one state court that 
has the power to appoint a guardian to her. The widely-adopted UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 
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relatives and friends. Relatives and friends typically only serve one (or very 
few) incapable individuals. The court tends to know little about, and have 
limited ongoing dealings with, relatives and friends. Any ongoing dealings 
are usually confined to inspection of reports.292 Hence the relationship 
between the court and a relative-and-friend guardian or agent is best 
described as a short-term, one-off interaction that does not allow relational 
norms to develop. 
B. Introducing Interrelational Reporting 
Section IV.A observes that the relationship between a professional 
guardian or agent and the relevant state court can involve repeated dealings 
and effectuate reputational sanctions. In this light, this Section will propose 
a monitoring mechanism to harness the reputational concerns of professional 
guardians and agents. 
The existing monitoring mechanism primarily takes the form of record-
keeping and reporting duties. The extent and effectiveness of these duties 
depend on the nature of the fiduciary relationship. Modern guardianship law 
typically imposes detailed reporting duties on a guardian and requires her to 
report to a court or state agency.293 The incapable individual also may inspect 
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her guardian’s reports.294 A breach of these reporting duties may lead to a 
loss-based remedy and,295 in extreme cases, removal of the errant guardian 
from her office.296 Modern agency law also imposes reporting duties, but 
affords great latitude to any contrary instruction that the principal gave before 
losing mental capacity.297 
Existing reporting duties are typically activity- or relationship-specific, 
and can be ineffective in harnessing the reputational concerns of 
professionals. For example, a professional agent A may owe a duty to send 
reports to her principal B, but A owes no duty to send the same reports to a 
potential principal C who is contemplating to engage A’s services. Neither 
agency law nor fiduciary law provides a mechanism to inform C of what B 
may learn about A from A’s reports. In other words, neither agency law nor 
fiduciary law prevents A from confining her reputational costs to each agency 
relationship. This remains the case even if A and B proceed to litigation, as 
long as their dispute is not well-publicized. Similarly, guardianship law 
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typically does not prevent a professional guardian from confining her 
reputational costs to each guardianship. In particular, limiting public access 
to guardianship reports and proceedings, confidentiality provisions in many 
guardianship statutes may even assist professional guardians to confine their 
reputational costs to each guardianship.298 
The proposed interrelational reporting duty aims to strengthen the 
existing monitoring mechanisms. This duty requires professional guardians 
and agents to report proven misconduct to all courts and individuals who 
contemplate to engage their fiduciary services. Strengthening interrelational 
sharing of information and monitoring, this duty primarily aims to deter and 
sanction misconduct by amplifying the errant guardian’s or agent’s 
reputational costs. For example, in the scenario above, upon seeing the 
reports about agent A’s potential misconduct against principal B, principal C 
may be less willing to engage A’s services. The proposed duty also elicits 
valuable information to inform the court. In particular, the court may refuse 
to offer future appointments to professionals who repeatedly commit 
misconduct. Alternatively, to bargain for advantageous terms and conditions 
                                                 
298 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-307, 5-407 (amended 2010). See generally Am. 
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for a particular incapable individual,299 the court may use reports regarding 
the professional guardian’s misconduct against other incapable individuals. 
The proposed interrelational reporting duty only marginally increases the 
reporting costs of professional guardians and agents. Professionals already 
have to comply with reporting duties;300 their pre-existing reporting 
mechanisms (such as account officers and computers)301 can easily 
accommodate the additional costs of complying with the proposed duty. By 
comparison, the proposed duty should not be imposed on relatives and 
friends. There is no point to insist on reports to multiple courts and potential 
principals when relatives and friends typically only serve one incapable 
individual. Without the benefit of professional reporting mechanisms, 
relatives and friends can also struggle to cope with onerous reporting 
duties.302 
Moreover, the proposed interrelational reporting duty should apply as a 
default duty that is waivable at the option of the court in the case of a 
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guardianship, or the principal (before she loses capacity) in the case of an 
agency relationship. This ameliorates concerns about attention costs;303 
taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, the court or 
principal may decide whether to insist on a report about the guardian’s or 
agent’s proven misconduct in other relationships.304 
By facilitating better monitoring and sharing of information, the proposed 
interrelational reporting duty strengthens other incentive-alignment 
mechanisms in fiduciary law. These include insurance bonds, remuneration 
for services and loss-based liabilities. The remainder of this Part will explain.  
C. Bond 
The proposed interrelational reporting duty can strengthen the incentive-
alignment functions that bonds perform in a guardianship or an agency 
relationship. As a condition of appointment as guardian, the court may 
require that a bond be obtained to insure the incapable individual against any 
losses arising from misconduct.305 When creating an agency relationship, the 
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principal also may stipulate similar bonding requirements. In the event of 
misconduct, the bond provider first pays the incapable individual (or her 
estate), and then pursues the errant guardian or agent to recover such 
payment.306 Thus, in addition to insuring the incapable individual, the bond 
exposes the errant guardian or agent to claims from the bond provider. The 
bond provider is typically better resourced and more sophisticated than the 
incapable individual (and those who expect to inherit from her). Moreover, 
upon becoming aware of misconduct, the bond provider may increase the 
guardian’s or agent’s premiums for obtaining bonds in the future. Overall, 
bonds disincentivize guardians and agents from committing misconduct by 
the threat of claims from bond providers and by the possibility of increased 
premiums. 
Strengthening the existing monitoring mechanisms, the proposed 
interrelational reporting duty can provide to bond providers additional 
information regarding an errant professional guardian or agent. The proposed 
duty requires reporting of misconduct in multiple relationships to the court. 
The court may provide such report to bond providers. Bond providers can 
then increase the errant guardian’s or agent’s premiums for obtaining bonds 
to insure multiple incapable individuals. The threat of such a large increase 
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in premiums amplifies the deterrence effects arising from bonds. 
D. Remuneration for Services 
As an established exemption to the sole-interest duty of loyalty, a 
fiduciary may receive reasonable remuneration for her services.307 The court 
typically has a discretion to grant reasonable remuneration to a guardian.308 
When creating an agency relationship, the principal also may stipulate 
remuneration to the agent.309 Remuneration primarily functions to incentivize 
professional guardians and agents to provide specialist services.310 Moreover, 
a grant of remuneration encourages professional guardians and agents to 
comply with their duties, because the court may reduce their remuneration in 
part or in whole in response to misconduct.311 
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The proposed interrelational reporting duty further strengthens the 
deterrence effects of typing remuneration to proper performance of duties. It 
does so by providing the court with information about misconduct in multiple 
relationships. Upon obtaining information about misconduct against one 
incapable individual, the court may reduce the professional guardian’s or 
agent’s remuneration for providing services to other incapable individuals as 
well. This can lead to a large reduction in the guardian’s or agent’s 
remuneration. The threat of such a large reduction can be a strong deterrent 
against misconduct. 
E. Loss-based Liability 
Loss-based remedies are available to deter and sanction breaches of 
fiduciary duty. In addition to the duty of loyalty and reporting duties, 
guardians and agents owe duties to comply with the instrument underlying 
the fiduciary relationship, to act within the scope of their authority, and to 
exercise a reasonable degree of care and prudence.312 A breach of these duties 
makes available compensatory damages to cover the incapable individual’s 
losses.313 The imposition of loss-based liability disincentivizes inefficient 
                                                 
312 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
313 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 95 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2012); 








breaches by shifting to the guardian or agent the resulting losses.314 
Moreover, responding to concerns about elder abuse, many jurisdictions now 
impose criminal penalties to sanction culpable misconduct.315 These penalties 
further deter professional guardians and agents from harming incapable 
individuals. 
The proposed interrelational reporting duty strengthens the deterrence 
effects of these loss-based liabilities and penalties. It does so by empowering 
the court to consider prior misconduct in determining the size of 
compensatory damages or penalties. For example, when dealing with 
misconduct against one incapable individual, the court can increase the size 
of damages or penalties if the errant guardian or agent had committed 
misconduct against other incapable individuals in the past. This can be a 
strong deterrent against repeated breaches. 
                                                 
314 Sitkoff, supra note 38, at 207. An efficient breach occurs when the gain it accrues to 
the fiduciary exceeds the loss it imposes on the beneficiary. A loss-based remedy permits 
such a breach by shifting the beneficiary’s loss to the fiduciary, so the fiduciary has 
incentives to breach only if the net gain is positive. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (discussing the 
interplay of disgorgement liability and efficient breach arising from loss-based liability). 
315 See, e.g., Lori Stiegel & Ellen Klem, Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n Law & Aging, Undue 
Influence: Context, Provisions, and Citations in Adult Protective Services Laws, By State, 
AM. BAR ASS’N,  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/Undue_Influence_
Context_Provisions_and_Citations_Chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2018) 









Prohibiting conflicts of interest, orthodox fiduciary law is meant to align 
a fiduciary’s incentives with her beneficiary’s.316 Such prohibition is too 
strict on close relatives and friends who serve as guardians or agents to elderly 
incapable individuals. In close families and personal relationships, strict 
prohibition of conflicts tends to disregard the incentive-alignment effects of 
biological and affective bonds, as well as social and moral norms. Such strict 
prohibition also tends to stultify the pursuit of valuable other-regarding goals 
and preferences. These tendencies harm the welfare of many seniors.317 
Recognizing these problems, this Chapter proposes reforms to optimize 
the fiduciary duties of guardians and agents. The main suggestion is that a 
substituted-judgment defense should be made available to close relatives and 
friends; this defense permits those conflicts of interest that the incapable 
individual would have authorized if she was capable. To the extent consistent 
with the individual’s own wishes, the substituted-judgment defense aims to 
accommodate intrinsic bonds and informal norms, and to facilitate the pursuit 
of valuable other-regarding goals and preferences. 
The proposed substituted-judgment defense admittedly weakens the 
protection against elder financial abuse offered by fiduciary law. Such 
                                                 
316 See supra Section I.C. 








weakened protection is justified in cases concerning close relatives and 
friends, but not in cases concerning professional guardians and agents. Cases 
concerning professionals tend to exhibit weak intrinsic bonds and other-
regarding preferences; strict fiduciary regulation continues to perform 
valuable incentive-alignment functions. Thus the substituted-judgment 
defense should not be made available to professionals. Moreover, to deter and 
sanction elder financial abuse by professionals, I propose an interrelational 
reporting duty to harness their reputational concerns. This duty requires 
professional guardians and agents to report proven misconduct to all courts 
and individuals who contemplate to engage their services. The goal is to 
amplify the reputational costs of misconduct. 
Overall, fiduciary law ought to regulate different guardianships and 
agency relationships differently. In particular, the incentives of close relatives 
and friends tend to differ from professionals’. Ignore these important 
differences, prevailing fiduciary law tends to operate as “an instrument of 
hardship and injustice in individual cases.”318 
                                                 





Chapter 3: Mental Capacity in Anglo-Australian 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As baby boomers in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions enter retirement 
with a higher life expectancy and more wealth than any generation before 
them, courts and legislatures are increasingly pressed to resolve disputes 
over the properties of the elderly. Empirical research consistently reveals 
the prevalence of financial misconduct against the elderly.1 Mental and 
                                                 
1  Yongjie Yon and others, ‘Elder Abuse Prevalence in Community Settings: a 
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis’ (2017) 5 Lancet Glob Heath e147, e147, e154 
(comprehensive review of prevalence studies showing that about 6.8 percent of people 
aged 60 or over experience financial abuse) (cited with approval in ‘Elder Abuse’ (World 
Health Organization, 8 June 2018) <https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/elder-abuse> accessed 11 February 2019). Generally Rae Kaspiew, Rachel 
Carson and Helen Rhoades, ‘Elder Abuse: Understanding Issues, Frameworks and 
Responses’ (Report, Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2015) (discussing empirical 





physical decline can make it difficult or impractical for many older people 
to safeguard their own financial interests. While their family members 
may provide assistance, they may also be swayed by their own inheritance 
expectations. This Chapter addresses the problem of how best to tackle 
financial abuse by family guardians and attorneys who manage property 
for the elderly.2 
Fiduciary law is the silver bullet that Anglo-Australian legislatures 
and law reformers have offered to deter and sanction financial abuse by 
guardians and attorneys. While there is no precise and unexceptional 
definition of a ‘fiduciary’, fiduciary law uniquely prohibits fiduciaries 
from making an unauthorised profit from their position, and from acting 
other than in the sole interests of their beneficiaries. This dual-prohibition 
arises from the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Responding to alarming statistics 
and widespread community concerns, law reform commissions typically 
recommend to impose the strictest form of fiduciary regulation on 
                                                 
2 See generally below Section II.A (introducing guardianships and durable powers of 
attorney). For simplicity, this paper uses ‘guardian’ to denote a person who is appointed 
by a court or tribunal to make decisions on behalf of another person. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the period and the function performed, alternative names for guardians 
include administrators, committees, conservators, deputies and financial managers. This 
paper uses ‘attorney’ to denote a person who is privately appointed to act on behalf of 





guardians and attorneys.3 The majority of Anglo-Australian jurisdictions 
have adopted those recommendations by statute.4 
Bucking the trend, this Chapter will argue that a moderate and flexible 
model of fiduciary law should be applied to regulate family guardians and 
attorneys. 5  In recent times, the typical property dispute concerns an 
elderly incapable person, and her guardian or attorney is likely a family 
member.6 It will be argued that the prevailing, strict model of fiduciary 
regulation overreacts to harmless conflicts within close families. As a 
result of such overreaction, family guardians and attorneys can expose 
themselves to liability merely by acting in accordance with familial norms 
and carrying out the wishes of the elderly incapable person. Moreover, 
many property disputes concern inheritance; someone who expects to 
inherit from the elderly incapable person sues the guardian or attorney in 
order to enlarge the asset pool available for distribution when the person 
                                                 
3 Australian Law Reform Commission, Elder Abuse – a National Legal Response: Final 
Report (No 131, 2017) 12, 17 (ALRC Elder Abuse Report); Queensland Law Reform 
Commission, A Review of Queensland’s Guardianship Law: Report (No 67, 2010) vol 
3, 247–48, 263 (Queensland Guardianship Report); Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
Guardianship: Final Report (No 24, 2012) 48, 412–13 (Victorian Guardianship Report). 
Also Trevor Ryan, ‘Developments in Enduring Powers of Attorney Law in Australia’ in 
Lusina Ho and Rebecca Lee (eds), Special Needs Financial Planning: A Comparative 
Perspective (CUP 2019) 181 (‘[R]egulation of conflict transactions is a key area that can 
contribute to reducing elder financial abuse[.]’).  
4 See below Section III-B. 
5 ‘Mental incapacity’ is typically a conclusion regarding a person’s mental ability. See 
below Section II-A. 





passes away. 7  The strict model fails to recognise potential conflicts 
between the elderly incapable person and the inheritance-motivated 
claimant. The primary beneficiaries of strict regulation are often not the 
incapable persons themselves, but those claimants who are driven by 
inheritance expectations. 
In contrast, moderate and flexible fiduciary regulation appropriately 
responds to the problem of financial abuse by family guardians and 
attorneys. This Chapter favours a flexible model that originates from 
historical Chancery jurisprudence and continues to find support in 
English and New South Wales case law. A small number of first-instance 
judgments from these jurisdictions recently incorporated much-needed 
flexibility into the fiduciary regulation of guardians and attorneys. These 
judgments continue to impose a duty of loyalty to prohibit conflicts of 
interest, but the errant guardian or attorney can avoid liability if he or she 
had acted to promote the best interests of the incapable person. This 
Chapter proposes a subjective interpretation of best interests. This 
interpretation recognises that conflicts of interest are ubiquitous and often 
harmless in close familial relationships. It further recognises that 
biological and affective bonds, as well as moral and social norms, can 
partially deter misconduct. In the subset of cases brought by claimants 
who are motivated by inheritance expectations, the proposed subjective 
                                                 





interpretation further mitigates the perverse incentives that these 
claimants may have. 
The approach taken in this Chapter is primarily grounded in equitable 
doctrine and theory. Although guardianship and power of attorney 
statutes and statutory instruments are diverse across Anglo-Australian 
jurisdictions, on the specific issue of fiduciary duty, they either adopt the 
equitable principles governing trustees or stay silent.8 Equitable doctrine 
and theory thus remain relevant even in the ‘age of statutes’. For instance, 
in England and Wales, an official code of practice codifies the fiduciary 
duties of guardians and attorneys.9 A court ‘must’ consider the code and 
any failure to comply with it,10 but the code is ‘not a statute and should 
not be construed as one’.11 Equitable doctrine and theory can therefore 
shed light on the extent to which the code should be followed to the letter 
in individual cases. In justifying the occasional departure from the code, 
the English Court of Protection (the specialist superior court of record in 
charge of mental capacity matters) already pays attention to the 
                                                 
8 Generally Section III-B. 
9 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice 
(London 2007) paras 7.60, 8.58 (MCA Code of Practice). 
10 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 42(5). 
11 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] AC 591 
[29] (Lady Hale DPSC, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Carnwath and 
Lord Hughes JJSC agreed). Also Peter Bartlett, ‘Editorial: The Code of Practice and the 
Ambiguities of “Guidance”’ (2009) 19 Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 157 






development of equitable doctrine in New South Wales.12 Moreover, the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) — the 
focus of recent scholarship and law reform regarding guardianship and 
power of attorney — is ambiguous on the issue of fiduciary duty. 13 
Equitable doctrine and theory can provide a surer guide to adjudicators 
and law reformers. 
This Chapter aims to fill in several gaps in the private law literature 
and disability rights literature. While there is a large body of scholarship 
on mental capacity to make healthcare and medical decisions,14 issues 
regarding property and financial decisions are typically marginalised.15 
This is notwithstanding the fact that property and financial matters 
                                                 
12 Eg Re JW; GGW v East Sussex County Council [2015] EWCOP 82, [2016] COPLR 
36 [20], [32], [42], [50](b). 
13 Opened for signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 
2008), discussed in Section V-D-2. 
14 Eg Peter Bartlett, ‘The United Nations Conventions on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and Mental Health Law’ (2012) 75 MLR 752, 758–72 (The CRPD and 
Mental Health Law); Mary Donnelly, ‘Best Interests in the Mental Capacity Act: Time 
to Say Goodbye?’ (2016) 26 Med LR 318 (Best Interests); Mary Donnelly, ‘Changing 
Values and Growing Expectations: The Evolution of Capacity Law’ (2017) CLP 305, 
314–21 (The Evolution of Capacity Law); Brenda Hale and others, Mental Health Law 
(6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) ch 6; the literature cited in n 268. 
15 For instance, empirical studies tend to consider a large sample of healthcare and 
medical matters but only a very small sample of property and financial matters. Eg Val 
Williams and others, Making Best Interests Decisions: People and Processes (Mental 
Health Foundation 2012) 5, 13, 45; Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
Mental Capacity Act 2005: Post-legislative Scrutiny (HL 2013-14, 139) para 4. 
Exceptions include Rosie Harding, ‘The Rise of Statutory Wills and the Limits of Best 
Interests Decision‐Making in Inheritance’ (2015) 78 MLR 945 (Statutory Wills); Rosie 






dominate the workload of the courts. 16  Leading texts on equity and 
fiduciary law also tend to avoid grappling with the complex web of 
statutes and equitable principles that govern the fiduciary duties of 
guardians and/or attorneys.17 Moreover, existing studies of private law’s 
response to elder financial abuse tend to focus on the doctrines of undue 
influence and unconscionability. 18  Covering all Anglo-Australian 
jurisdictions, this Chapter joins a small but growing number of specialist 
treatises to provide an account of how fiduciary law can deter and 
sanction misuse of power by guardians and attorneys.19 
There are nonetheless important issues that fall outside the scope of 
this Chapter. In atypical cases, the guardian or attorney is a private 
professional or government agency, rather than a relative or friend of the 
incapable person. Focusing on typical cases, this Chapter has little to say 
                                                 
16 Eg Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (n 15) para 212. 
17 Eg Paul Finn, Fiduciary Obligations: 40th Anniversary Republication with Additional 
Essays (first published 1977, Federation Press 2016) para 9. 
18 Eg Fiona Burns, ‘Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly’ (2002) 26 MULR 499; 
Fiona Burns, ‘The Equitable Doctrine of Unconscionable Dealing and the Elderly in 
Australia’ (2003) 29 Mon LR 336; Fiona Burns, ‘Elders and Testamentary Undue 
Influence in Australia’ (2005) 28 UNSWLJ 145 (Elders); Roger Kerridge, ‘Wills Made 
in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable Testator’ (2000) 59 CLJ 
310; Pauline Ridge, ‘Equitable Undue Influence and Wills’ (2004) 120 LQR 617; C 
Peisah and others, ‘The Wills of Older People: Risk Factors for Undue Influence’ (2009) 
21 International Psychogeriatrics 7; Brian Sloan, Informal Carers and Private Law (Hart 
Publishing 2013) ch 7; Yvette Maker and others, ‘From Safety Nets to Support Networks: 
Beyond “Vulnerability” in Protection for Consumers with Cognitive Disabilities” (2018) 
41 UNSWLR 818; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Succession Laws: Report (2013) 
ch 2; ALRC Elder Abuse Report (n 3) 211–14. Exceptions include Ryan (n 3). 
19 Eg GE Dal Pont, Powers of Attorney (2nd edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2015) ch 8; 
Richard McCullagh, Australian Elder Law (Lawbook Co 2018) ch 19; Nick O’Neil and 





about how best to regulate professional guardians and attorneys. Cases 
involving misconduct by professionals exist,20 and issues regarding their 
regulation are left to another day. Another issue concerns the fiduciary 
regulation of supporters — defined as persons who offer supportive, 
rather than substituted, decision-making assistance to persons who may 
lack mental capacity. While law reform commissions and human rights 
scholars tend to recommend supported decision-making,21 they disagree 
on whether to impose fiduciary duties on supporters. 22  How best to 
regulate supporters is an issue that may arise when supported decision-
making systems become more prevalent. 
Part II below will elaborate upon the problem of financial misconduct 
by guardians and attorneys, and provide illustrative examples. Part III will 
introduce the prevailing, strict model of fiduciary regulation. Part IV will 
show that recent first-instance judgments from England and New South 
                                                 
20  Eg Public Guardian v Matrix Deputies Ltd & Anor [2017] EWCOP 14, [2017] 
COPLR 415. 
21 Eg Law Commission, Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty (Law Com No 372, 
2017) para 14.51; Law Commission, Making a Will (Law Com CP No 231, 2017) para 
4.29 (Making a Will); ACT Law Reform Advisory Council, Guardianship Report (No 
4, 2016) 10 (ACT Guardianship Report); Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, 
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Law (No 124, 2014) 11 (ALRC 
Commonwealth Law Report); New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Review of 
Guardianship Act 1987: Report (No 145, 2018) 71 (NSW Guardianship Report); 
Victorian Guardianship Report (n 3) 136. 
22  Eg Victorian Guardianship Report (n 3) 143–44 (arguing supporters should owe 
fiduciary duties); ACT Guardianship Report (n 21) 59 (same). Cf NSW Guardianship 
Report (n 21) 84 (arguing supporters may not owe fiduciary duties); Law Commission, 






Wales have developed an alternative, flexible model. The crux of this 
Chapter, Part V will argue in favour of the flexible model that emerges 
from these judgments. Part VI will conclude. 
II. FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT BY GUARDIANS AND ATTORNEYS 
A. Asset Management for the Elderly: Guardianship and 
Durable Power of Attorney 
Population ageing is old news. Recent estimates suggest that 3.8 
million Australians (15 percent of the Australian population) and 12 
million Britons (18 percent of the British population) are aged 65 years or 
over, and both the number and the proportions of older people are 
projected to grow. 23  The trend in population ageing coincides with 
decades of significant economic growth. Since 1960, the Australian 
economy has grown 71-fold, and the British economy 36-fold.24 In the 
modern economy, the stereotype that older people are ‘frail, out of touch, 
burdensome or dependent’ is outdated. 25  Physical and/or cognitive 
                                                 
23  ‘Older Australia at a Glance’ (Australian Institution of Health and Welfare, 10 
September 2018) <https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/older-people/older-australia-at-a-
glance/contents/demographics-of-older-australians/australia-s-changing-age-and-
gender-profile> accessed 17 October 2018 (citations omitted); ‘Overview of the UK 
Population: July 2017’ (Office for National Statistics, 21 July 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/po
pulationestimates/articles/overviewoftheukpopulation/july2017> accessed 17 October 
2018. 
24  ‘GDP (Current US$) | Data’ (The World Bank) 
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=AU-GB> 
accessed 17 October 2018. 






decline is nonetheless common among the elderly. In particular, recent 
studies estimate that about 430,000 Australians and 850,000 Britons live 
with dementia.26 
Guardianship is a common legal mechanism to facilitate the provision 
of property-management services to the elderly. To create a guardianship 
for a person, an Anglo-Australian court or tribunal must first be satisfied 
that the person lacks mental capacity to manage an aspect of his or her 
life or property. Mental capacity is typically a functional concept that 
accounts for cognitive functioning, the specific tasks to be undertaken, 
and concerns for autonomy and protection. 27  The presence of some 
mental or physical disability in the medical sense is usually neither 
sufficient nor necessary for meeting the legal test of mental incapacity.28 
Once a person is found mentally incapable of managing some aspect of 
life or property, the court or tribunal has a discretion to appoint a 
                                                 
26 ‘Facts for the Media’ (Alzheimer’s Society) <https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/about-
us/news-and-media/facts-media> accessed 17 October 2018; ‘Dementia Statistics’ 
(Dementia Australia, September 2018) <https://www.dementia.org.au/statistics> 
accessed 19 October 2018. 
27  Eg Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 2; Secretary, Department of Health and 
Community Service v JWB and SMB (Marion’s Case) (1992) 175 CLR 218, 266 
(Brennan J); Gibbons v Wright (1954) 91 CLR 423, 437–38; CJ v AKJ [2015] NSWSC 
498 [17]–[29] (citations omitted); P v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2015] NSWSC 579 
[52]–[62] (citations omitted). Generally Hale and others (n 14) paras 2–024, 2–025; 
O’Neil and Peisah (n 19) chs 1.1, 8.11.5. 
28 Hale and others (n 14) para 2–023; O’Neil and Peisah (n 19) para 1.3. Eg CJ v AKJ 
[2015] NSWSC 498 (finding that a young adult with autism has mental capacity). Cf 
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 22(1) (requiring a ‘disability’ before 
a guardian may be appointed); Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 (Tas) s 





substitute decision-maker — the guardian — to make decisions regarding 
that aspect of life or property. The discretion to create a guardianship is 
typically exercised to promote the best interests of the incapable person, 
taking into account his or her known wishes and the availability of less 
restrictive forms of decision-making support.29 
While a guardianship is officially created, a power of attorney is a 
private instrument through which a person — the principal — authorises 
another person — the attorney — to act on behalf of the principal.30 There 
was an old common law rule that avoids the attorney’s authority upon the 
principal losing mental capacity. The rationale was that the attorney could 
only do what the principal had capacity to do. In the last few decades, 
Anglo-Australian legislatures followed US jurisdictions to remove that 
common law rule.31 Modern power of attorney statutes permit a durable 
(or enduring, or lasting, depending on the jurisdiction) power of attorney 
to commence, or remain valid, upon the principal losing mental capacity. 
These statutes allow individuals who anticipate their loss of capacity in 
the future to choose their own representatives. The underlying purposes 
                                                 
29 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 4; O’Neil and Peisah (n 19) chs 8.11.7–8. 
30 Dal Pont (n 19) para 1.1; Denzil Lush and Caroline Bielanska, Cretney & Lush on 
Lasting and Enduring Powers of Attorney (8th ed, LexisNexis 2017) para 1.1. 
31 Lush and Bielanska (n 30) paras 1.1–1.19; Dal Pont (n 19) paras 3.8, 3.14, 3.24–25 
(citations omitted). Statutes sometimes preserve the common law rule in limited 
circumstances, such as in respect of the principal’s powers and discretions as a trustee. 
Eg Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) s 163B, discussed in Belfield v Belfield [2012] 





are to promote personal autonomy and dignity, and to avoid the cost, 
emotional stress and embarrassment of invoking the official guardianship 
system.32 
The elderly are the main users of guardianships and durable powers 
of attorney, typically with a family member serving as guardian and/or 
attorney.33 Empirical observations suggest that the combination of wealth 
and natural decline contributes to a steady increase in demand for 
guardianship.34 While the private nature of powers of attorney renders it 
difficult to obtain reliable statistics on them, informal observations 
suggest that their primary users are older persons who have had a whole 
working life to accumulate wealth.35 
B. Misuse of Power or Discretion 
Guardians and attorneys typically have a broad discretion over how to 
take actions that affect the incapable persons they serve. (This Chapter 
                                                 
32 Lush and Bielanska (n 30) para 1.6; Dal Pont (n 19) paras 1.25–27, 1.58–65, 8.57–58. 
33 Terry Carney, ‘Adult Guardianship and Other Financial Planning Mechanisms for 
People with Cognitive Impairment in Australia’ in Ho and Lee (eds) (n 3) 9; Lucy Series, 
‘Applications for Permission to the Court of Protection: a Statistical Analysis’ (2012) 2 
Elder LJ 175 (using data collected and provided by Denzil Lush, who recently retired 
from the Court of Protection after 20 years’ service); Re Various Incapacitated Persons 
(Appointment of Trust Corporations as Deputies) [2018] EWCOP 3 [45]–[46]. 
34  Eg Ministry of Justice, ‘Family Court Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2018) 
(GOV.UK, 27 September 2018) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/family-
court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2018> accessed 17 October 18, table 22; ‘NCAT 
Annual Report 2016-2017’ (NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal, 2017) 
<http://www.ncat.nsw.gov.au/Pages/about_us/publications_and_resources/annual_repo
rts.aspx> accessed 17 October 2018, 43–45. 





does not consider attorneys who do not act according to a durable power.) 
Such discretion may be abused. First, the incapable person tends to lack 
the ability to monitor the exercise of discretion by the guardian or attorney 
to a satisfactory degree. 36  Secondly, any actual wrongdoing by the 
guardian or attorney is often undetectable; record keeping can be 
imperfect or poor, and the guardian or attorney is easily able to produce 
evidence favourable to his or her position. Thus, unless sufficiently 
constrained, the guardian or attorney has the opportunity to abuse his or 
her discretion. He or she may be well be tempted to act on that opportunity. 
C. Examples 
This Section will introduce two examples to facilitate subsequent 
analysis of fiduciary law and its practical operation. Consider first the 
New South Wales case of Smith v Smith (Smith).37 In that case, the wife 
of an elderly incapable person (both in their second marriages) served as 
his attorney while he lived in a nursing home. Using her husband’s money 
without proper prior authorisation,38 the wife ‘enjoyed holiday cruises 
                                                 
36  Generally Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305 
(describing the ‘agency’ problem); Robert H Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of 
Fiduciary Law’ (2011) 91 BU L Rev 1039, 1041 (discussing the limited role of 
monitoring in fiduciary law); Elizabeth S Scott and Robert E Scott, ‘Parents as 
Fiduciaries’ (1995) 81 Va L Rev 2401, 2419–21 (discussing the limits of monitoring 
mechanisms in the family context). Also Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 [74] 
(Arden LJ, with whom Jonathan Parker LJ agreed) (recognising the ‘agency’ problem in 
trust law). 
37 [2017] NSWSC 408. 





with her side of the family, bought an expensive car and expensive 
jewellery, gambled and enjoyed regular entertainment.’39 She also used 
her husband’s money to buy real property in her own name and in the 
names of her children from her first marriage. Some of these expenses 
substantially devalued what her husband’s children from his first 
marriage expected to inherit under his will.40 After the husband passed 
away, these children sued to recover the wife’s expenses (or their 
proceeds) to the deceased’s estate. The children did so to increase their 
expected inheritance. They were successful.41 
The second example is the Nebraska case of In re Conservatorship of 
Hanson (Hanson), 42  which also concerned a married couple in their 
second marriages. Years before the husband became mentally-incapable, 
the couple made an agreement pursuant to which the husband regularly 
paid the wife for the added expense of his living in her home. The wife 
became the husband’s guardian when he lost mental capacity, and she 
continued to receive payments without proper authorisation. The wife had 
no sinister motive and merely engaged in ‘family financial management 
                                                 
39 [2017] NSWSC 408 [5]. 
40 ibid [6], [248]–[249]. See generally below Section V-C (discussing fiduciary conduct 
that aims to diminish the incapable person’s estate upon his or her passing away). 
41 [2017] NSWSC 408 [12], [434], [448], [464]–[465]. 





in the family’s accustomed manner.’43 The husband lived in the wife’s 
home until he passed away. His children from his first marriage then sued 
to recover the payments that the wife received during the period of 
guardianship. The children again did so to increase their expected 
inheritance, and were again successful.44 
A preliminary observation is that these two cases illustrate how 
disputes over property and financial decisions present different challenges 
than disputes over medical treatment. First, the wives were sued after their 
incapable husbands had passed away. Unlike in cases concerning medical 
treatment, the incapable husbands here were not alive to express their own 
views. Secondly, even if the husbands had consented to their wives’ 
impugned conduct before they died, any expert opinion on their mental 
abilities at the time of consenting would unlikely be based on 
contemporaneous observation at that time. 45  This again distinguishes 
typical property cases from typical medical-treatment cases, in which 
adjudicators can benefit from (more) reliable expert opinion derived from 
direct observation and examination of the incapable person. Thirdly, the 
impugned conduct in these two cases — enjoying an unauthorised 
personal benefit while managing the incapable person’s property — 
                                                 
43 ibid 211. 
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might have harmed Mr Smith, but seemed to have benefited Mr Hanson. 
Mrs Hanson’s conduct also reflected a pre-existing agreement with Mr 
Hanson. In addition, the wives’ impugned conduct affected the children’s 
expected inheritance. The point is that, in typical property cases, persons 
other than the incapable person could assert their own interests, which the 
law would often openly recognise and protect. In contrast, the law 
governing medical decision-making focuses exclusively upon the 
interests of the incapable person.46 
In sum, courts in resolving disputes over the property of an elderly 
incapable person typically have to balance the incapable person’s own 
interests against the potentially legitimate interests of others. Except 
perhaps in guardianship cases involving a prior finding of mental 
incapacity, evidence of mental ability is also often unreliable. These 
challenges have long rendered ‘disparities in mental ability . . . less salient 
as a matter of law.’47 ‘The issue of capacity is . . . not one on which expert 
evidence will be determinative, and the experts themselves fully 
                                                 
46 Generally the literature cited in n 14. Also Jonathan Herring, Vulnerable Adults and 
the Law (OUP 2016) 66–69 (criticising the traditional notion of autonomy in medical 
decision-making for isolating the patent from his or her relationships) (Vulnerable 
Adults). 
47 Susanna L Blumenthal, Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility 
in American Legal Culture (Harv UP 2016) 17 (discussing Anglo-American mental 





appreciate that.’ 48  While medical evidence is not irrelevant, litigation 
outcome strongly depends on doctrine, policy, and incentive. It is against 
this background that legislatures, courts, and law reformers have 
developed legal frameworks to regulate guardians and attorneys who 
manage property for elderly incapable persons. 
III. THE STRICT MODEL OF FIDUCIARY REGULATION 
This Part and Part IV below will use Smith49 and Hanson50 to explain 
and contrast the two models of fiduciary regulation that operate in Anglo-
Australian jurisdictions. Fiduciary law is a diverse and flexible body of 
law; its content and rigour depend on the particular fiduciary relationship 
and the facts and circumstances of the case.51 This Part will introduce the 
strict model — based on the fiduciary duties of trustees — that most 
Anglo-Australian legislatures and law reform commissions prefer. Part 
IV below will introduce an alternative, flexible model that finds support 
in English and New South Wales case law. 
                                                 
48 Penelope Reed, ‘Capacity and Want of Knowledge and Approval’ in Birke Häcker 
and Charles Mitchell (eds), Current Issues in Succession Law (Hart Publishing 2016) 
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49 [2017] NSWSC 408. 
50 682 NW 2d 207 (Neb 2004). 
51 Eg Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244, 251 (Lord Selborne); Chan v Zacharia 





A. The Prophylactic Theory of Trust Fiduciary Law 
The pre-Judicature Act English Court of Chancery laid the foundation 
for modern fiduciary law in Anglo-Australian jurisdictions. In the early 
eighteenth century, after years of financial exploitation and 
ineffectiveness under a disgraced judge, the Chancellorship went to Lord 
King LC, who penned a series of moralist judgments to pursue an anti-
corruption agenda.52 Professor Joshua Getzler observed that Lord King’s 
efforts culminated in Keech v Sandford, a seminal case concerning a 
trustee who renewed to himself a lease held on trust for the benefit of a 
minor.53 This was after the lessor had refused to renew the lease to the 
minor beneficiary. Ruling the new lease was held on trust, Lord King 
opined that ‘[t]hough I do not say there is a fraud in this case, yet [the 
trustee] should rather have let it run out than to have the lease to 
himself. … [F]or it is very obvious what would be the consequences of 
letting trustees have the lease on refusal to renew to [beneficiaries].’54 
Keech v Sandford is a foundational judgment for the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty — that a fiduciary is to avoid an unauthorised conflict of interest 
or personal profit.55 While not all duties owed by a fiduciary are fiduciary 
                                                 
52 Joshua Getzler, ‘“As If.” Accountability and Contractual Trust’ (2011) 91 BU L Rev 
973, 982–84. 
53 (1726) Sel Cas t King 61, 62; 25 ER 223, 223. 
54 ibid. 
55  Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-





in nature, the duty of loyalty is peculiarly fiduciary.56 Professor Matthew 
Conaglen’s influential thesis articulates that the duty of loyalty serves a 
prophylactic purpose to protect the proper performance of the non-
fiduciary duties that are fundamental to the fiduciary’s role.57 In addition 
to compensatory remedies, profit-stripping remedies are available to 
sanction a breach of the duty of loyalty. These profit-stripping remedies 
remove the personal gain that tempted fiduciaries to place themselves in 
situations of conflict, where they might neglect their fundamental duties. 
Moreover, good faith on the part of the fiduciary does not excuse a breach 
of fiduciary duty.58 Lord King in Keech v Sandford, for instance, ‘[did] 
not say there is a fraud in this case’.59 
While the duty of loyalty is meant to deter and sanction misconduct,60 
it can also prohibit conduct that benefits both the beneficiary and the 
fiduciary.61 To ameliorate this problem of over-deterrence, fiduciary law 
                                                 
56 Eg Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71, 137 (Gummow J); Bristol & West Building 
Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 (CA) 16–18 (Millett LJ). 
57 ibid 57, 62–63, 185–87. 
58 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) [1967] 2 AC 134n. 
59 (1726) Sel Cas t King 61, 62; 25 ER 223, 223. 
60 Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (n 55) 57, 62–63, 185–87; Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] 
EWCA Civ 959 [74], [107] (citations omitted); Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria 
Friendly Society Ltd v Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd [2018] HCA 43 [8] 
(Kiefel CJ, Keane and Edelman JJ) (citations omitted), [78] (Gageler J) (citations 
omitted). 
61 Eg Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. Generally John H Langbein, ‘Questioning 






permits the fiduciary to seek prospective authorisation of most potential 
breaches of fiduciary duty. First, the fiduciary can seek the fully-informed 
consent of the beneficiary to pursue personal gains, and the beneficiary 
can condition consent on sharing some of these gains. 62  Safeguards 
against fiduciary overreach at this juncture include strict disclosure 
requirements,63 and potentially a non-waivable core of fiduciary law that 
nullifies consent for bad faith and dishonest breaches. 64  Secondly, 
trustees (and some other types of fiduciaries) can seek prospective 
authorisation from a court.65 To the extent that prospective authorisation 
is sought, the court can scrutinise the proposed action before it is taken. 
B. Application to Guardians and Attorneys 
Smith66  and Hanson67  can illustrate the consequences of applying 
trust fiduciary law to guardians and attorneys who serve elderly incapable 
persons. Without prior authorisation, the wife-attorney in Smith breached 
                                                 
62  Matthew Conaglen, ‘The Extent of Fiduciary Accounting and the Importance of 
Authorisation Mechanisms’ (2011) 70 CLJ 548, 563–64 (citations omitted) 
(Authorisation Mechanisms). 
63 ibid 576 (citations omitted). 
64 Eg Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18–19 (Millett LJ) 
(precluding a fiduciary to act in bad faith even with his or her beneficiary’s fully-
informed consent); Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241, 253 (Millett LJ) (accepting the 
existence of ‘an irreducible core of obligations’ owed by trustees to their beneficiaries, 
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benefit of the beneficiaries’). 
65 Generally Conaglen, Authorisation Mechanisms (n 62). 
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her duty of loyalty by using her incapable husband’s money to benefit 
herself and her side of the family. 68  Similarly, the wife-guardian in 
Hanson breached her duty of loyalty by taking her incapable husband’s 
money.69 Good faith on the part of the fiduciary is irrelevant; it does not 
matter that Mrs Hanson had no sinister motive, 70  while Mrs Smith’s 
conduct was ‘wilful’ and exhibited a lack of honesty and 
reasonableness.71 Similarly, no difference turns on the fact that Mrs Smith 
entrusted Mr Smith’s primary care to a nursing home,72 while Mrs Hanson 
took care of Mr Hanson in her home pursuant to their agreement; Mrs 
Hanson could have, but did not, seek prior judicial authorisation to benefit 
from that agreement.73 
Holding both Mrs Smith and Mrs Hanson in breach of fiduciary duty 
is the outcome that most Anglo-Australian legislatures and law reform 
commissions prefer. There is a trend towards codifying the duty of loyalty 
                                                 
68 [2017] NSWSC 408 [12], [434], [448], [464]–[465]. 
69 682 NW 2d 207, 211 (Neb 2004). 
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in strict and inflexible terms, modelled upon trust fiduciary law.74 For 
example, Queensland’s guardianship and power of attorney statutes 
prohibit transactions ‘in which there may be conflict, or which results in 
conflict’ between a guardian’s (or an attorney’s) duty to the incapable 
person and his or her own interests or another duty. Also prohibited is a 
conflict between the guardian’s (or attorney’s) duty to the incapable 
person and ‘the interests of a person in a close personal or business 
relationship’ with the guardian (or attorney).75 In similarly strict terms, 
the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania have codified the duty of 
loyalty for both guardians and attorneys, while Victoria has codified the 
duty for attorneys.76 Moreover, in England and Wales, an official code of 
practice codifies the duty of loyalty for both guardians and attorneys.77 
Except in a small number of cases (cited in Section IV-B below), the 
English Court of Protection has applied trust fiduciary law to guardians 
and attorneys.78 
                                                 
74 Eg Dal Pont (n 19) paras 2.9–10, 55.8 [sic]. This codification effort aims to clarify the 
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263. 
75 Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 37; Powers of Attorney Act 1998 
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Also consistent with trust fiduciary law is the availability of 
prospective approval to legitimise a potential breach of fiduciary duty. In 
England, prospective judicial approval is available to both guardians and 
attorneys.79 The guardianship statutes in the Australian Capital Territory, 
Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria expressly provide for prospective 
approval by a court or tribunal.80 The power of attorney statutes in these 
jurisdictions also expressly provide for prospective approval by the 
principal when he or she had (or regained) capacity.81 Notwithstanding 
the judicial preference for prospective scrutiny,82 the Victorian power of 
attorney statute permits retrospective validation by a tribunal (and by the 
principal when he or she had or regained capacity).83 Queensland further 
makes available retrospective judicial approval to both guardians and 
attorneys.84 
                                                 
79 Re Buckley: the Public Guardian v C [2013] EWCOP 2965, [2013] COPLR 39 [43] 
(for attorneys); Re GM [2013] EWCOP 2966, [2013] COPLR 290 [87], [99] (for 
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80 Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) s 14; Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) ss 37(1), 152; Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 
(Tas) s 32C(1); Guardianship and Administration Act 1986 (Vic) s 30. 
81 Powers of Attorney Act 2006 (ACT) s 42(3); Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 
73(1); Powers of Attorney Act 2000 (Tas) s 32AC(1); Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (Vic) 
ss 65(1), (2), (4). 
82 McCullagh (n 19) para [19.400] (citations omitted). 
83 Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (Vic) ss 65(3), (5). 
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Efforts to adopt trust fiduciary law should be seen as part and parcel 
of broader reforms to tighten fiduciary regulation of guardians and 
attorneys. First, all Anglo-Australian jurisdictions impose record-keeping 
and reporting obligations on guardians 85  and attorneys. 86  These 
obligations strengthen fiduciary regulation by facilitating public and 
private monitoring of guardians and attorneys. A breach of record-
keeping and reporting obligations can have serious consequences. For 
example, in Public Guardian v MP, a husband who served as guardian to 
his wife of 25 years failed to comply with his reporting obligations.87 
Although the English judge was ‘absolutely certain that there has been no 
dishonest misappropriation’ of the wife’s property,88 his Honour removed 
the husband from the guardianship office for fears of eroding and 
undermining the safeguarding system.89 Similarly, in resolving doubtful 
                                                 
85 For England, Re PL [2015] EWCOP 14 [27]; MCA Code of Practice (n 9) para 8.66. 
For Australian jurisdictions, Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991 (ACT) 
s 26; NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW) s 116; Guardians of Adults Act 2016 
(NT) s 28; Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) s 49; Guardianship and 
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questions, Australian courts and tribunals construe the evidential 
deficiency arising from a failure to keep proper records against the 
guardian or attorney.90 
Secondly, a court or tribunal may require a guardian to obtain a 
security bond to indemnify the incapable person against any losses caused 
by the guardian’s misconduct.91 In the event of misconduct,92 the bond 
provider can be called upon to compensate the incapable person (or his or 
her estate). The errant guardian can then face a claim from the bond 
provider. Thus, in addition to providing a remedy for misconduct, the 
security bond spares the incapable person (or his or her estate) of the cost 
and delay of suing the guardian.93 The standard practice in England is to 
require guardians to obtain a security bond. 94  Australian courts and 
                                                 
90 Smith [2017] NSWSC 408 [448] (citations omitted), followed in Ash v Ash (No 2) 
[2017] VSC 569 [105]; In the Matter of LQL (Guardianship) [2018] ACAT 53 [52]. 
91 A ‘security bond’ is also commonly known as a ‘surety bond’. For consistency, this 
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93 Re Gladys Meek; Jones v Parkin and Others [2014] EWCOP 1, [2014] COPLR 534 
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tribunals prefer to determine whether a security bond should be required 
on a case-by-case basis.95 
C. Narrow Exemptions 
There are narrow exemptions to a guardian or an attorney’s statutory 
duty of loyalty. First, many statutes permit gifts out of the incapable 
person’s property in limited circumstances. Because a gift benefits 
someone other than the incapable person, the guardian or attorney by 
making the gift can breach his or her duty of loyalty. Statutory gifting 
exemptions typically authorise gifts that (i) reflect the incapable person’s 
known or expected wishes; and (ii) are reasonable in the light of his or 
her financial circumstances. 96  Some jurisdictions impose further 
restrictions. New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania allow attorneys 
to make gifts only if their powers of attorney expressly authorise them to 
do so.97 England, the Australian Capital Territory, and Victoria limit the 
operation of express gifting provisions in powers of attorney, so that they 
only authorise gifts for special occasions or to charities.98 
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96 NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW) s 76; Guardianship and Administration 
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98 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) s 12; Powers of Attorney Act 2006 (ACT) ss 34, 39; 





Secondly, some statutes expressly authorise provision out of the 
incapable person’s property for the needs and maintenance of his or her 
dependants. Benefiting someone other than the incapable person, such 
provision can amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. The Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales, the Northern Territory and 
Queensland have enacted statutory exemptions to permit reasonable 
provision for the incapable person’s dependants.99 On the other hand, 
England and Victoria impose various restrictions on an attorney’s powers 
to make provision for dependants pursuant to express authority in his or 
her power of attorney.100  
Thirdly, some statutes exempt various transactions involving 
proprietary interests jointly held by the guardian (or attorney) and the 
incapable person. These exemptions permit the guardian (or attorney) to 
deal with joint proprietary interests without violating the statutory duty of 
loyalty. For both guardians and attorneys, the Australian Capital Territory 
and Queensland exempt dealings in relation to joint proprietary 
interests. 101  Tasmania and Victoria have a similar exemption for 
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attorneys.102 England generally requires guardians and attorneys to keep 
their property separate from the incapable person’s, but makes an 
exception for married couples.103  
Hanson can illustrate the narrowness of these statutory exemptions.104 
Mrs Hanson received payments from her husband pursuant to an 
agreement between them;105 her case therefore fell outside the scope of 
statutory exemptions for gifts or joint proprietary interests.106 Moreover, 
to include her case within the statutory exemptions for provision to 
dependants would require an expansive construction of the relevant 
statutory provision. This can often be difficult. For example, in 
Queensland, a ‘dependant’ is defined as ‘a person who is completely or 
mainly dependent’ on the incapable person.107 It would be a stretch to 
suggest that Mrs Hanson — the carer and owner of the family home — 
                                                 
102 Powers of Attorney Act 2014 (Vic) s 64(2)(c); Powers of Attorney Act 2000 (Tas) s 
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was ‘completely or mainly’ dependent on her mentally-incapable 
husband.108 
IV. THE FLEXIBLE MODEL OF FIDUCIARY REGULATION 
While the strict model of fiduciary regulation finds favour among 
most Anglo-Australian legislatures and law reformers, a small number of 
first-instance judgments from England and New South Wales take a 
different view. This Section will introduce the flexible model of fiduciary 
regulation that these judgments have developed. 
A. Equity’s Flexible Approach 
1. Historical Foundations 
Keech v Sandford had a little twist that eventually became a source of 
confusion and litigation some 300 years later: the beneficiary was a minor, 
and her trustee was also her guardian.109 A guardian is technically not a 
trustee, even though they both often manage property for someone else; 
in a trust relationship, the trustee holds the title to the managed property, 
                                                 
108 In England, prior to the 2014 amendments to the Inheritance (Provision for Family 
and Dependants) Act 1975, a similar problem affected applicants who sought family 
provision relief on the dependent basis pursuant to s (1)(1)(e) of that Act. The deceased’s 
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Family Provision Claims on Death (Law Com No 331, 2011) paras 6.43–6.62; John G 
Ross Martyn and others, Theobald on Wills (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) para 11-
052. 
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but in a guardianship, the title remains with the incapable person.110 The 
question is whether, notwithstanding that technicality, guardians should 
be held to the same standard of behaviour expected of trustees? 
A cautious ‘no’ has been the longstanding view of courts of equity. 
To understand that view requires an appreciation of the historical 
foundations of a guardian’s duty to account. Medieval common law 
developed the action of account as an early form of legal regulation 
against abuse of power by property managers. An account at common law 
involved two steps: first, a judgment determining whether the defendant 
was accountable; second, if the defendant was accountable, a judgment 
for the return of the relevant property or for the payment of a sum found 
due.111 Some category of guardians was among the initial accounting 
parties.112 In the early seventeenth century, the King or Queen’s lunacy 
jurisdiction over mentally-incapable persons and wardship jurisdiction 
over minors went to the Court of Chancery, and developed into one 
protective jurisdiction covering all categories of guardians.113 Chancery 
                                                 
110 Generally Clay v Clay [2001] HCA 9, (2001) 202 CLR 410 [37]–[42] (discussing the 
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111 JA Watson, The Duty to Account: Development and Principles (Federation Press 
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also introduced its own accounting process to hold guardians accountable 
in equity.114 Accounting in equity was more streamlined and effective 
such that it eventually supplanted its common law progenitor.115 
Dr James Watson’s historical analysis shows that the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty ‘assumes the existence of the duty to account; while accounting 
is perfectly well adapted to effect and facilitate protection of the fiduciary 
one.’116 Conaglen wrote that an account of profits ‘seeks to nullify the 
temptation [to enter into a conflicted transaction] by rendering it 
pointless[.]’117 Thus, although the duty of loyalty and the duty to account 
are not identical, the remedial consequences of a breach of the duty of 
loyalty depend on the rigour of the duty to account. 
In this light, Sir Henry Studdy Theobald — an English judge who 
wrote a seminal treatise on the protective jurisdiction in the early 
twentieth century 118  — described a flexible duty to account. ‘It is a 
question depending upon the circumstances of each case whether [a 
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guardian] ought to be required to account or not.’119 In particular, the 
existence of a close familial relationship would ease the burden of 
accounting. Theobald wrote: 
If [the incapable person] lives with the [guardian], and an allowance is made 
for his maintenance, prima facie, the intention is that the [guardian] is not to 
account as long as the [incapable person] is properly maintained. The 
[guardian] has difficult duties to perform, and it is intended that the payment 
made shall be as profitable as the circumstances of the case will allow. Of 
course, in such a case, anything like a strict account would be impossible. 
The [incapable person] lives as a member of the family, and it could not be 
ascertained exactly how much of the general outlay ought to be borne by 
him.120 
Thus, while beneficiaries of a trust were entitled ‘as of right’ to call upon 
their trustees to account,121 a guardian’s duty to account was flexible.122 
For example, in Brown v Smith, 123  a ten-month-old girl became 
entitled to an income under some testamentary trusts when her father 
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passed away. The trustees obtained a guardianship over the girl together 
with an order to pay the whole income to her mother for the girl’s 
maintenance and education during her minority. The order ceased to be 
operative when the mother remarried. Without obtaining a new court 
order (ie proper prospective approval), the mother continued to receive 
the income until her daughter reached majority. The daughter later sought 
an account, aiming to recover any amount that was not spent on her 
personally. Any such amount had been applied towards household 
expenses, which benefited the daughter and the other members of the 
household. Ruling against the daughter, Jessel MR found that prospective 
approval would have been granted if it was sought. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed.124 
Informed by cases like Brown v Smith,125 Sir Owen Dixon took a 
flexible approach to formulating a guardian’s duty to account. In Countess 
of Bective v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Bective),126 a case that 
was recently approved by a unanimous High Court of Australia,127 his 
Honour stated ‘a general rule’ that guardians ‘are not liable to account as 
trustees.’ 128  ‘[T]he nature of the actual abode, the condition of the 
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household and the state of the family of the [incapable person] or other 
person to be maintained’ must be considered. 129  In agreement with 
Theobald, Dixon J emphasised the importance of considering the 
particular circumstances of the family: 
Often the person to be maintained is a member of a family enjoying the 
advantages of a common establishment; always the end in view is to supply 
the daily wants of an individual, to provide for his comfort, edification and 
amusement, and to promote his happiness. It would defeat the very purpose 
for which the fund is provided, if its administration were hampered by the 
necessity of identifying, distinguishing, apportioning and recording every 
item of expenditure and vindicating its propriety.130 
However, the flexible duty to account is not so relaxed as to disregard 
the risk of financial abuse. In equity, a guardian owes a duty of loyalty to 
the incapable person. A guardianship is just ‘a fiduciary relationship with 
particular characteristics.’131 For instance, the outcome in Brown v Smith 
would have been different if the mother had ‘[made] up a purse’ for 
herself with her daughter’s income. 132  Thus courts of equity tend to 
lighten, but not eliminate, the burden of accounting on a guardian. 
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2. Resurgence in New South Wales 
‘Times change, but relationships between family members over 
property raise issues that are similar from one decade or century to the 
next.’ 133  In New South Wales, equity’s flexible formulation of a 
guardian’s duty to account now informs the exercise of judicial discretion 
retrospectively to exonerate guardians and attorneys from liability for 
breaches of fiduciary duty. The best interests of the incapable person 
determine whether to grant exoneration. For example, in C v W (No 2), 
the sons of an elderly incapable woman who served as her guardians or 
attorneys committed various breaches of fiduciary duty.134 Justice Geoff 
Lindsay of the Supreme Court of New South Wales relieved the sons of 
liability mainly because it was in the woman’s best interests to bring an 
end to the litigation between her children.135 Similarly, in Ability One 
Financial Management Pty Ltd v JB, Lindsay J relieved a professional 
guardian of any liability for potential breaches of fiduciary duty arising 
from receiving remuneration without proper prospective authorisation.136 
In so ruling, his Honour partly relied upon the finding that prospective 
authorisation would have been granted according to the best-interest 
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standard if it was sought. 137  Such willingness to grant retrospective 
exoneration notwithstanding the guardian’s failure to seek prospective 
authorisation is consistent with historical guardianship cases, such as 
Brown v Smith.138 
Recent New South Wales decisions confirm that equity’s flexible 
approach to regulating guardians also extends to attorneys who serve 
elderly incapable persons. The case for the imposition of fiduciary duty 
on an attorney is usually strong when he or she serves an incapable 
principal. The principal places a high level of trust on the attorney.139 The 
extent of public monitoring and supervision of attorneys is weak 
compared to that of guardians.140 Moreover, attorneys often undertake to 
comply with the terms and conditions of a prescribed form, which terms 
and conditions can include fiduciary duties.141 Justice Richard White of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales thus held that the attorney-
incapable principal relationship is ‘undoubtedly’ fiduciary.142 However, 
the relationship is ‘not a relationship of trustee and beneficiary and the 
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law does not always impose an obligation on [the attorney] to account.’143 
Instead, Theobald’s treatise and guardianship cases offer guidance on the 
rigour of an attorney’s duty to account.144 
As Hanson145  and Smith146  can illustrate, the flexible approach to 
fiduciary regulation tolerates some conflicts of interest within families. 
Unlike the strict approach, the flexible approach adopted in New South 
Wales would likely relieve Mrs Hanson from liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty. She could argue that it was in her incapable husband’s best 
interests to live with her and be cared for by her in their habitual residence; 
the payments from her husband covered (in part at least) his living and 
care-taking expenses. The fact that Mrs Hanson enjoyed an unauthorised 
benefit from her position would not be fatal to her argument. On the other 
hand, the flexible approach would (and did) still hold Mrs Smith liable 
for breach of fiduciary duty. It would be a stretch to argue that it was in 
Mr Smith’s best interests to be left in a nursing home while Mrs Smith 
spent his money to enjoy luxuries with her side of the family and buy real 
property for herself and her children from a prior marriage. Mrs Smith 
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also made some of these expenses to devalue the property that the children 
from Mr Smith’s first marriage were entitled to inherit under his will;147 
his wishes regarding succession planning were therefore undermined. The 
point is that the flexible approach is not fixated upon conflicts of interest; 
it aims to pursue the best interests of the incapable person. 
B. Relaxation of Strict Fiduciary Law in England 
While the English regime is heavily influenced by trust fiduciary law, 
the Court of Protection has shown some willingness to lighten the burden 
of fiduciary regulation on guardians and attorneys. In a small number of 
cases, the Court exercised a judicial discretion retrospectively to ratify 
breaches of fiduciary duty by an errant guardian or attorney.148 The Court 
did so to advance the best interests of the incapable person — as defined 
by section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK). These cases typically 
involved gifts made on behalf of the incapable person, requiring a close 
analysis of the gifting restrictions imposed by that Act.149 In conducting 
statutory interpretation, the Court recognised that conflict of interest is the 
mischief that the legislature sought to remedy by restricting guardians and 
attorneys’ gifting authority.150 The Court’s willingness to tolerate some 
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conflicts of interest was in part driven by Theobald’s treatise, the New 
South Wales decisions in point, as well as recent developments in 
international human rights law (which Section V-D-2 below will 
discuss).151 
V. JUSTIFYING THE FLEXIBLE MODEL 
Challenging the prevailing model of fiduciary regulation, the recent 
efforts to apply a flexible model in England and New South Wales leave 
important questions unanswered. As Part IV has explained, a small 
number of first-instance decisions in these jurisdictions are primarily 
responsible for applying the best-interests standard to govern 
retrospective scrutiny of fiduciary conduct; whether appellate courts 
should take a similar view is an open question. Another open question is 
whether the English and New South Wales view should be followed in 
other Anglo-Australian jurisdictions. This can be an open question even 
in jurisdictions where a guardian or an attorney’s duty of loyalty is based 
on statute. For example, the Victorian power of attorney statute and the 
Queensland guardianship and power of attorney statutes expressly 
provide a discretion retrospectively to validate previously-unauthorised 
conflicts. 152  There is an open question as to whether Victorian and 
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Queensland courts or tribunals should exercise that discretion in 
accordance with the best-interests standard. 
This Part will offer normative grounds to explain and justify the 
flexible model of fiduciary regulation. The primary aim here is to 
persuade courts and tribunals to apply the flexible model to guardians and 
attorneys. Another aim is to persuade legislatures, law reformers and 
scholars of the merits of flexible fiduciary regulation. 
To facilitate presentation, let the ‘best-interests defence’ refer to the 
retrospective application of the best-interests standard to exonerate a 
previously-unauthorised conflict of interest by a guardian or an attorney. 
The claim to be advanced is that the best-interests defence should be 
understood to have a subjective interpretation with logical implications: 
(1) The subjective interpretation is that the best-interests defence excuses 
a conflict of interest in cases where the incapable person could have 
and would have authorised the conflict if he or she was mentally-
capable and fully-informed; 
(2) This interpretation logically implies that if a mentally-capable person 
cannot authorise a particular conflicted action or transaction, then the 
best-interests defence does not excuse such action or transaction. 
The proposed subjective interpretation largely engages a ‘substituted-
judgment’ analysis to respect the incapable person’s own values and 
preferences whenever ascertainable. Section A will apply fiduciary 





Building upon Part IV, Section B below will argue that the proposed 
interpretation correctly protects close family members who serve as 
guardians and/or attorneys. Section C will examine the main logical 
implication of the proposed interpretation: the best-interests defence does 
not excuse conflicted actions or transactions that amount to evasion of the 
applicable family provision statute. Section D will defend the flexible 
model against potential criticisms. All Sections will argue against the 
prevailing, strict model. 
A. Approximation of a Private Individual’s Power to Authorize 
Departures from Strict Fiduciary Law 
1. Default Law versus Mandatory Law 
When applied to protect mentally-capable persons, the strict model of 
fiduciary law primarily operates as default law that yields to party 
modification. The duty of loyalty can deter and sanction fiduciary conduct 
that actually benefits the beneficiary. To remedy such over-deterrence, 
fiduciary law generally permits the fiduciary to seek the fully-informed 
consent of the beneficiary to pursue personal gains.153 The beneficiary is 
usually free to authorise departures from those aspects of fiduciary law 
that he or she finds undesirable. Moreover, fiduciary law generally does 
not ask hypothetical questions to excuse conflicts of interest;154 if the 
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fiduciary commits a breach of fiduciary duty without the beneficiary’s 
consent, then it is not a defence to prove that the beneficiary would have 
consented if consent was sought.155 As Conaglen explained in another 
context, allowing retrospective approval would ‘encourage[] fiduciaries 
to “chance it”, on the basis that part of the profit they make from the 
infringing transaction might be able to be kept if the court is so 
minded.’156  In other words, fiduciaries would have little incentive to 
obtain the actual consent of their beneficiaries if they were allowed to 
prove hypothetical consent at the time of adjudication. 
In cases concerning mentally-incapable persons, however, fiduciary 
law tend to operate as mandatory law. ‘Prima facie, a person incapable of 
managing his or her affairs might reasonably be thought to be incapable 
of giving his or her fully-informed consent to a transaction otherwise in 
breach of fiduciary obligations.’157 To be sure, guardians tend to face 
more challenges than attorneys in securing fully-informed consent from 
incapable persons. While the appointment of a guardian requires an 
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official finding of mental incapacity, 158  no such finding is needed to 
appoint an attorney. Thus, in rare cases, attorneys had successfully 
defended consent obtained from elderly principals. 159  For example, in 
Crossingham v Crossingham,160 Kimberley served as his elderly father 
Ernest’s day-to-day carer and attorney. Ernest gave the PIN to his bank 
account to Kimberley and told him to ‘look after yourself’.161 Kimberley 
then withdrew moneys to pay household expenses and for his father’s care. 
He also withdrew moneys for his own purposes, including gambling, 
alcohol and playing golf. After Ernest passed away, Kimberley’s sisters 
sued Kimberley to recover the moneys withdrawn.162 The New South 
Wales judge did not require Kimberley to repay the moneys withdrawn 
during Ernest’s lifetime. 163  His Honour found that ‘[Ernest’s] mental 
capacity was not disturbed. He must have known that giving his son the 
PIN to the account and telling him that he could use the moneys to look 
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after himself created a risk that the moneys might be dissipated.’164 In 
other words, Kimberley had Ernest’s fully-informed consent to withdraw 
moneys for selfish purposes. It would have been harder or impossible for 
Kimberley to secure such consent if a guardianship proceeding had 
determined that Ernest lacked mental capacity. 
In typical cases, however, dementia (or a similar degenerative 
condition) is the reason for appointing the guardian or attorney. As the 
dementia progresses and worsens, it becomes harder for the guardian or 
attorney to argue that any consent given is fully-informed. Moreover, it 
can be very costly to ‘litigation-proof’ any consent given; there may be a 
need to engage the service of medical professionals. For instance, in 
succession cases involving assessment of mental ability, the ‘golden rule’ 
counsels that a medical professional should be engaged to verify and 
document the quality of consent in order to reduce the likelihood of a 
subsequent finding of testamentary incapacity.165 The English Court of 
Protection has adopted an analogous rule that requires a medical 
professional to conduct assessment of mental ability. 166  Thus both 
guardians and attorneys tend to face significant challenges in securing and 
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‘litigation-proofing’ consent, even though such challenges are marginally 
more surmountable for attorneys. 
Some law reformers argue that the incapable person could authorise 
departures from fiduciary law before losing mental capacity. 167  For 
example, principals who are only in the early stages of dementia often can 
make most decisions about their lives;168 they can authorise departures in 
the power of attorney before they experience significant memory loss, 
cognitive difficulties, or other symptoms that tend to appear in the later 
stages of dementia.169 This argument overestimates a person’s ability to 
anticipate future contingencies. Empirical research in behavioural 
economics and psychology consistently reveals that individuals tend to 
make systematic errors when making inferences about the future.170 The 
cost of documenting all anticipated contingencies would also be 
prohibitively high. In fact, the need to respond to new circumstances as 
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they arise is often the very reason for engaging a fiduciary.171 This is 
especially true when a guardian or an attorney is appointed to serve an 
elderly person; life expectancy is now higher than any generation before, 
thus the length of time for property-management services is also 
prolonged. 
Textbook writers also tend to emphasise the availability of 
prospective authorisation by a court or tribunal.172 Yet there are practical 
challenges for relying on this mechanism as the only (or the main) 
solution to the problem of over-deterrence arising from strict fiduciary 
law. First, widespread ignorance of fiduciary law within the 
community173 implies that most lay guardians and attorneys are unlikely 
to know of the availability of court or tribunal approval, let alone the 
importance of seeking approval prospectively rather than retrospectively. 
Secondly, disputed cases often involve relatives of the elderly incapable 
person fighting over their expected inheritance. The adversarial nature of 
these disputes can generate high legal costs. In particular, inheritance 
disputes involving children from different marriages or cohabitation 
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relationships are common;174 animosity between these litigants can drive 
them to incur unnecessary legal expenses with the goal of harming the 
other side.175 Moreover, limited funding, heavy caseloads and shortages 
in staffing can further undermine the effectiveness of the process for 
obtaining prospective court or tribunal authorisation. 
2. A Solution to the Problem of Over-deterrence 
Focusing on cases concerning mentally-incapable persons, Section V-
A-1 above shows the ineffectiveness of the usual mechanisms for solving 
the problem of over-deterrence. It may be argued that two of these 
mechanisms also tend to be ineffective in respect of mentally-capable 
persons; powers of attorney granted by principals who never lose mental 
capacity may not account for all future contingencies, and the process for 
obtaining prospective court or tribunal approval may fail mentally-
capable persons as well. Yet one mechanism tends to be ineffective only 
in respect of incapable persons: a private individual’s power to authorise 
departures from those aspects of strict fiduciary law that he or she 
subjectively finds undesirable. In this light, the main function of the best-
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interests defence becomes apparent: it approximates the decision that the 
incapable person would have reached in a state of capacity if his or her 
fully-informed consent was sought by his or her guardian or attorney. This 
is the proposed subjective interpretation of the best-interests defence. 
The best-interests defence tends to excuse a conflict of interest in 
cases where the incapable person would have permitted the conflict if he 
or she had capacity. This is partly because the best-interest standard has 
long been predominantly a subjective concept in cases concerning 
administration of property.176 In the nineteenth century, the English Court 
of Chancery began to effectuate the incapable person’s own wishes in the 
administration of his property.177 The perspective of the incapable person 
was ‘central’, although not ‘conclusive’. 178  After the Judicature Act 
reforms, courts exercising protective jurisdiction continued to consider 
what the incapable person would have wanted if he or she had capacity.179 
Recent applications of the best-interests standard in England and in New 
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South Wales focus on the elderly incapable person’s subjective wishes.180 
Moreover, the hypothetical question regarding the incapable person’s 
wishes in a state of capacity assumes that the person is fully-informed of 
the relevant conflict of interest.181 
Evidence of an elderly incapable person’s past conduct, relational 
norms and wishes tends to support inferences regarding what he or she 
would have wanted if he or she had capacity. The person may have 
expressed his or her wishes in succession-planning instruments, and even 
if not, he or she has had a lifetime to leave a ‘memory trail … in the minds 
of family and friends’.182 For instance, past gifting patterns can reveal 
whether the person would make a particular gift if he or she had 
capacity.183 The person’s will and wish letters can also reveal his or her 
gifting intentions. 184  The English Court of Protection tends to attach 
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‘magnetic importance’ to a will.185 Gifts that are out of character would 
not be approved retrospectively.186 
Hanson can illustrate how the best-interests defence can address the 
problem of over-deterrence. 187  The proposed subjective interpretation 
would direct a court to ask whether, if he had capacity, Mr Hanson would 
have authorised Mrs Hanson to receive payments from him according to 
their pre-existing agreement. It was likely beneficial for Mr Hanson to 
live with and receive care from Mrs Hanson in their habitual residence, 
and the payments to Mrs Hanson eased her financial burden of continuing 
that living and caring arrangement rather than moving him to a nursing 
home.188 Mrs Hanson could also rely on the evidence that before Mr 
Hanson lost mental capacity, he had consented to the agreement with Mrs 
Hanson as well as ‘family financial management in the family’s 
accustomed manner[.]’189 Moreover, there was an analogous Chancery 
decision concerning a married couple who had an arrangement to share 
household expenses before the wife became incapable. The Court made 
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provision out of her property to carry out the arrangement, because the 
evidence revealed that the wife would have done the same if she had 
capacity.190 Supported by precedent, Mrs Hanson would likely succeed in 
establishing the best-interests defence. This outcome solves the problem 
of over-deterrence; Mrs Hanson would likely be protected from liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty because her conduct was subjectively 
beneficial to Mr Hanson. 
In sum, strict prohibition of conflicts of interest can give rise to the 
problem of over-deterrence. A fiduciary who serves a mentally-capable 
beneficiary can solve that problem by obtaining the beneficiary’s fully-
informed consent, but a guardian or an attorney who serves a mentally-
incapable person typically struggles to take advantage of that mechanism. 
The best-interests defence responds to the resulting problem of over-
deterrence in cases concerning incapable persons. Under the proposed 
subjective interpretation, the best-interests defence aims to approximate, 
as closely as possible in the circumstances, for incapable persons the 
outcome that capable persons can obtain by giving fully-informed consent: 
departures from those aspects of strict fiduciary law that are subjectively 
undesirable. So understood, the best-interests defence merely functions to 
equalise the degree of protection for capable and incapable persons. 
                                                 





3. Exoneration rather than Ratification 
The proposed subjective interpretation of the best-interests defence 
follows the New South Wales view that breaches of fiduciary duty by 
guardians and attorneys may be exonerated rather than the view, proffered 
by the English Court of Protection, that such breaches may be ratified.191 
The analysis thus far does not depend on the exoneration-ratification 
distinction. It is now convenient to explain why that distinction may 
matter. 
First, courts of equity may retrospectively exonerate breaches of 
fiduciary duty by guardians and attorneys,192 while courts and tribunals 
vested with (statutory or inherent) protective jurisdiction may 
retrospectively ratify such breaches on behalf of incapable persons.193 An 
implication of this distinction is that when the relevant incapable person 
dies, the protective jurisdiction to grant ratification seems to be lost,194 
while the equitable jurisdiction to grant exoneration remains intact.195 As 
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the previous (and subsequent) arguments in favour of flexible fiduciary 
regulation do not depend on whether the incapable person is alive at the 
time of adjudication, the best-interests defence should be understood to 
permit retrospective exoneration rather than ratification. 
Secondly, adoption of the exoneration approach tends to avoid clashes 
with guardianship (and power of attorney) statutes that include non-
subjective elements in their best-interests formula. For example, refusing 
to take a ‘substituted-judgment’ approach, Lewison J in In re P (Statutory 
Will) held that under the best-interests test formulated by s 4 of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (UK), an incapable person’s subjective wishes ‘are to 
be given great weight’ but not ‘determinative’. 196  This and similar 
decisions may present statutory-interpretation challenges for those who 
prefer a purely subjective interpretation of best interests. Yet such 
challenges do not rise if the errant guardian or attorney seeks to invoke 
the equitable jurisdiction to grant retrospective exoneration rather than a 
statutory jurisdiction to grant retrospective ratification. Hence the 
exonerate approach tends to give more freedom to develop the equitable 
principles governing retrospective exoneration. 
However, the exoneration-ratification distinction should not be 
exaggerated. The trend in law reform is against non-subjective 
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formulations of best interests.197 The UK Supreme Court now emphasizes 
the subjective elements in the best-interests test in the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (UK).198 The Court of Protection also does not always follow In 
re P (Statutory Will).199 Moreover, Professor Rosie Harding’s analysis of 
this case and similar cases shows that their outcomes would have been 
reached by applying a subjective, ‘substituted-judgment’ analysis.200  
B. Close Families in the Protective Jurisdiction 
This Section will argue that fiduciary regulation of guardians and 
attorneys ought to accommodate families of affection and dependence, to 
use Professor Lawrence Friedman’s expression.201 Such a family may or 
may not be based on formal marriage or bloodline.202 As a shorthand, all 
discussions of ‘close families’ refer to families of affection and 
                                                 
197 See generally Section V-D-2 below. 
198 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [2014] AC 591 
[45] (Lady Hale DPSC, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Carnwath and 
Lord Hughes JJSC agreed). 
199 [2010] 1 Ch 33, not followed in eg Re Joan Treadwell, Deceased; Public Guardian 
v Lutz (2013) EWHC 2409 (COP), [2013] COPLR 578 [95]. Also Harding, Statutory 
Wills (n 15) 959–60. 
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201  Lawrence M Friedman, Dead Hands: a Social History of Wills, Trusts, and 
Inheritance Law (Stan UP 2009) 11. Generally Elizabeth S Scott and Robert E Scott, 
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based on adult relationships as those that exhibit the ‘core qualities [of] a demonstrated, 
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202 ibid 11; Rosalind Croucher and Prue Vines, Succession: Families, Property and 






dependence. It will be argued that qualifying strict fiduciary duty with the 
best-interests defence appropriately accommodates the interests of 
guardians and attorneys who are in a close familial relationship with the 
elderly incapable person. 
1. Cost-effective Regulation by Intrinsic Bonds and Informal Norms 
Intrinsic bonds and informal norms in close families tend to be strong, 
and can often cost-effectively deter misconduct. In relation to close 
parent-minor child relationships, Professors Elizabeth Scott and Robert 
Scott argued that extra-legal mechanisms in the forms of biological and 
affective bonds, as well as social and moral norms, have a dominating 
effect in incentivising parents to fulfil their care-taking role.203 Public 
humiliation is another form of sanction that discourages misconduct.204 
Limited legal regulation of close parent-child relationships recognises 
that extra-legal mechanisms can cost-effectively deter parental 
misconduct.205 More recently, Elizabeth Scott and Ben Chen argued that 
extra-legal mechanisms can also deter misconduct when a spouse/partner 
or an adult child serves as guardian to an elderly incapable person.206 To 
                                                 
203 Scott and Scott (n 36) 2430, 2433. 
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be sure, affective bonds in such an adult guardianship tend to be less 
effective in deterring misconduct than in a close parent-minor child 
relationship; hence guardians of elderly incapable persons should be 
subject to more onerous legal regulation than the typical parent. Yet the 
presence of intrinsic bonds and informal norms can still partially offset 
the need for strict fiduciary regulation. 
The available empirical evidence reveals the critical role of extra-legal 
mechanisms in close families. Based on empirical research involving 
carers of family members or friends with dementia in the United 
Kingdom,207 Professor Rosie Harding recently reported that more than 90 
percent of the respondents considered themselves responsible to provide 
care, but less than 40 percent considered themselves to be legally 
responsible. 208  These family-and-friend carers took on their role even 
though ‘caring can be financially crippling, socially isolating and 
emotionally draining.’ The Australian Bureau of Statistics also recently 
reported that almost 2.7 million Australians provided unpaid primary care 
to older people (aged 65 years and over) or people with disabilities.209 
The largest group of these primary carers were spouses/partners of the 
                                                 
207 Generally Harding, Duties to Care (n 15) 50–74. 
208 ibid ch 4, 91 (Table 4.2). 
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Summary of Findings, 2015’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 18 October 2016) 
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care-recipient (40 percent), followed by adult children (25.7 percent).210 
Almost 80 percent of these primary carers resided with the care-recipient. 
Aside from not getting paid, these primary carers incurred substantial 
opportunity costs; ‘[t]he time taken to care for someone can impact on the 
carer’s ability to remain engaged in the community, participate in the 
workforce and stay healthy.’211 The most common reasons for taking on 
the care-taking role were ‘a sense of family responsibility (66.9 percent)’ 
and ‘a feeling they could provide better care than anybody else (50.3 
percent)’. Moreover, adult children who provided primary care to their 
aged parents were mainly driven by ‘the responsibility of a family 
member to provide the care’ (77.4 percent).212 
Empirical findings regarding elder abuse therefore must be cautiously 
interpreted in the light of the prevalence of family carers. Surveys from 
Anglo-Australian jurisdictions consistently report that most alleged 
perpetrators of elder abuse are related to the victim. While the exact 
figures vary, adult children and spouses/partners are typically reported as 
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the largest groups of alleged perpetrators.213 Yet these findings should not 
be interpreted to suggest that family members are prone to commit elder 
abuse.214 Saying elder abusers are likely to be family members is not the 
same as saying family members are likely to be elder abusers. That family 
members are well-represented in elder abuse statistics may well be driven 
by the prevalence and frequency of dealings between the elderly and their 
family members. What would support strict fiduciary regulation is any 
empirical finding suggesting a strong tendency of family members to 
commit elder abuse. The author is unaware of any such finding. 
Both theoretical considerations and empirical evidence thus offer 
reasons to doubt the extreme view that financial conflict in a close familial 
relationship is a necessary evil. Rather, ‘Family and other caregivers are 
the cornerstone and default safety net system within the contemporary 
long-term-care system[.]’ 215  There is then much to be said for the 
moderate view that fiduciary law should not inflexibly discount those 
family guardians and attorneys who provide valuable services 
notwithstanding their financial conflicts.  
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2. Ubiquity of Harmless Conflicts 
Another justification for flexible fiduciary regulation is the ubiquity 
of conflicts of interest within close families. Unless complex property 
management is required, courts and tribunals typically prefer to appoint 
close family members as guardians, and private individuals also tend to 
appoint their close family members as durable attorneys.216 Empirical 
research reveals widespread conflicts of interest within families.217 The 
sources of conflict include psychological involvements and intertwined 
financial interests. In particular, financial conflicts in close familial 
relationships often arise from joint property ownership, shared residence, 
and inheritance expectations.218 Senior Judge Denzil Lush of the English 
Court of Protection thus stated that ‘[c]onflicts of interest are ubiquitous 
in any mental capacity jurisdiction and it would be unrealistic, if not 
impossible, to eradicate them entirely.’ 219  Speaking extra-judicially, 
Justice Geoff Lindsay also took the view that community living and 
property sharing ‘necessitate a relaxation of “the no profit” rule for the 
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purpose of serving the interests of the incapable person.’220 The following 
will add that fiduciary regulation may affect whether well-intended 
family members would be willing to provide valuable property-
management services. 
The strict model of fiduciary regulation can discourage well-intended 
family members from taking on a fiduciary office. First, financial 
conflicts are ubiquitous in close families, yet compliance with the sole-
interest duty of loyalty can require close family members to remove their 
conflicts. The costs of removing conflicts can deter close family members 
from serving as guardian or attorney. Secondly, in the strict model, the 
process for appointing a guardian can also deter close family members 
from seeking appointment as guardian. The majority of Australian 
jurisdictions have enacted statutory provisions that identify the presence 
of a conflict of interest as a factor against appointment as guardian.221 The 
guardianship statute in the Australian Capital Territory disfavours 
conflicts of interest in general, but makes a narrow exception to 
accommodate conflicts between spouses.222 Taking an extreme view, the 
                                                 
220 Lindsay, Incapacity in a Family Context (n 157) paras 37–38. 
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Western Australian and Tasmanian guardianship statutes prohibit persons 
with conflicts of interest from serving as guardians.223 
On the other hand, applying the best-interests defence partially to lift 
the prohibition against conflicts of interest, the flexible model recognises 
that close family members should not be discouraged from serving as 
guardian or attorney. 224  More precisely, the proposed subjective 
interpretation recognises that ‘[b]est interests is not synonymous with 
“self-interest”’;225 family members can benefit from their position to the 
extent consistent with what the incapable person would have wanted if he 
or she had capacity. Moreover, in New South Wales, the mere existence 
of a conflict of interest is often not a factor against appointment as 
guardian; the guardianship statute there recognises that conflicts are 
permissible unless they are ‘undue’.226 While some English cases suggest 
that having a conflict of interest is a factor against appointment as 
                                                 
223 Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 44(1)(b); Guardianship and 
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guardian, 227  the availability of retrospective ratification confirms that 
some degree of conflict is permissible.228 Intrafamilial conflicts are to be 
managed or controlled, not prohibited.229 
English and Australian courts recognise that fiduciary law can affect 
a family member’s incentive to take on a fiduciary office.  In Bective, 
Dixon J was lenient to family guardians in part to give them ‘some 
inducement’ for taking on their role. 230  ‘Courts of equity have not 
disguised the fact that the [flexible duty to account] gives to a parent or 
guardian … an opportunity of gaining incidental benefits[.]’ 231  Such 
incidental benefits must be ‘small’ and ‘incidental to the incapable 
person’s enjoyment of his or her own property[,]’ as Lindsay J clarified.232 
Taking a similar view, Lush SJ introduced a de minimus rule to exempt 
guardians and attorneys from liability for small benefits arising from 
unauthorised conflicts.233 Moreover, both the English Court of Protection 
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and the Supreme Court of New South Wales are willing retrospectively 
to authorise good-faith guardians and attorneys to receive remuneration 
for providing their services.234 This responds to the fact that guardians and 
attorneys are typically relatives who do not seek prospective authorisation 
to receive remuneration.235 
To be sure, the strict model gives courts a discretion to make 
allowances to good-faith fiduciaries for their efforts and expenses.236 One 
may then argue that the availability of allowances as remuneration already 
provides enough incentives; family guardians and attorneys can ‘get paid 
to care’, so there is no need to relax the strict prohibition against conflicts 
of interest. This argument overstates the value of monetary reward in 
familial relationships. First, a familial relationship is largely private; 
services provided in such a relationship are difficult or impossible to 
describe and document.237 Hence any allowance is likely to remunerate at 
most a proportion of the services provided. Secondly, in close familial 
relationships, over-reliance on monetary reward may ‘crowd out’ intrinsic 
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motivations. 238  Tying monetary reward to fiduciary service can 
commodify the voluntary nature of the underlying familial relationship.239 
Family guardians and attorneys who request an allowance also risk 
signalling that they are driven by money rather than intrinsic 
motivations.240 Moreover, there is the risk of signalling that the incapable 
person or the court distrusts the family guardian or attorney;241 the signal 
may be that the guardian or attorney would shirk his or her responsibilities 
without monetary reward. 
C. Recognition of Inheritance Expectations 
The proposed subjective interpretation of the best-interests defence 
logically implies that if a mentally-capable person cannot authorise a 
particular conflicted action or transaction, then the best-interests defence 
does not excuse such action or transaction. For example, the best-interests 
defence does not excuse a guardian or an attorney from non-compliance 
with any non-waivable core of fiduciary duty, which core prohibits bad 
                                                 
238 Empirical research shows that the likelihood of such ‘crowding out’ is increased 
when the monetary reward is small relative to the services provided. Eg Uri Gneezy and 
Aldo Rustichini, ‘Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All’ (2002) 115 Q J Econ. 791. 
239 Generally Melanie B Leslie, ‘Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and 
Relational Contract’ (1999) 77 NC L Rev 551. 
240 Benjamin Ho and David Hoffman, ‘Trust and the Law’ in Joshua C Teitelbaum and 
Kathryn Zeiler (eds), Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics (Edward 
Elgar 2018) 307–08 (explaining the likely causes of ‘crowding out’). 
241 Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole, ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation’ (2003) 70 Rev 





faith and dishonesty;242 capable persons have no power to authorise their 
fiduciaries to depart from any such non-waivable core, so the best-
interests defence does not generate such a power for incapable persons. 
Similarly, in cases concerning transfers of property at or near death, the 
applicable family provision statute imposes outer limits on judicial 
willingness to respect subjective will and preferences. As these outer 
limits of testamentary freedom apply to capable persons, the best-
interests defence does not generate a power to exceed such outer limits 
for incapable persons. This Section will argue that this logical implication 
is a virtue: it makes explicit the role of inheritance expectations whenever 
present, and partially mitigates the perverse incentives that may arise from 
any such inheritance expectations. 
In theory, guardians and attorneys owe fiduciary duties only to the 
elderly incapable persons they serve. In reality, near the end of an 
incapable person’s life, the conduct of his or her guardian or attorney, and 
how fiduciary law regulates such conduct, may affect the interests of 
persons who expect to inherit from the incapable person. The size and 
composition of the incapable person’s estate at death depend on the 
outcome of any fiduciary claim against his or her guardian or attorney. A 
successful claim tends to enlarge the estate, and thereby benefits some 
persons who expect to inherit. For example, if the incapable person is 
                                                 





alive, then a fiduciary claim can be a prequel to an application for the 
making of a statutory will.243 In such a case, the elderly incapable person 
enjoys the fruits of a successful fiduciary claim only for the remainder of 
his or her lifetime. The claim also enlarges his or her estate at death, which 
will be shared by those with inheritance entitlements. Moreover, if the 
incapable person has passed away by the time of adjudication, then the 
fruits of a successful fiduciary claim exclusively accrue to persons who 
expect to inherit. For example, a fiduciary claim can be made at the same 
time as, or in anticipation of, an application for family provision relief.244 
In this scenario, a successful fiduciary claim enlarges the estate of the 
deceased incapable person. The estate will then be shared among those 
who are entitled to inherit, including by way of family provision relief. 
Figure 6 1 below depicts typical inheritance-driven fiduciary claims. 
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Figure 6: Breach-of-Fiduciary Duty Claims Driven by Inheritance 
Expectations 
 
The preceding analysis suggests that in cases concerning inheritance, 
fiduciary law can potentially impact upon elderly incapable persons and 
persons who expect to inherit from them. It conforms with reality for 
lawmakers and adjudicators to consider the interests of both groups of 
persons. Recognising the implicit role of persons with inheritance 
expectations then enables an analysis of how best to respond to potential 
conflicts between their interests and the interests of incapable persons. 
It is submitted that a defect of the strict model of fiduciary regulation 
is its tendency to ignore the possibility of conflicts between an elderly 
incapable person and claimants who expect to inherit from him or her. 
The elderly person may wish to benefit her guardian or attorney at the 








Hanson, 245  the payments that the wife-guardian received from her 
incapable husband decreased the size of the husband’s estate at death; 
these payments thus harmed the interests of his children from his first 
marriage, who had inheritance expectations. That the children succeeded 
in their fiduciary claim against Mrs Hanson illustrates that the strict model 
practically prioritises the interests of claimants with inheritance 
expectations over the incapable person’s. Claims to avoid conflicted 
transactions tend to succeed without regard to the incapable person’s own 
wishes. The ‘real’ beneficiaries of strict fiduciary regulation may well be 
claimants with inheritance expectations. 
By introducing the best-interests defence, the flexible model of 
fiduciary regulation can recognise and balance potential conflicts between 
an elderly incapable person and claimants who expect to inherit from him 
or her. Anglo-Australian succession law and policy favour a qualified 
freedom of testation: a person’s freedom of testation is qualified by a 
moral duty to provide for his or her family, the exact contour of which 
duty is defined by the applicable family provision statute.246 In a similar 
vein, the flexible model of fiduciary regulation ‘takes a large and liberal 
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view of what “benefit” is, and it will do on behalf of [the incapable person] 
not only what may directly benefit him or her, but what, if he or she were 
capable of managing their own affairs, he or she would as a right-minded 
and honourable person desire to do[.]’ 247  The proposed subjective 
interpretation of the best-interests defence thus advances the incapable 
person’s freedom of testation, while the logical implications of that 
interpretation mark the outer limits of that freedom. More precisely, 
inheritance expectations legitimately qualify the testamentary freedom of 
incapable persons to the extent that capable persons are subject to the 
same qualifications. (Section V-D-2 below will address the relationship 
between such equal restrictions of testamentary freedom and the CRPD.) 
It is not beyond the permissible bounds of judiciary creativity to 
implement succession law and policy in the protective jurisdiction. From 
the Norman Conquest until the mid-sixteenth century, primogeniture was 
the underlying principle governing succession to land.248 In that era, the 
wardship jurisdiction (one of the predecessors of the modern protective 
jurisdiction) aimed to ‘prevent incapable people from alienating their 
                                                 
247 W v H [2014] NSWSC 1696 [47] (quoting, inter alia, Theobald (n 119) 380 with 
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paras 21.5–21.6. A testator had some degree of freedom to will his chattels subject to his 





lands and disinheriting their heirs[,]’249 who were said to be chosen by 
God. 250  Testamentary freedom gradually expanded in the next three 
centuries. 251  Consistent with that development was Chancery’s 
willingness to effectuate the incapable person’s own wishes and its 
reluctance to interfere with inheritance expectations in his property.252 In 
the early twentieth century, the excesses of testamentary freedom led 
Anglo-Australian legislatures to adopt New Zealand’s innovative family 
provision statute.253 Thus prevailing succession law and policy have long 
informed the administration of the protective jurisdiction. 
It should be clarified that the outer limits of testamentary freedom are 
not uniform across Anglo-Australian jurisdictions. For instance, the 
family provision statutes in England and New South Wales have complex 
anti-evasion provisions.254 Imposing restrictions on testamentary freedom, 
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these anti-evasion provisions aim to nullify certain transactions, including 
lifetime dispositions of property, that the deceased made with the 
intention of defeating applications for family provision relief. When 
applied in England and New South Wales, the best-interests defence 
would not excuse guardians and attorneys from assisting incapable 
persons to make transactions that are captured by the applicable anti-
evasion provisions. However, the best-interests defence would operate 
differently in jurisdictions that do not have similar anti-evasion 
provisions.255 Thus, in general, the practical operation of the best-interests 
defence varies with the applicable family provision statute. 
D. Common Criticisms 
Supporting flexible fiduciary regulation of guardians and attorneys, 
the previous Sections argue that the best-interests defence qualifies the 
sole-interest duty of loyalty primarily to ameliorate the over-deterrence 
effect of that duty and to accommodate harmless conflicts in close 
families. Best-interests standards are commonly subject to two criticisms: 
indeterminacy, and discrimination against people with disabilities. This 
Section will argue that these criticisms should not lead to rejection of the 
proposed subjective interpretation of the best-interests defence, and that 
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the strict model of fiduciary regulation can also be criticised on the same 
grounds. 
1. Indeterminacy 
Scholars have criticised best-interest standards for their 
indeterminacy. These standards tend to grant a broad judicial discretion 
to consider a range of incommensurable factors without provision of any 
guidance on how to weigh or rank them.256 For example, the best-interest 
factors listed in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK) include the incapable 
person’s own wishes and feelings, beliefs and values, and an 
unenumerated class of ‘other factors that he would be likely to consider 
if he were able to do so.’257 Family life is also largely private; outsiders, 
such as courts and tribunals, often have no access to much of the 
information needed to apply many best-interest factors.258 The breadth of 
judicial discretion and the resulting indeterminacy can impose substantial 
adjudication costs on courts. Such indeterminacy can further make it 
difficult and costly for private individuals to comply with their duties and 
resolve their disputes.259 
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This Section does not deny that adoption of the best-interests defence 
adds indeterminacy to the resolution of breach-of-fiduciary duty claims. 
Instead, it will argue that such additional indeterminacy is typically 
negligible. First, English and New South Wales case law now requires 
that predominance be given to one best-interest factor: what the incapable 
person would have wanted if he or she had capacity. This view reduces 
the range of best-interest factors to be considered and the costs of 
considering them. It also reduces the degree of indeterminacy. 
Secondly, the proposed subjective interpretation of the best-interest 
defence primarily protects guardians and attorneys who are in a close 
familial or personal relationship with the incapable person. These 
guardians and attorneys have a strong case for family provision relief 
from the incapable person’s estate, 260  regardless of whether the best-
interests defence is available. Family provision law is already 
indeterminate.261 When a dispute is viewed as a whole, introducing the 
best-interest defence adds little to the degree of indeterminacy already 
arising from the potential availability of family provision relief. 
Thirdly, the strict model of fiduciary regulation is not necessarily 
more determinate than the flexible model. While a statutory duty of 
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loyalty predictably prohibits conflicts of interest, the availability of vague 
statutory exemptions generate indeterminacy. The typical gifting 
exemption, for instance, permits gifts that reflect the incapable person’s 
wishes and are ‘reasonable’ in the light of his or her financial 
circumstances. 262  Similarly, the typical exemption for provision to 
dependants requires such provision to be ‘reasonable’, and fails to 
delineate the degree of ‘dependency’ required.263 Undermined by these 
vague exemptions, the strict model is also exposed to the indeterminacy 
criticism. Thus indeterminacy alone cannot explain or justify preferring 
the strict model over the flexible model. 
2. Discrimination 
Critical Legal Scholars have criticised best-interests standards as an 
extreme form of paternalism. The very notion of legal incapacity is said 
to facilitate paternalistic imposition of dominant societal values on people 
with disabilities, and thereby deprive them of their autonomy and 
dignity.264 Recent efforts to promote the rights of people with disabilities 
                                                 
262 Generally Section III-C. 
263 Generally Section III-C. Cf Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 
1975, s 1(3) (defining a dependent of the deceased for the purpose of making a family 
provision claim), s 3(4) (the deceased’s assumption of responsibility for the applicant’s 
maintenance as a factor in assessing family provision claims on the dependent basis). 
264 Eg Duncan Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) 
41 Md L Rev 563, 633, 641–44; George J Alexander and Thomas S Szasz, ‘From 





culminated in the CRPD,265 which the United Kingdom and Australia 
have ratified.266 The CRPD marks a shift away from the ‘medical’ model 
of disability law and policy — in which people with disabilities are the 
subject of protection — towards a ‘social’ model that enshrines dignity, 
autonomy and equality before the law. This Section will argue that 
adoption of the flexible model brings fiduciary law closer to meeting the 
ideals of the CRPD. 
The claim to be advanced is not that the flexible model ‘perfectly’ 
complies with the CRPD, but that the flexible model fares better than the 
strict model. This clarification matters because both the strict model and 
the flexible model assume the continuing existence of guardianships and 
powers of attorney. While CRPD-minded scholars and law reformers tend 
to accept powers of attorney,267 they tend to reject guardianships (except 
perhaps as a last resort).268 Similarly, both models of fiduciary regulation 
                                                 
265 n 13. 
266  ‘Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (United Nations Treaty 
Collection) <https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-
rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html> accessed 17 October 2018). Australia has 
made a reservation to preserve substitute decision-making arrangements, such as 
guardianship. 
267 Eg Anna Arstein-Kerslake and Eilionóir Flynn, The General Comment on Article 12 
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: a Roadmap for Equality 
before the Law’ (2016) 20 Intl J Hum Rts 471, 476 (General Comment); Harding, Duties 
to Care (n 15) 91; Rosie Harding and Elizabeth Peel, Polyphonic Legality: Power of 
Attorney Through Dialogic Interaction (2019) 28 S & L S 675, 676. 
268 A large literature has developed to consider the extent to which guardianships are 
consistent with the CPRD. Eg Bartlett, The CRPD and Mental Health Law (n 14) 758–
67; Amita Dhanda ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of 
the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse J Int'l L & Com 429; Donnelly, 
Best Interests (n 14); Mary Donnelly, ‘Deciding in Dementia: The Possibilities and 





retain some concept of incapacity, which concept may sit uncomfortably 
with article 12(2) of the CRPD and the General Comment on that article 
(GC1).269 Thus it is possible that both the strict model and the flexible 
model fail to comply with the CRPD. It is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter to explore that possibility because it advances a comparative 
rather than absolute claim. 
The text of the CRPD tolerates both the strict model and the flexible 
model. Article 12(4) requires States Parties to ensure that safeguarding 
‘measures relating to the exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will 
and preferences of the person, are free of conflict of interest and undue 
influence’.270 The very same article also requires safeguarding measures 
to be ‘proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances’ and 
‘proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s 
rights and interests.’271 Preamble (x) further recognises that ‘the family is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society’, and envisages the 
contribution of families ‘towards the full and equal enjoyment of the 
                                                 
Eilionóir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, 
Fiction, or Fantasy?’ (2014) 32 Berkeley J Int’l L 124; Hale and others (n 14) paras I–
008, I–009. 
269 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1: 
Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law, 11th sess, UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1 (19 
May 2014) 3. 
270 n 13 (emphasis added). 
271  n 13 art 12(4) (emphasis added). For other articles concerning safeguards, see 





rights of persons with disabilities[.]’ At the same time, the CRPD 
recognises that families could also be a source of abuse. Article 16(1) in 
particular requires States Parties to take ‘appropriate’ measures to 
‘protect persons with disabilities, both within and outside the home, from 
all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse’.272 Perhaps as a result of 
such textual ambiguity, the English Court of Protection has used the 
CPRD to justify strict regulation of intrafamilial conflicts in some cases273 
and flexible regulation in other cases.274 
Moreover, little guidance regarding fiduciary duty comes from the 
supported/substituted decision-making distinction. GC1 rejects systems 
of substituted decision-making under which a substituted decision-maker 
makes decisions based on objective best interests rather than subjective 
will and preferences.275 Neither the strict model nor the flexible model 
permits the guardian or attorney to advance objective best interests in 
deciding whether to expose himself or herself to a conflict of interest. The 
strict model prohibits unauthorised conflicts of interest without regard to 
the incapable person’s objective best interests or subjective will and 
preferences. This Chapter understands the flexible model to adopt a 
                                                 
272 n 13 (emphasis added). 
273 Eg Public Guardian v MP [2015] EWCOP 21 [41]–[42]. 
274 Eg Re JW; GGW v East Sussex County Council [2015] EWCOP 82, [2016] COPLR 
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subjective interpretation of best interests, which interpretation respects 
the incapable person’s own will and preferences whenever ascertainable. 
Thus, insofar as regulating conflicts of interest is concerned, neither 
model facilitates impermissible substituted decision-making as defined 
by GC1. 
In addition, the flexible model and the strict model neither promote 
nor stultify efforts to provide supported decision-making systems as 
required by article 14(3) of the CRPD.276 Both models lead to the same 
outcome in cases where what the incapable person would have wanted 
cannot be ascertained. In these cases, the guardian or attorney cannot 
successfully establish the (subjectively-interpreted) best-interests defence. 
Thus, just like the strict model, the flexible model does not excuse 
unauthorised conflicts of interest. At the same time, neither model 
precludes the guardian or attorney from seeking prospective judicial 
authorisation or, in rare cases, fully-informed consent from the incapable 
person. Both models thus equally leave room for the development of 
supported decision-making systems that may assist the incapable person 
to give the required consent on his or her own.  
However, in cases involving sufficient evidence of what the incapable 
person would have wanted if he or she had capacity, the flexible model is 
less paternalistic than the strict model. The strict model largely disregards 
                                                 





such evidence while the flexible model respects it. 277  In sufficient-
evidence cases, the flexible model essentially facilitates a ‘substituted-
judgment’ analysis that accords with the CRPD,278 while the strict model 
paternalistically prohibits conflicts of interests even if the incapable 
person would have permitted such conflicts. 
Empirical studies nonetheless have shown that those who make a best-
interests decision on behalf of an incapable person frequently pay 
insufficient attention to the person’s subjective values and wishes 
notwithstanding a legal obligation to do so.279 Formal law thus seems to 
diverge from practical ‘reality’. Yet any such divergence should not 
justify rejection of the flexible model in favour of the strict model. 
Focusing on health and social care matters, empirical studies tend to 
collect at most a small sample of property and financial matters. 280 
Empirical claims regarding property and financial matters are thus 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, to the extent that formal law 
influences ‘real’ decision-making in property and financial matters, 
subjective values and wishes are more likely to be respected if their 
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consideration is permitted rather than prohibited by formal law. The 
flexible model permits judicial consideration of subjective values and 
wishes while the strict model prohibits such consideration to a great 
extent.281 
The logical implications arising from the proposed subjective 
interpretation do not run afoul of the CRPD. ‘Equality is the key’ to 
achieving the ideals and aspirations of the CRPD.282 As Arstein-Kerslake 
and Flynn  explained, legal restrictions upon a person’s decisions to self-
harm or harm others must apply ‘equally to persons with and without 
disabilities’. 283  Within the space of fiduciary regulation, the logical 
implications of the subjectively-interpreted best-interests defence do 
exactly that. These implications impose outer limits on the range of 
excusable conflicts of interest only to sanction those kinds of conflicts 
that mentally-capable persons would not have been permitted to authorise. 
Thus, for instance, the flexible model would impose the same outer limits 
on the testamentary freedom of incapable persons and capable persons.284 
Such equalisation of the outer limits of testamentary freedom is consistent 
with the requirement, under article 12(5) of CRPD, that States Parties are 
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282 Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn, General Comment (n 267) 485. Also ibid 477. 
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to ‘ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit 
property, to control their own financial affairs…’, and to ‘ensure that 
persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.’ If 
the outer limits of testamentary freedom discriminate against incapable 
persons, then it is the law of succession rather than fiduciary law that 
should be the subject of criticism.285 
To recapitulate, in cases where there is sufficient evidence to ascertain 
what the incapable person would have wanted if he or she had capacity, 
the flexible model better achieves the ideals and aspirations of the CRPD 
than does the strict model. In other cases, both models fare equally with 
regard to the CRPD.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter supports moderate and flexible fiduciary regulation of 
family guardians and attorneys who serve elderly incapable persons. The 
prevailing, strict model of fiduciary regulation assumes that the fiduciary 
can readily secure authorisation from the beneficiary to depart from 
default fiduciary law when it is harmless or beneficial to do so. Yet 
guardians and attorneys typically face significant obstacles to secure 
authorisation from elderly incapable persons and to ‘litigation proof’ any 
such authorisation. Moreover, in many cases, the strict model fails to 
                                                 
285 Eg Harding, Statutory Wills (n 15) (arguing that the English law governing statutory 
wills contradicts the CRPD when applied to incapable persons who are unable or 
unwillingness to express their testamentary preferences). Also ibid 970 (suggesting to 





recognise potential conflicts between elderly incapable persons and 
claimants who bring breach-of-fiduciary duty claims to increase their 
expected inheritance. The flexible model of fiduciary regulation that 
English and New South Wales courts have developed essentially 
approximates, for an incapable person, a capable person’s power to 
authorise his or her fiduciaries to depart from those aspects of fiduciary 
law that he or she subjectively finds undesirable. It is suggested that the 
flexible model can alleviate the potential over-protectiveness of fiduciary 
law, accommodate harmless conflicts in close families and mitigate the 
perverse incentives arising from inheritance expectations whenever 
present. 
Contradicting the prevailing view among Anglo-Australian 
legislatures and law reformers, this Chapter reaches the conclusion that 
strict fiduciary regulation is not the solution to the problem of financial 
abuse against the elderly. Such strict regulation inflexibly prohibits 
harmless conflicts with little regard for the elderly incapable person’s own 
wishes and familial bonds. That inflexibility, I argue, tends to ‘convert 
equity into an instrument of hardship and injustice in individual cases.’286 
                                                 




Appendix A: Mental Capacity in American Transactional 
Law: Cases 
 
This Appendix contains the two surveys of cases referred to in chapter 1 
of this Dissertation. The Westlaw 2013-18 Survey in Table 2 below contains 
thirty cases decided in 2013-18 that are listed under Westlaw’s West Key 
Number System, k-92. This table excludes cases that did not reach issues 
regarding mental capacity; and cases concerning a breach of fiduciary duty. 
The  Restatement and Williston survey in Table 3 contains fifty-five cases 
decided after 1963 that appear in the case citations supplement to 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) or in the 
footnotes of 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10:8 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999). This table excludes 






    



















































































































































































































































































































































Old age, poor 



























































































































































































































































































Old age, stroke, 
confusion, lack 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dementia  Yes 
Contract 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Old age Yes 
Transfer 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































n)  v. 
son 









































































Family Yes Yes N.A. N.A. No N.A. No 
 
Appendix B: Mental Capacity in American
Transactional Law: Economic Model
This Appendix constructs a behavioral-contract-theoretic model to capture
the transactions of potentially incapable individuals.1 The numerical example
introduced in Part IV of the Article uses the results of this model. Section B.1
below will set up the model. Assuming the absence of a power of avoidance,
Section B.2 considers the equilibrium properties of the model. Section B.3
introduces a power of avoidance. Section B.4 permits the transacting parties
to renegotiate.
B.1 The Model
The model has three players: an individual who may lack mental capacity, an
actor who may transact with the individual, and a claimant who may challenge
any transaction. The actor may take one of two actions—x0 or x1—pursuant
to any transaction. Let C(x) > 0 be the actor’s cost of taking action x.2 Let
B̂(x) > 0 be the individual’s willingness to pay for action x at the time of
1 The model set up in this Appendix builds upon the multi-selves model introduced by
Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, Consumer Optimism and Price Discrimination, 3 Theoretical
Econ. 459 (2008).
2All analyses remain valid under the more general assumptions that the actor’s action
space is a compact set X and B̂,B,C : X → R are continuous functions. See generally Eliaz
& Spiegler, supra note 1.
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forming any transaction. If she has capacity at that time, then B̂(x) is her
benefit arising from x. If the individual lacks capacity, then her “true” benefit
is B(x).3 Action x0 is a “do nothing” option that costs the actor zero and gives
the individual zero benefit; B̂(x0) = B(x0) = C(x0) = 0. This action captures
the actor’s choice of not dealing with the individual. Action x1 costs the actor
less than the individual’s willingness to pay; C(x1) < B̂(x1).4
The timing and information structure of the model are as follows. The
actor first designs the terms of a transaction comprising at least one action x
and a corresponding price p ∈ R, and offers these terms to the individual.5
At this time, the actor knows the individual’s willingness to pay (B̂), and
holds the belief that the individual is incapable with probability µ and capable
with complementary probability 1 − µ. With such knowledge and beliefs,
3The model’s bifurcation of the incapable individual’s benefit from transacting is not
premised on, and does not support, a binary view of the manifestation of mental disorders
or incapacities. For example, a mental disorder giving rise to transactional incapacity may
manifest as a point in a continuum between a capable state and the most severe episode
characterizing that disorder. The model captures such diversity. To see this, for each action
x, let B(x), B̄(x) respectively describe the individual’s willingness to pay in a capable state
and in the state during which she is affected by the most severe episode. Suppose that at
the time of forming the transaction, the individual’s willingness to pay lies in the middle of
these two extreme states. Then this model captures such intermediate state by defining the B̂
function by B̂(x) = 0.5B(x)+ 0.5B̄(x); that is, the individual’s willingness to pay for x in the
legally-relevant incapable state is the average of her willingness to pay in a capable state and
her willingness to pay in the most severe incapable state. This modeling technique captures
any intermediate form of disorder or incapacity.
4If this assumption were violated, then the model becomes trivial because the actor would
always choose to “do nothing” (x0).
5Formally, the actor chooses a menu {(x, p)} ⊂ {x0, x1} × R.
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execution of the contract, the Claimant may exercise any power to avoid it.4 Diagram 4 below 
describes the Model. 
 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 
The actor designs 
the terms of a 
transaction 




accepts or rejects 
the transaction, and 
chooses an action-
price pair therein. 
If a transaction was 
accepted, then the actor 
takes the chosen action 
and obtains the 










Diagram 4: the Model 
 
Farnum v. Silvano can illustrate how this Model captures the contracts of incapable 
individuals.5 Recall that in that case, an elderly woman made a cut-rate sale of her house to a 
young friend. The Actor in the Model represents the young friend, and the Action captures the 
services (such as lawn-mowing) that he provided to the elderly woman. The price P is the 
benefit that the young friend obtained from the woman—his profits from buying her house 
cheaply. The contract in the Model thus describes the young friend’s services (the Action) and 
the benefit (P) that he obtained in exchange for providing these services. The Claimant in the 
Model represents the woman’s nephew-guardian (and expectant heir), who brought the 
avoidance claim. 
The remainder of this Section will elaborate upon the key assumptions underlying the 
Model. The critical assumption is that the Actor is a sophisticated actor who makes choices to 
maximize her own payoff and has superior bargaining power. While this assumption may 
appear cynical and unrealistic, it simplifies the Model to focus on the problem of elderly 
financial abuse. This problem is most pronounced when the potential abuser—the Actor in the 
Model—is sophisticated, self-interested and superior in bargaining. Under this assumption, the 
normative case for maintaining a broad mental capacity doctrine is the strongest. In Part IV 
below, I will propose to narrow the doctrine. Hence I make this assumption to “stack the cards” 
against me. 
Another assumption is the Claimant is also sophisticated and self-interested. This 
assumption aims to capture the potential misalignment of incentives between the incapable 
Individual and her representative—the Claimant. Being sophisticated and self-interested, the 
Claimant may have the incentive to avoid a contract even if the incapable Individual benefited 
from it. As Section II.A has explained, this assumption captures typical contractual capacity 
cases in modern times. 
A further assumption is that the Actor knows the incapacity. Although Sections III.D–E 
below will explore the consequences of dropping this assumption, it captures most of the 
modern cases surveyed. First, a significant proportion of these cases concerned individualized 
contracts between relatives or friends.6 It conforms with reality to assume knowledge of any 
incapacity. Second, another significant proportion of the cases surveyed concerned contracts 
for admission into a nursing home or a hospital.7 The nursing home or hospital—captured by 
                                               
4 The Claimant may be a different person from the incapable Individual, see supra Section II.A, or just the 
Individual recovering from her incapacity. 
5 540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989) (discussed in text accompanying supra notes 53–57). 
6 See supra Section II.A. 
7 See supra Section II.B. 
Figure 7: Timing of the model
the actor designs the transaction to maximize her expected profits.6 The
individual then either accepts or rejects the transaction with the (possibly
mist ken) belief that her benefit is B̂. She r ceives the outsid payoff of 0 if
she rejects the transaction. If she accepts the transaction,7 then she chooses
an action-price pair sti ulated in the transaction to maximize her (per eiv d)
payoff: her willingness to pay less the price she pays.8 As Section B.3 will
elaborate, if there is a power to avoid transactions for want of capacity, then
a third player—the claimant—chooses whether to exercise that power. Figure
7 depicts the timing of the model.
Farnum v. Silvano can illustrate how the model captures the transactions
of potentially incapable individuals.9 Recall that in that case, an elderly
woman who had dementia and seizure disorder made a cut-rate sale of her
6Formally, let the individual pay price p for action x if she lacks capacity, but p̂ for x̂ if
she has capacity. The actor’s expected profits are µ [p − C(x)] + (1 − µ)[p̂ − C(x̂)].
7As a tie-breaking rule, assume that the individual accepts the transaction if she is indif-
ferent between accepting or rejecting it.
8Formally, the individual’s payoff is B̂(x ′)− p′ if she chooses the action-price pair (x ′, p′).
9540 N.E.2d 202 (Mass. Ct. App. 1989).
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house to a young friend in whom she had trust and confidence. The actor
in the model represents the young friend, and his chosen action (x) captures
the services (such as lawn-mowing) that he provided to the elderly woman.
The transactional price (p) is the benefit that the young friend obtained from
the woman—his profits from buying her house cheaply. The terms of the
transaction in the model thus describe the young friend’s services (the action)
and the benefit (the price) that he obtained in exchange for providing these
services. His cost of providing these services was C(x). The elderly woman’s
willingness to pay for the young friend’s services at the time of making the
transaction was B̂(x), while her “true” benefit was B(x). The claimant in the
model represents the woman’s nephew (and expectant heir), who brought the
claim to avoid the transaction.
The remainder of this Section will explain the key assumptions underlying
the model. The critical assumption is that the actor is a sophisticated player
who makes choices to maximize her own payoff and has superior bargaining
power. While this assumption may appear cynical and unrealistic, it simplifies
the model to focus on the problem of elderly financial abuse. This problem is
most pronounced when the potential abuser—the actor here—is sophisticated,
self-interested and superior in bargaining. Under this assumption, the norma-
tive case for maintaining a broad mental capacity doctrine is the strongest. As
I propose to narrow the doctrine in Parts III and IV of the Article, I make this
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assumption to “stack the cards” against me.
Another assumption is the claimant is also sophisticated and self-interested.
This assumption aims to capture the potential misalignment of incentives be-
tween the potential incapable individual and her representative—the claimant.
Being sophisticated and self-interested, the claimant may have an incentive to
avoid a transaction even if the individual benefited from it. As Section III.A
of the Article explains, this assumption captures typical transactional capacity
cases in modern times.
A further assumption that by the time the claimant decides whether to
seek avoidance, the transaction has been fully executed. This assumption
aims to capture inheritance disputes over fully-executed contracts, irrevoca-
ble gifts and other lifetime transactions that transferred some property away
from the potentially incapable individual’s estate. That property is the price
p in the model, and the recipient’s conduct giving rise to the transfer is the
action x. This assumption does not capture fully-executory or partly-executed
contracts, for instance, a contract to refer any disputes to arbitration. Cap-
turing fully-executory contracts, Section B.4 will modify the model to show
that the normative arguments to be advanced are robust to the possibility of
renegotiation. The author also has on file a modification of the model that
captures partly-executed contracts. All these modifications lead to slightly
different quantitative predictions regarding the exact transactional terms. As
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the normative arguments to be advanced do not depend on the exactness of
the predicted transactional terms, I keep the assumption of full execution to
minimize technicality.
Moreover, there is an assumption that mental incapacity is the only poten-
tial basis of avoidance of any transaction. This assumption rules out alternative
bases of avoidance, such as undue influence and unconscionability. There is
no loss of generality in assuming away these alternative doctrines, because
the subsequent formulation of the power of avoidance in Section B.3 is suffi-
ciently flexible to cover all of them. Hence, to focus on mental incapacity and
to minimize technicality, I assume away alternative bases of avoidance.
B.2 No Power of Avoidance
In this baseline scenario, suppose there is no power of avoidance. Proposition
1 below states the equilibrium properties of the model.10 To facilitate pre-
sentation, define B̃ = B̂ − B. If the individual initially lacks capacity, then B̃
measures the change in her willingness to pay upon regaining capacity. Call
B̃ her revaluation price.
Proposition 1. Without a power of avoidance, the actor offers an equilibrium
transaction with terms that charge price p = B̂(x1) for action x1. The individ-
10The chosen equilibrium concept is the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. A profile of choices
is such an equilibrium if given the other player’s choices, each player’s choices maximize her
payoff according to her contemporaneous beliefs whenever it is her turn to choose.
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ual accepts the transaction and chooses this action-price pair, regardless of
her state of capacity.
In equilibrium, the individual’s “true” surplus from transacting is −B̃(x1)
if she lacks capacity, and 0 if she has capacity. The actor’s expected profits
are B̂(x1) − C(x1).
Proof of Proposition 1
The absence of a power of avoidance implies the individual’s state of
capacity does not affect the actor’s expected profits. Tomaximize her expected
profits p − C(x), the actor can charge the maximum p = B̂(x1) for x1. 
Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium, the actor may exploit the individ-
ual if she lacks capacity. Without a power of avoidance, the individual’s “true”
surplus from transacting is −B̃(x1); she loses her revaluation price—the dif-
ference between her “true” benefit (B(x1)) and her willingness to pay (B̂(x1))
at the time of forming the transaction. Call a transaction exploitative if
B(x1) < p. The equilibrium transaction is exploitative whenever the individ-
ual’s incapacitymakes hermorewilling to pay: B̂(x1) > B(x1) ⇔ −B̃(x1) < 0.
However, no exploitation takes place if B̂(x1) ≤ B(x1).11
11See supra Section III.B, Part IV of the Article (discussing the normative implications of
these observations).
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B.3 Power of Avoidance
This Section introduces a power of avoidance. Suppose that after full execution
of the transaction, a third player—the claimant—may attempt to avoid the
transaction.12 The consequences of attempted avoidance depends on whether
the individual (who transacted with the actor) was incapable at the time of
forming the transaction:13
1. Suppose the individual was incapable. Then the claimant’s avoidance
attempt is successful. She recovers the transactional price p from the
actor, and pays to the actor a reasonable price R(x) ≥ 0 (where x
was the action that the actor took pursuant to the terms of the avoided
transaction).14 Assume R(x0) = 0: the reasonable price is zero if the
12The claimant may be the initially-incapable individual recovering from her incapacity,
the initially-capable individual pretending to have been incapable, or a different person. In
typical cases, the claimant is someone who expects to inherit from the potentially incapable
individual. See generally supra Section III.A of the Article.
13The present specification of the consequences of attempted avoidance does not imply
the absence of judicial errors or uncertainty in dispute resolution. To see this, consider an
alternative formulation under which the claimant’s avoidance attempt would be successful
with probability θ if the individual initially had capacity, and with probability θ̄ if the
individual initially lacked capacity. Assume θ̄ > θ, so being initially incapable increases
the likelihood of successful avoidance. Let b(x), r(x) respectively denote the individual’s
willingness to pay at the time of forming the transaction and the claimant’s reasonable price
upon successful avoidance. Assume r(x) ≤ b(x) to ensure the claimant has an incentive
to avoid. This alternative formulation is captured by the present model; just define B̂(x) =
θr(x) + (1 − θ)b(x) and R(x) = θr(x) + (1 − θ̄)b(x).
14The value of R depends on those equitable considerations that control the power of
avoidance and its remedial consequences, see generally supra Section I.A of the Article, and
factors such as any transaction costs, litigation costs, as well as any imbalance between the
claimant and the actor. Whether R is the result of settlement or litigation is immaterial to the
subsequent analysis.
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actor “did nothing”.15 Further assume R(x1) ≤ B̂(x1): the reasonable
price is no greater than the maximum price that the individual was
willing to pay at the time of forming the transaction.16
2. Suppose the individual was capable. Then the avoidance attempt fails.
The claimant decides whether to avoid with knowledge of the individual’s true
state of capacity at the time of forming the transaction. The actor continues
to lack such knowledge.
A preliminary observation is that introducing a power of avoidance can
encourage opportunistic avoidance in the following sense. Notice that the
claimant’s incentive to avoid any transaction does not depend on B—the
potentially incapable individual’s “true” benefit from transacting. Regardless
of how much the individual would have valued the transaction, the claimant
has an incentive to avoid it whenever doing so gives her a better outcome. In
particular, the claimant has an incentive to avoid even if B > R: the benefit of
the chosen action to the individual is greater than its reasonable price.
To facilitate presentation of the equilibrium properties, define information
rent I = B̂−R as the difference between themaximum price that the individual
was willing to pay at the time of forming the transaction and the reasonable
15See Restatement Third of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment §§ 16 cmt. a, 33
cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2011).
16This assumption ensures that the reasonable price is effective in the sense that it would
incentivize avoidance of a maximally-exploitative transaction. See supra Section B.2.
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price.
Proposition 2. With a power of avoidance, the equilibrium has the following
properties:
1. In the event that the individual initially lacks capacity, the actor expects
to receive the reasonable price for her action. In addition to the cost
of acting, the actor’s expected costs include a weighted amount of the
information rent. The action taken maximizes the difference between
such expected returns and costs.17 Except the reasonable price, the
actor does not obtain any of the joint surplus from transacting.
2. In the event that the individual initially has capacity, the actor expects
to take action x1. The actor expects to obtain the joint surplus from
transacting less the information rent.18
Proof of Proposition 2
The revelation principle implies that any equilibrium transaction that the
actor can implement corresponds to one that induces honest reporting of the
individual’s “type”—her state of capacity. To apply the revelation principle,
this proof will proceed as if the individual in a capable state is a different
player from the individual in an incapable state.
17See infra equation (1) for a formal and precise description of the equilibrium action
targeting the individual if she lacks capacity.
18Formally, the capable individual’s transactional price is B̂(x1) − I(x), where x is the
equilibrium action targeting the incapable individual.
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Let (x, p) denote the action-price pair that at the time of forming the trans-
action, the incapable individual believes she would choose. The claimant’s
power of avoidance places an upper bound on the price that the actor can
expect to receive:
p ≤ R(x). (LC)
The incapable individual accepts the transactional terms if and only if her
participation constraint holds:
B̂(x) − p ≥ 0 (PC)
where 0 is her outside payoff. Implicit in the formulation of (PC) is that the
incapable individual mistakenly believes her benefit is B̂ rather than B.
Let (x̂, p̂) denote the action-price pair that the capable individual believes
she would choose. To ensure that the incapable individual chooses the action-
price pair designed for her, the following incentive-compatibility constraint
must hold:
B̂(x) − p ≥ B̂(x̂) − p̂. (IC)
The following participation constraint and incentive-compatibility con-
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straint respectively ensure that the capable individual accepts the transactional
terms and chooses the action-price pair designed for her:
B̂(x̂) − p̂ ≥ 0 (P̂C)
B̂(x̂) − p̂ ≥ B̂(x) − p. (ÎC)
The actor chooses (x, p), (x̂, p̂) to maximize her expected profits:
µ [p − C(x)] + (1 − µ) [p̂ − C(x̂)] (Π)
subject to constraints (LC), (PC), (IC), (P̂C) and (ÎC).
For any choice of actions x and x̂, the actor can raise prices p, p̂ until
(LC) binds without violating the other constraints.19 This implies p = R(x).
The assumption R ≤ B̂ then ensures the satisfaction of (PC): B̂(x) − p =
B̂(x) − R(x) ≥ 0.
The choice p = R(x) implies (IC) and (ÎC) respectively become B̂(x) −
R(x) ≥ B̂(x̂) − p̂ and B̂(x̂) − p̂ ≥ B̂(x) − R(x). These together imply
B̂(x) − R(x) = B̂(x̂) − p̂. (?)
19Except perhaps (P̂C). This step will ignore (P̂C), and a subsequent step will prove that
it holds.
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A rearrangement of (?) gives p̂ = B̂(x̂) − B̂(x)+ R(x). Using R ≤ B̂ again
ensures the satisfaction of (P̂C): B̂(x̂) − p̂ = B̂(x̂) − B̂(x̂) + B̂(x) − R(x) =
B̂(x) − R(x) ≥ 0.





µ [R(x) − C(x)] + (1 − µ)
[
B̂(x̂) − C(x̂) − B̂(x) + R(x)
]}
Hence the equilibrium action targeting the capable individual is x̂ = x1 ∈
argmax(B̂ − C), while that targeting the incapable individual is
x ∈ argmax(µ(R − C) − (1 − µ)I), (1)
where I = B̂ − R is the information rent. 
Proposition 2 shows the tradeoffs of introducing a power to avoid transac-
tions for want of capacity. First, introducing a power of avoidance mitigates
potential exploitation. With a power of avoidance, the claimant can reduce
the price that the actor can impose on the incapable individual. However, in
equilibrium, the actor only expects to receive the reasonable price (R) when
transacting with the incapable individual. Moreover, transacting with the in-
capable individual would require the actor to pay information rent (I) to the
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capable individual. This is because at the time of formation of the transac-
tion, the actor does not know whether the individual has capacity; to obtain
generous terms and conditions, the individual may pretend to be incapable
even though she has capacity. Thus the actor needs to pay information rent
in order to disincentivize the capable individual from so pretending. Such
information rent adds to the actor’s usual cost of taking actions (C). In sum,
the power of avoidance reduces the actor’s expected returns and increases her
expected costs. These effects dampen the actor’s incentives to transact in the
first place.20
B.4 Renegotiation
This Section considers the implications of allowing renegotiation. As a modi-
fication of themodel, suppose that after formation of the transaction but before
the actor takes any action pursuant to the transactional terms, she and the in-
dividual may renegotiate. The individual now has capacity. If she initially
had capacity, then her willingness to pay for action x remains B̂(x). If she
initially lacked capacity, then her willingness to pay is now B(x)—her “true”
benefit. In renegotiation, the actor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which the
20The actor’s equilibrium transactional practice avoids dealingwith the incapable individual
if the reasonable price following successful avoidance is too small, or if the weighted informa-
tion rent is too high. Formally, (1) shows the actor chooses x = x0 if R(x1)−C(x1) < 1−µµ I(x1).
See generally supra Parts III, IV of the Article (discussing the normative implications of these
observations).
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individual may accept or reject.
Assuming the absence of any power of avoidance, Proposition 3 below
characterizes the equilibrium. To facilitate presentation, let x̃ denote the
action that induces the maximum revaluation price: x̃ ∈ argmax(B̃). In
other words, x̃ takes advantage of the maximum effect of incapacity on the
individual’s willingness to pay. Let x∗ denote the efficient action when B is
the individual’s “true” benefit: x∗ ∈ argmax(B − C).
Proposition 3. Suppose renegotiation is permitted before the actor takes any
action, and there is no power of avoidance. The equilibrium has the following
properties:
1. If the individual is initially incapable, then she accepts a transaction
with the mistaken belief that she would pay B̂(x̃) for action x̃. However,
she ends up paying B̃(x̃) + B(x∗) for action x∗.21
The individual’s “true” surplus is −B̃(x̃) ≤ 0. In addition to all the
joint surplus, the actor extracts the maximum revaluation price from
the individual; the actor’s profits are B(x∗) − C(x∗) + B̃(x̃).
2. If the individual is initially capable, then she accepts a transaction with
the correct belief that she would pay B̂(x1) for action x1.
The individual obtains zero joint surplus from transacting. The actor
21Whether this is the result of renegotiation or initial transactional design is immaterial.
As the proof of Proposition 3 will clarify, the initial transaction is renegotiation-proof.
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obtains all the joint surplus; her profits are B̂(x1) − C(x1).
Proof of Proposition 3
This proof first finds each equilibrium under the assumption that renego-
tiation does not take place, and then checks that the equilibrium transaction is
indeed renegotiation-proof.
Let (x′, p′) denote what, at the time of formation of the transaction, the
incapable individual believes she would choose. Her participation constraint
is:
B̂(x′) − p′ ≥ 0. (PC′)
Implicit in the formulation of (PC′) is that the incapable individual is naive
at the time of contract formation; she mistakenly believes that her willingness
to pay does not change to B later.
The actor may profit from the incapable individual’s time-inconsistent
willingness to pay. More precisely, the actor may design two possibility
different action-price pairs, (x′, p′) and (x, p), and put them both in the terms
of the transaction. This can exploit the incapable individual’s initial belief
that she would choose (x′, p′) instead of (x, p):
B̂(x′) − p′ ≥ B̂(x) − p, (C1)
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but she subsequently has the incentive to choose (x, p) instead of (x′, p′):
B(x) − p ≥ B(x′) − p′. (C2)
To ensure the incapable individual chooses the action-price pair designed
for her, the following incentive-compatibility constraint must hold:
B̂(x′) − p′ ≥ B̂(x̂) − p̂, (IC′)
where (x̂, p̂) is the action-price pair designed for the capable individual.
The following participation and incentive-compatibility constraints re-
spectively ensure that the capable individual accepts the transactional terms
and chooses the action-price pair designed for her:
B̂(x̂) − p̂ ≥ 0 (P̂C)
B̂(x̂) − p̂ ≥ B̂(x) − p. (ÎC)
The availability of (x′, p′) requires an additional incentive-compatibility
constraint to ensure that the capable individual does not choose (x′, p′):




The actor maximizes her expected profits (Π) by choosing action-price




The following will find action-price pairs that maximize the actor’s ex-
pected profits subject to constraints (PC′), (C2), (IC′), (P̂C) and (ÎC
′
), and
will conclude with showing that the chosen action-price pairs indeed satisfy
the remaining constraints.
Some algebra reveals (IC′), (ÎC
′
) bind, implying
B̂(x′) − p′ = B̂(x̂) − p̂. (2)
Holding the action choices and price p fixed, the actor can raise prices
p′, p̂ without losing any profit until (C2) binds: p′ = B(x′) − B(x) + p.22 A
substitution exercise then transforms (2) to
B̃(x′) + B(x) − p = B̂(x̂) − p̂, (?′)
where B̃ = B̂ − B.
Then, still holding the action choices fixed, the actor can increase prices
22Except perhaps (PC ′), (P̂C). This step will ignore these constraints, and a subsequent
step will ensure that they hold.
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p, p̂ until each side of (?′) drops to 0, when (PC′), (P̂C) bind:

p = B̃(x′) + B(x)
p̂ = B̂(x̂).
(3)




B̃(x′) + B(x) − C(x)
]





Hence the action choices are characterized by x′ = x̃ ∈ argmax(B̃),
x = x∗ ∈ argmax(B − C), and x̂ = x1 ∈ argmax(B̂ − C). Observe that x, x1
are renegotiation-proof.
It remains to check that constraints (ÎC), (C1) are satisfied. Some algebra
using the actor’s choices of prices and actions transforms both (ÎC), (C1) into
B̃(x̃) ≥ B̃(x∗),
which holds because x̃ ∈ argmax(B̃). 
Proposition 3 shows the observations made in Section B.2 are robust to
the possibility of renegotiation. The incapable individual’s “true” surplus
from transacting is −B̃(x̃); she loses her maximum revaluation price. This
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transaction exploits her whenever her incapacity makes her more willing to
pay: −B̃(x̃) < 0.
Proposition 4 below considers the equilibrium implications of introducing
a power to avoid transactions for want of capacity when renegotiation is
permitted.
Proposition 4. Suppose renegotiation is permitted before the actor takes any
action, and there is a power of avoidance. The equilibrium has the following
properties:
1. In the event that the individual is initially incapable, the terms of the
initial transaction include an action-price pair (x, p) that sets the actor’s
expected benefits as the reasonable price and her expected costs as the
sum of the individual’s “true” benefit and a weighted amount of the
information rent.23 Through renegotiation, the actor ends up taking
action x∗.
The individual’s “true” surplus from transacting is B(x) − R(x). The
remaining joint surplus goes to the actor, whose profits are B(x∗) −
C(x∗) − B(x) + R(x).
2. In the event that the individual initially has capacity, the actor expects
to take action x1. The actor expects to obtain the joint surplus from
23See infra equation (7) for a formal and precise description of the initial equilibrium action
targeting the incapable individual.
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transacting less the information rent.24
Proof of Proposition 4
This proof first finds the equilibrium terms of the initial transaction under
the assumption that the initially-capable individual does not renegotiate, and
then checks that her action-price pair specified by those transactional terms
is indeed renegotiation-proof. This strategy allows the actor to design any
renegotiated transaction with the knowledge that the individual who has the
incentive to renegotiate was initially incapable.
When renegotiating with the initially-incapable individual, the actor offers
new transactional terms comprising an action-price pair (xR,PR) to maximize
her profits
PR − C(xR)
subject to the individual having the incentive to accept this new transaction:
B(xR) − PR ≥ B(x) − R(x) (4)
where (x, p) is the action-price provided by the initial transaction, and the
right-hand side of inequality (4) is the individual’s payoff from executing the
24Formally, the capable individual’s transactional price is B̂(x1) − I(x), where x is the
initial action targeting the incapable individual.
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initial transaction and then avoiding it in order to pay the reasonable price
rather than the agreed price. As the proof of Proposition 2 has explained, the
power of avoidance prevents the actor from expecting to receive more than the
reasonable price R(x) for taking action x; that is, p ≤ R(x).
Tomaximize profits subject to (4), the actor chooses xR = x∗ ∈ argmax(B−
C) and
PR = B(x∗) − B(x) + R(x). (5)
At the time of designing the initial transactional terms, the actor can
anticipate the possibility of renegotiation. She can choose action-price pairs





+ (1 − µ) [p̂ − C(x̂)]
which becomes the following after a substitution exercise using (5):
µ [B(x∗) − C(x∗) − B(x) + R(x)] + (1 − µ) [p̂ − C(x̂)] . (6)
For reasons stated in the proof of Proposition 2, the actor’s choices are
subject to constraints (LC), (PC), (IC), (P̂C) and (ÎC). (Unlike in the proof of
Proposition 3, the existence of a power of avoidance implies that the initially-
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incapable individual is now no longer bound by any exploitative action-price
(x′, p′). Hence constraints (C1), (C2), (IC′), (PC′), (ÎC
′
) in that proof no
longer apply here.)
For reasons stated in the proof of Proposition 2, holding the actions x, x̂
fixed, the actor chooses p = R(x) and p̂ = B̂(x̂) − B̂(x) + R(x). A substitution
exercise using these prices then transforms (6) into
µ [B(x∗) − C(x∗) − B(x) + R(x)] + (1 − µ)
[
B̂(x̂) − C(x̂) − B̂(x) + R(x)
]
.
Hence the actor chooses x̂ = x1 ∈ argmax(B̂ −C) for the initially-capable
individual, which is renegotiation-proof. The action chosen for the incapable
individual under the initial transactional terms is
x ∈ argmax{µ(R − B) − (1 − µ)I} (7)
where I is the information rent. Upon recovering from her incapacity and
through renegotiation, the initially-incapable individual chooses x∗. 
Proposition 4 first confirms renegotiation does not affect the observations,
made in Section B.3, that introducing a power to avoid transactions for want of
capacity mitigates potential exploitation but encourages opportunistic avoid-
ance. With a power of avoidance, the claimant can reduce the price that the
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actor can impose on the initially-incapable individual. However, the actor’s
expected returns are reduced to the reasonable price. Moreover, transacting
with the initially-incapable individual would require the actor to pay informa-
tion rent to the initially-capable individual. In sum, the power of avoidance
reduces the actor’s expected returns and increases her expected costs. These
effects dampen the actor’s incentives to transact in the first place.25
25The actor’s equilibrium transactional practice avoids dealing with the initially-incapable
individual if the reasonable price following successful avoidance is too small, or if the
weighted information rent is too high. Formally, an application of (7) shows the actor chooses
x = x0 if R(x1) − B(x1) < 1−µµ I(x1).
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